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     ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis investigates value creation in MBO transactions and the effect of earnings 
management on the perceived performance improvements following buyout. Various samples 
of buyouts are used to examine earnings management and performance, however, especial 
attention is given to private-to-private MBOs. We find that MBOs and private equity sponsors 
generate little additional value after controlling for selection bias. MBO performance peaks in 
the year preceding MBO, a result that could indicate practice of earnings management before 
MBO transactions. Further analysis of accounting numbers reveals that managers of private 
firms inflate earnings prior to MBO. The earnings management practice and resulting accrual 
reversals have substantial impact on the subsequent performance. We also show that earnings 
management is mainly practiced by private non-family firms while family firms do not 
engage in earnings management prior to MBO transaction. The presence of a private equity 
investor in the team tends to constrain practice of earnings management in MBOs, while 
private equity investors tend to inflate earnings at the time of exit. Overall, the results suggest 
that value gains or losses subsequent to buyout do not fully reflect operational activities. 
Selective investment strategies of private equity funds and earnings management influence 
performance. Key to understanding performance is the distinct managerial and ownership 
motivations for undertaking an MBO that vary across different types of buyouts.
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    CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
Central to the justification of increasing management buyout (MBO) activity is the potential 
to create additional value. The emergence of a vibrant MBO environment in 1980s led to the 
discussion of public company as a viable organisational governance form. Jensen (1986) and 
others argued that public companies are plagued by conflicts of interest between managers 
and shareholders, which can be eliminated or at least mitigated by going private through 
MBO transactions. MBO form of private ownership would offer benefits that cannot be 
provided by simply delisting and going private without MBO. In fact, privately held firms are 
also often acquired by their management in MBO deals. Therefore, the literature suggests 
that, MBO is a superior form of organisation (Jensen, 1989). One implication of this argument 
is that elimination of agency problems and improving managerial focus on profitable strategic 
operations would translate into better performance. 
The extensive literature on MBO performance suggests that MBOs offer at least partial 
improvements to company governance. The research often recognises that incentive 
realignment resulting from removal of moral hazard and improved monitoring is vital to the 
value creation. Less often recognised is, however, that a strategic event like MBO can present 
its own moral hazard problems that might influence performance. The bidding wars between 
incumbent management team and private equity sponsors in the mega buyout of RJR Nabisco, 
which was eventually sold for a 45% higher price per share than the original price offered by 
managers, set the most well-known example of moral hazard problems existing in MBOs.  In 
a similar vein, managers may have opportunistic incentives to manage earnings prior to MBO 
transaction. If managers engage in earnings management, the subsequent performance is 
likely to be affected due to accruals reversals. The impact of accrual reversals on performance 
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is documented in the IPO and SEO literature (Rangan, 1998; Teoh et al., 1998b). As far as 
buyouts are concerned, Perry and Williams (1994) and others show presence of earnings 
management practice in PTP buyouts, however, they do not examine the effects associated 
with performance. This study examines MBO performance, earnings management and the 
relationship between the two. With the exception of few recent studies (e.g., Meuleman et al., 
2009; Jelic and Wright, 2011; Boucly et al., 2011), the focus of buyout research remains 
fixated at public-to-private MBOs which represent a small portion of the buyout market 
(Stromberg, 2008). There is also a need to distinguish between public and private forms of 
ownership in their motivations to undertake buyout since different motivations impose 
distinct firm prospective. This study recognises that buyouts are comprised of both public and 
private firms as well as various forms of ownership structures. The main subjects of interest in 
this thesis are, therefore, MBOs of privately held firms. 
This thesis is motivated by the paucity of research on private-to-private buyouts. This 
research questions the ability of private-to-private MBOs to create operational value and 
examines their non-operational practices in doing so. Of particular concern is the 
sustainability and generalisability of the so-called buyout superiority. This research examines 
performance and earnings management practices of buyouts as well as managerial 
motivations for earnings management in private firms across various ownership and buyout 
types to find an answer. 
An overview of the literature is presented in Chapter 2. Especial emphasis is given to the 
sources of operating gains and value creation mechanisms in buyouts. The realisation of 
buyout investment and the roles of PE sponsors in facilitating value creation are also briefly 
addressed. The chapter concludes by identifying potential areas of further research.  
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The first empirical study presented in Chapter 3 examines operating performance of 412 UK 
MBOs completed between 2000 and 2009. The sample consists of private-to-private and 
divisional buyouts. Results indicate that performance improvements are mostly limited to the 
first three years following transaction. MBO profitability remains better than industry from 
two years before buyout to fifth buyout year. MBO profits peak in the year preceding 
transaction. MBOs backed by private equity (PE) sponsors consistently have higher profits 
and growth than non-backed MBOs. Buyouts and PE firms, however, generate little or no 
additional value following transaction. Rather, they appear to capitalise on the good firm 
prospects. Therefore, the higher profitability of PE-backed MBOs might be the result of a 
selective investment strategy by PE firms. However, earnings management practices may also 
be partly responsible for the performance peak before MBO. The research must, therefore, 
distinguish between the two explanations. 
Chapter 4 examines earnings management prior to MBOs and the subsequent performance. 
Existing research indicates practice of earnings understatement prior to public-to-private 
MBOs (e.g., Perry and Williams, 1994) and that upwards earnings management may 
negatively influence the subsequent financial performance (e.g., Teoh et al., 1998b; Jo and 
Kim, 2007). Therefore, we test whether post-buyout performance can be explained by 
earnings management carried out before MBO. The study comprises 291 private-to-private 
MBOs. We are not aware of any buyout study that examined the earnings management in 
privately held firms and the relationship between earnings management and performance. In 
the UK, one recent study (Mao and Renneboog, 2013) investigating earnings management in 
public-to-private MBOs emerged in the course of writing the thesis. The results contradict 
prior research on public-to-private MBOs. Privately held firms engage in upwards earnings 
management one year before MBO. We speculate that private firms have different agency 
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problems from public firms and managers are consequently expected to behave differently. 
We find, however, that earnings management is significantly and negatively associated with 
performance changes in the next three years following transaction. This result implies that 
post-buyout operating gains might be diluted due to accrual reversals. The recent evidence 
from buyouts showing smaller performance gains might be partly an unintended consequence 
of including large number of private-to-private MBOs in research samples. Likewise, the 
large performance gains documented for early buyouts might be a result of the strong focus of 
performance studies on public-to-private MBOs. 
In Chapter 4 we speculated that upwards earnings management is a result of different agency 
problems faced by private firms. Chapter 5 sheds more light on the earnings management 
practices of managers prior to MBO transactions. We segregate private firms based on family 
and non-family ownership status and use additional samples from MBI deals and secondary 
MBO exits to compare earnings management motivations. The results indicate that 
differences exist along the lines of family vs. non-family MBOs and full vs. divisional MBOs. 
Family firms do not manage earnings while non-family firms manage earnings upwards. 
Consistent with Chou et al. (2006) and Cao (2008), the findings also highlight the shifting 
incentives of PE sponsors at the time of exit. PE sponsors tend to reduce earnings 
management practice prior to MBO deals and tend to inflate earnings prior to secondary MBO 
exits. The results emphasise that buyout is a heterogeneous organisational form and 
generalised statements about buyouts might produce misleading conclusions. 
This research makes several important contributions to the buyout literature. We use a novel 
set of MBO transactions to provide recent evidence on MBO performance and earnings 
management and show that PE sponsors and buyouts in general create little additional value. 
The value gains or losses do not represent operational activities due to selective investment 
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strategy of PE funds and earnings management practice preceding buyouts. We document that 
privately held firms have different reasons and motivations for undertaking an MBO, which is 
manifested by their distinct upward earnings manipulation behaviour prior to transaction. We 
also demonstrate that post-buyout performance changes can be partially explained by earnings 
management. Therefore, we infer that existing research on value creation in buyouts is likely 
to be biased. The research shows that differences not only exist between MBOs of public and 
privately held firms, but also between MBOs of private family and non-family firms. This 
research provides the first test of earnings management in family MBOs and in private-to-
private MBOs in general. 
The remainder of the thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the existing literature 
on buyout performance and value creation. Chapter 3 examines performance of UK MBOs. 
Chapter 4 investigates earnings management in private-to-private MBOs and documents the 
relationship between earnings management and post-buyout performance. Chapter 5 provides 
additional evidence on the earnings management prior to MBO transactions. Chapter 6 offers 
concluding remarks of the thesis.  
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   CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
An acquisition is called management buyout (MBO) when the firm equity is fully or partially 
acquired by the incumbent management team often with the participation of private equity 
(PE) investors (Wright et al., 1994). In many cases the ability of managers to self-finance a 
takeover is limited due to large amounts of capital required, thus they often resort to external 
borrowing and seek financial support from buyout specialists (DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 
1987). These buyouts partly financed by debt are called leveraged buyout (LBO). MBO and 
LBO terms often overlap since personal wealth of managers may not be large enough to 
finance the entire takeover. Acquisition of a firm by an outside management team is called 
management buy-in (MBI). While MBOs are often negotiated in friendly terms, MBIs are 
more likely to be hostile transactions where incumbent management cannot realise the value 
creation potential (Robbie and Wright, 1995). Consequently outsiders who discover the firm 
potential may bid for acquisition. For example, the management buy-in of retailer stores chain 
Gateway, also known as Somerfield, was one of the largest hostile buy-ins in the UK and 
valued the company at £2,157 million in 1989 (Robbie and Wright, 1996). However, 
incoming managers often face unexpected problems (Wright et al., 1995). Existing managers 
are informed about these problems and do not continue with the purchase since they do not 
see a feasible MBO opportunity. Therefore MBIs are more likely to occur when an MBO is 
not possible (Jelic, 2011). 
The emergence and rise of L/MBO activity is associated with the changing role of 
institutional investors and the lack of appropriate control mechanisms (Jensen, 2010). The 
subsequent increase in agency costs resulted in free cash flows invested in unprofitable 
diversification projects (Jensen, 1986), which led to a wave of mergers and acquisitions as 
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well as emergence of LBO and MBO market (Renneboog and Simons, 2005). However, the 
intense L/MBO activity in the late 1980s was associated with the increasing number of 
bankruptcies resulting in anti-takeover legislative measures and nearly terminating L/MBO 
activity until its re-emergence in 1997 (Kaplan and Stromberg, 2008). These so-called first 
and second buyout waves are characterised by different market trends. The first wave 
L/MBOs are often large companies acquired using high levels of debt while the second wave 
witnessed more investor interest in small and private firms financed with lower levels of debt 
(Renneboog and Simons, 2005; Guo et al., 2011) as well as the rise of secondary buyouts 
(Zhou et al., 2013).  
L/MBO transactions occur worldwide in a variety of industries, and target both private and 
public companies (Stromberg, 2008). The literature has largely focused on public-to-private 
(PTP) buyouts although they form only a minority of all transactions. Stromberg (2008) 
reports that PTPs account for 6.7% of the worldwide buyout population in terms of number of 
deals and 28% of the all transactions in terms of value. The remainder is accounted for mostly 
by divisional, secondary and private-to-private buyouts where family-owned and other 
privately owned companies arrange a buyout, which implies that the motivations behind 
L/MBOs are not limited to solving principal-agent conflicts in public companies. In 
recognition of this fact, this study places the emphasis on non-PTP buyouts. 
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews theoretical and empirical 
literature on L/MBO value creation. Section 3 discusses buyout longevity and exit strategies. 
Section 4 dwells on third party certification and the role of PE investors in buyouts. Section 5 
concludes the chapter. 
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2.2 Motivations of Management Buyouts and Sources of Value Gains 
The destruction of value by managers generates large profit opportunities which can be 
captured by innovative organisational structures such as MBO (Jensen, 2010). The separation 
of ownership and control mechanisms create agency problems between managers and 
shareholders that managers are able to exploit in the absence of strict monitoring (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1986), leading to deviations from shareholder value maximisation. 
The agency conflicts might be especially strongly pronounced for diversified companies 
lacking a core business focus and a consistent investment strategy. The conflicts in these 
companies can arise between managers and shareholders, and between parent organisation 
and divisions. The divisions of large and diversified companies are usually constrained by the 
centralised strategies of the parent, which precludes the division managers from utilising the 
true capacity. The realisation of true capacity is particularly observed in privatisation buyouts 
which are more likely to be forced to behave within the limits of central policies (Jones, 1992) 
and grow fast when these constraints are removed (Wright et al., 1994). Therefore, division 
managers who realise this potential might seek to take it over in an MBO transaction. In cases 
where managers are mainly responsible for the value destruction with their entrenchment 
behaviour (Fama and Jensen, 1983), outside investors and management may team up to 
acquire the firm. The presence of outside investors and ensuing concentrated ownership 
following MBO provide the necessary levels of incentives and monitoring to realign the 
managerial objectives with firm objectives (Jensen, 1989; Gilhully, 1999). For publicly listed 
firms, going-private through an MBO could be a defensive strategy by managers against 
hostile takeover attempts (Renneboog and Simons, 2005). In many cases, managerial wealth 
is insufficient to buy the entire firm share, thus management team agrees to PE sponsorship in 
exchange for several concessions such as giving PE firms board seats and control roles (Barry 
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et al., 1990). In family firms, MBO could be a result of family succession issues when no 
suitable member of family exists to succeed the retiring generation (Howorth et al., 2004).  
2.2.1 Incentive Realignment Hypothesis  
The removal of agency conflicts and managerial entrenchment behaviour through MBO 
provides the motivation for undertaking MBO.  Incentive realignment hypothesis proposes 
that reunification of ownership and control and ensuing concentrated ownership allow 
managers to create value (Renneboog and Simons, 2005). This is particularly true for public-
to-private transactions that suffer more from agency problems due to their dispersed 
ownership structure. Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that increased managerial ownership 
could improve financial performance because managers have greater stakes in value 
increasing actions. Managers, having substantial ownership share following buyout, are likely 
to work more diligently towards value maximisation. Moreover, the motivations of managers 
may be strengthened by the presence of an active PE investor, who sets performance targets 
for managers and monitors them through equity ratchets by which the managerial ownership 
may increase or decrease conditional upon meeting performance targets (Wright et al., 1994).  
The opponents of incentive realignment hypothesis argue that increasing managerial 
ownership could exacerbate financial performance due to managerial risk aversion (Fama and 
Jensen, 1985) and risk-averse managers can reject high-risk but more profitable projects in 
favour of low-risk but less profitable projects (Holthausen and Larcker, 1996). High levels of 
managerial ownership may render the management indifferent to board restructuring and 
delay the restructuring process that often takes place following buyout (Franks et al., 2001). 
Demsetz (1983) and Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that concentrated managerial ownership 
might give managers effective control over the organisation and disciplining mechanisms, 
resulting in monitoring mechanisms becoming ineffective. Contrary to the implications of 
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incentive realignment, managerial risk aversion and entrenchment hypotheses suggest that a 
decrease in managerial equity could lead to performance improvements (Holthausen and 
Larcker, 1996). 
2.2.2 Control Hypothesis 
Control hypothesis suggests that wealth gains from L/MBOs are largely due to increasing 
quality of monitoring. Grossman and Hart (1980) argue that investment in monitoring 
activities will be limited in companies with dispersed ownership since an investment by one 
shareholder will provide benefit to all shareholders. After MBO, however, the number of 
shareholders will be fewer and stakeholders will have stronger incentives to invest in 
monitoring (Admati et al., 1994). Fewer shareholders and high ownership concentration imply 
that a main source of wealth gains is a reduction in agency costs (Renneboog and Simons, 
2005). Consistent with control hypothesis, evidence shows that L/MBO boards convene more 
frequently than those of public companies (Kaplan and Stromberg, 2008). The increasing 
quality of interaction and communication between shareholders therefore result in a more 
efficient management mechanism. 
2.2.3 Free Cash Flow Hypothesis 
Postulated by Jensen (1986), free cash flow hypothesis argues that L/MBOs eradicate agency 
problems between managers and shareholders that stem from inefficient use of cash flows in 
firms with few positive net present value projects, thereby creating wealth-increasing effects. 
Murphy (1985) claims that managers tend to build empires, which means retaining resources 
to grow beyond optimal size and consequently invest in suboptimal projects. An L/MBO has 
disciplinary effects by virtue of high leverage; it solves cash allocation problems and allows 
managers to allocate surplus cash to debt payments rather than investing in unprofitable 
projects. The disciplinary effects of buyout are more pronounced for mature firms with 
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abundant cash but low growth opportunities (Jensen, 1986). High-growth firms with 
profitable investment opportunities but no surplus cash are likely to have different agency 
problems and not benefit from the disciplinary effects of leverage. Opler and Titman (1993) 
examine determinants of LBO activity. They find that free cash flow problems and financial 
distress costs are important determinants of which firms undertake LBOs. Consistent with the 
free cash flow hypothesis, their results indicate that high cash flow firms simultaneously 
having low Tobin’s q (proxy for incentive alignment) are more likely to undertake an LBO. 
The deterrent effects of financial distress costs suggest that debt financing is crucial to 
realising LBO gains. Firms with low financial distress costs might benefit from the 
disciplinary effects of debt by undertaking an LBO. Recent studies, however, present a 
challenge to Jensen’s free cash flow theory. For example, Weir et al. (2008) document that 
PTP buyouts in the UK market do not have excess cash prior to buyout transaction. Similarly, 
Datta et al. (2013) find that going private LBOs have high leverage than their non-buyout 
industry counterparts prior to buyout, suggesting that reducing excess cash through leveraging 
is not a primary motivation for undertaking buyout. In the same vein, Cohn et al. (2015) show 
that PTP buyouts maintain high leverage levels following buyout and do not reduce leverage 
even though they have excess cash to pay down debt. This is inconsistent with the Jensen’s 
theory since it argues that excess cash in LBOs should be used to pay debt. They conclude 
that public firms attempt to change their capital structure through LBOs rather than acting on 
a purely transactional basis and the persistence of post-buyout high leverage brings substantial 
wealth benefits due to tax shield. 
2.2.4 Tax Shield Hypothesis  
Lowenstein (1985) argues that tax deductions can be an important source of wealth in highly 
levered LBOs and leads investors to pay a premium over the share price. This argument, 
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however, ignores other tax-creating operations that arise following buyout. Jensen (2010) 
notes that if buyout specialists pay a premium over the market value, the shareholders would 
realise these capital gains in their income and pay more income tax. MBOs also engage in 
thorough restructuring activities and sell non-core assets subsequent to buyouts, which is 
likely to generate additional tax payments on sale. The tax-generating asset sales may offset 
the gains from tax deductions on interest payments. Moreover, realignment of managerial 
incentives and other performance-improving activities are likely to increase taxable income. 
In addition, external financing providers ensure that managers prioritise debt payments after 
the buyout (DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 1987). Therefore, interest payments will decline along 
with decreasing debt levels over time, creating less tax shield every post-buyout year. In 
contrast with DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1987), Cohn et al (2015) show that LBO managers do 
not prioritise debt payments following buyout. They document a persistent high leverage in 
the five years following LBO transaction, suggesting that the value of the wealth generated by 
tax shield might be higher than previously estimated. Kaplan (1989a) finds that half of the 
LBOs pay no tax in the first year following buyout. However, average tax payments return to 
pre-buyout levels by third post-buyout year due to performance improvements and partial 
retirement of debt. This result is consistent with tax shield argument, but also shows that tax-
deductible interest does not entirely eliminate tax obligations.  
2.2.5 Wealth Transfer Hypothesis  
Critics of buyout investors suggest that L/MBOs create value by expropriating stakeholder 
wealth (Jensen, 1989). Wealth transfer to shareholders may occur in the form of higher 
dividend payments, issuance of debt of equal or higher seniority (Jensen, 1989; Renneboog 
and Simons, 2005), false pricing through earnings management prior to buyout transaction 
(Perry and Williams, 1994), and asset stripping behaviour (Wright et al., 2009). An 
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unexpected issue of debt could lead to substantial bondholder wealth expropriation in PTP 
buyouts; however, this is not a continuing problem since protective measures such as 
covenant provisions often accompany MBO transaction Jensen (2010). Consistent with 
Jensen (2010), evidence shows that covenants offering low protection against capital 
restructuring lead to a partial investment loss for bondholders (Renneboog and Simons, 2005), 
whilst convertible bond and preferred stock holders generally record significant amounts of 
wealth gains (Marais et al., 1989). The transfer of employee wealth is often alleged to form a 
significant portion of value creation in MBOs. PE investors are accused of being short-sighted 
investors, laying off employees and reducing wages to create value (Shleifer and Summer, 
1988). The existing evidence, in general, does not support employee wealth expropriation. 
Kaplan (1989a) and Smith (1990) find that post-buyout improvements in efficiency and 
performance are not related to wealth transfers from employees and shareholders.  Amess and 
Wright (2007) show that LBOs pay lower wages than non-LBOs, however, they do not lay off 
employees. Jelic and Wright (2011), in contrast, indicate that more jobs are generated 
following MBO transactions. To our knowledge, the only empirical evidence supporting 
wealth transfer hypothesis is presented by Datta et al. (2013) who show that improvements in 
productivity and efficiency are due to a reduction in the labour force and cost of goods sold. 
2.2.6 Undervaluation Hypothesis 
The undervaluation hypothesis asserts that wealth gains are the result of unrealised growth 
potential which can be exploited by insiders or outside investors who realise this potential. In 
private firms where separation of ownership and control is not clearly delineated, managers 
may not be able to exploit the true potential of the firm due to dominant role of owners in 
decision-making process. These managers would seek to buy the firm through an MBO and 
pursue growth opportunities. The undervaluation problem is also often pronounced for 
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subsidiaries of diversified companies. Wright et al. (1994) argue that divisions are constrained 
by a central parental policy and have limited ability to pursue their own strategies and create 
value. The centralised policies can lead to a decrease in the profitability of divisions and 
companies often sell these unprofitable assets to focus on the core business (Lang et al., 
1995). Acquisition of division in an MBO transaction allows managers to realise the latent 
growth potential previously restricted by the parent (Wright et al., 2001; Bruining and Wright, 
2002). Public companies suffering from cautious investor approach in cold markets may also 
choose to undertake an L/MBO to avoid undervaluation (Renneboog and Simons, 2005). The 
existing research supports undervaluation hypothesis. Opler and Titman (1993) find that lack 
of profitable investment opportunities is a defining characteristic of public firms undertaking 
LBO. Renneboog et al. (2007) document a 30% increase in share price following buyout 
announcement. They conclude that pre-MBO undervaluation, incentive realignment and tax 
shields are important sources of value gains. Geranio and Zanotti (2010) find that financial 
performance of public firms outperforms the market by 18% from buyout announcement to 
delisting date. Undervaluation of company and company size are significant factors 
explaining the positive announcement effect on share price. Datta et al. (2013) show that LBO 
equity is significantly less valued than their counterparts despite having better performance 
prior to buyout. Hence managers might be motivated to engage in value increasing 
restructuring activities through an LBO. Consistent with this proposition, undervaluation 
motivation of managers to undertake LBO is supported by improved post-buyout valuation. 
2.2.7 Heterogeneity Hypothesis 
The heterogeneity hypothesis argues that ownership structures of buyout targets are not 
homogeneous and going private MBO decision is driven by ex ante managerial ownership. 
Poor performance and incentive misalignment are common characteristics of a typical buyout 
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target; however it is the unique effects of low and high managerial equity that creates the 
distinction (Halpern et al., 1999). Stulz (1988) argues that low managerial equity firms are 
more frequently targeted by takeover attempts. Upon becoming target of a takeover attempt, 
these managers might opt to undertake an MBO in order to maintain their position. High 
managerial equity firms, on the other hand, are not concerned about hostile takeover attempts 
since managers control the vital decisions. The MBOs in high managerial ownership firms are 
therefore more likely to be voluntary transactions. However these managers may attribute 
more importance to their unsystematic risk and seek to diversify their investments to preserve 
their wealth (Halpern et al., 1999). These managers would be better off by selling a portion of 
their shares in an LBO transaction.  
2.2.8 Transaction Costs Hypothesis  
The transaction costs hypothesis argues that wealth gains from LBOs are mainly the result of 
delisting from stock exchange and consequently eliminating costs related to listing and 
mandatory information disclosure rules (DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 1987). This hypothesis is 
particularly illustrated by the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the US in 2002, which 
made listing on public markets costly for small listed firms. These companies may opt to go 
private in LBO transactions. Note that in the UK and Europe, it is also mandatory for private 
companies to disclose annual accounts while only private firms with public debt disclose 
financial information in the US. 
2.2.9 Family Succession Hypothesis 
The family firm organisations provide an important source of MBO deals. Approximately 
20% of European buyouts are acquisition of family firms (Scholes et al., 2008). The 
generational succession issues are crucial to the survival of family business and culture 
(Burkart et al., 2003). The retiring generation of family members may consider MBO as an 
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alternative succession route when there is no suitable family member to lead the family 
business in the future (Wright et al., 1992; Howorth et al., 2004). The selection of an 
incumbent manager as family successor is motivated by the fact that the relations between 
managers and ruling family members are characterised by a personal connection based and 
long-established altruistic business approach (Langli, 1983; Chrisman et al., 2004). In the 
absence of an insider (family member or manager) to succeed the retiring family, an external 
management team might acquire the business in an MBI transaction (Scholes et al., 2008). 
2.3 Accounting Manipulation Hypothesis 
The accounting manipulation hypothesis argues that ex post value gains do not represent real 
performance improvements since managers expropriate shareholders by using their private 
information and buy it below market value. Because the deal pricing is often based on 
earnings multiples, managers might have incentives to exercise their discretion over account 
numbers and to engage in earnings manipulation (DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 1987), which 
would underprice shares and enable them to pay less for the purchase. MBO proposals by 
managers, however, might be subject to close scrutiny by shareholders since the takeover 
attempt may be interpreted as an attempt to expropriate them. Moreover, a buyout proposal by 
the incumbent management team would reveal to other investors that managers view their 
firm as an attractive investment opportunity. Thus, a buyout proposal at a low price might 
generate a competing offer from another company.  As a result buyout proposals frequently 
offer a premium from 15% to 50% above market value (Kaplan, 1989b). Managers who hold 
substantial amounts of equity and are not part of the MBO team also typically sell their shares 
in the buyout (Kaplan, 1989b). This is irrational behaviour if non-participant managers have 
the same information as MBO team and if the buyout is underpriced (Jensen, 2010). Evidence 
also shows that a buyout announcement causes abnormal increases in stock price (DeAngelo 
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et al., 1984; Geranio and Zanotti, 2010) and stock prices tend to decrease following the 
withdrawal of the offer. This implies that markets expect a premium to be offered and adjust 
their behaviour accordingly. The evidence on earnings management in MBOs suggests that 
managers deflate earnings prior to public-to-private transactions. DeAngelo (1986) finds that 
public-to-private MBOs do not engage in earnings management which they interpret as 
evidence of stricter monitoring and market attention accompanying the transaction. Perry and 
Williams (1994) interprets the lack of earnings management evidence in DeAngelo sample in 
the light of more recent methodological developments and concludes that DeAngelo earnings 
management proxy does not fully reflect managerial discretion.
1
 Using a larger sample and a 
novel prediction model, Perry and Williams (1994) show that MBOs manage earnings 
downwards in the year preceding buyout transaction. Mao and Renneboog (2013) document 
practice of income-decreasing accruals and real earnings management in the UK MBOs. The 
existing evidence is, however, limited to public-to-private MBOs since no study tests earnings 
management hypothesis at the time of MBO in private firms. This hypothesis does not explain 
how post-buyout value is created should managers manage earnings prior to MBO. The link 
between earnings management and ex post value creation is studied in equity issues, where 
going public private firms publish their financial accounts prior to IPO, removing the 
financial data constraints widely present in private firm research. The related literature 
documents a negative relationship between earnings management and post-IPO/post-SEO 
performance of equity issuing firms (Rangan, 1998; Teoh et al., 1998a; 1998b; Jo et al., 
2007). Although no studies attempt to examine this link in MBOs, a similar relationship 
between earnings management and performance can be expected for going private MBO 
                                                          
1
 DeAngelo (1986) assumes that nondiscretionary accruals are equivalent to last year total accruals and models 
the discretionary accruals in the estimation year as the change in total accruals. Jones (1991) develops a time-
series regression based approach to more accurately estimate the discretionary component. Jones model and its 
modified variants are some of the most popular techniques used in the earnings management literature. 
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transactions. In this case, prior evidence on buyout performance would not reflect the accrual 
reversals following buyout. 
2.4 Empirical Research on Buyout Performance 
The literature on value creation in buyouts is consistent in suggesting that undertaking an 
L/MBO substantially mitigates agency problems between managers and shareholders, reduces 
managerial entrenchment and realigns the incentives of managers. The evidence is, however, 
less consistent in showing how and how much value is generated following L/MBO 
transaction. Considerable differences in performance are particularly observed along the lines 
of early and late buyout waves. An important characteristic of early buyout studies is their 
tendency to focus on very large and heavily publicised LBOs, which are hardly likely to 
represent the general population and buyout trends. The L/MBO research today still preserves 
its focus on public-to-private transactions, largely due to lack of data availability for private 
firms in the US; however, a growing body of literature increasingly recognises that buyouts 
are comprised of small and large firms as well as public and private firms. Table 2-1 presents 
a summary treatment of select studies on L/MBO performance. 
Early studies show large improvements in profitability and cash flow subsequent to LBO 
(Kaplan, 1989a; Smith, 1990; Opler, 1992).  Buyouts perform better than industry in the short 
and medium term (Smith, 1990), while the long term performance might be subject to shifts 
in performance (Opler, 1992). Evidence suggests that operating gains are due to real 
performance improvements resulting from realignment of managerial incentives (Kaplan, 
1989a; Smith, 1990). In contrast, the wealth transfer hypothesis is not supported. The use of 
high leverage is critical to incentive realignment and value creation. DeAngelo and DeAngelo 
(1987) find that debt levels increase from below 20% to 86% in LBOs. Managers of PE-
backed MBOs typically own a smaller fraction of shares prior to transaction than do the 
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managers of non-PE-backed MBOs. Their results suggest that the occurrence of an LBO and 
the amount of debt used to leverage an MBO deal are conditional upon transaction size and 
the ability of managers to self-finance the acquisition. LBO transactions tend to be undertaken 
when the wealth of managers is insufficient to cover the acquisition. 
The second wave L/MBOs are characterised by smaller operating gains and more 
conservative use of leverage. The samples used in these studies tend to be more 
comprehensive. For example, Boucly et al. (2011) studies 839 French LBOs while Kaplan 
(1989a) examines 76 LBOs. The second wave and European buyout studies are able to utilise 
larger samples since the samples often cover both buyout waves (e.g., Jelic and Wright, 2011) 
and European studies are not constrained by the lack of private firm financial data. The firms 
targeted in MBO transactions tend to be good performers (Desbrieres and Schatt, 2002; 
Chung, 2011). LBOs continue to outperform their respective industries (Weir et al., 2008; 
Caselli et al., 2011), however the improvements relative to pre-buyout performance are less 
pronounced (Desbrieres and Schatt, 2002; Jelic and Wright, 2011; Guo et al., 2011). Instead, 
the evidence highlights the value added by PE sponsors (Cressy et al., 2007; Weir et al., 2008) 
and emphasises the growth-focused approach of L/MBOs in post-buyout period (Boucly et 
al., 2011; Chung, 2011). This result is consistent with a scenario where post-buyout operating 
gains are harder to generate in the second buyout wave (Weir et al., 2008; Guo et al., 2011) 
and lower debt levels reduce the pressure on managers to create value (Desbrieres and Schatt, 
2002; Guo et al., 2011). The recent emphasis on post-buyout growth is also attributable to the 
analysis of a large number of small and medium private firms that often seek PE funding to 
remove growth constraints (Boucly et al., 2011; Chung, 2011).  
Studies begin to emphasise the heterogeneous nature of buyouts and non-generalisability of 
results obtained from public-to-private L/MBO samples (Datta et al., 2013) as well as 
20 
 
operating performance obtained from restricted buyout samples where only buyouts issuing 
public debt can be examined during their private period. Cohn et al. (2014) overcomes the 
financial data issue in the US using a confidential dataset and separately examines 
performance of public debt issuers and non-issuers. They find that public-to-private buyouts 
do not result in performance improvements nor they outperform their respective industries; 
however they significantly outperform industry peers when only public debt issuers are 
considered. Therefore, they argue, performance indicators obtained from subsample of public 
debt issuing buyouts are likely to be upward biased.
2
  
2.5 Buyout Survival and Exits from Buyout Organisational Form 
2.5.1 Longevity of Buyouts 
Jensen (1986, 1989) argues that L/MBO is a superior organisational form since it offers better 
managerial incentives and resolve agency conflicts between managers and shareholders 
through leveraging and investor control. Therefore, managers and shareholders would prefer 
buyout organisational form to public form of ownership.  According to Jensen, L/MBOs 
should stay in buyout form for an unspecified but considerably long period. Kaplan (1991) 
argues that the performance-improving activities in L/MBOs tend to be one-off changes, and 
once they are implemented relative benefits of future changes become relatively smaller. 
Moreover, the substantial post-buyout debt levels do not represent a permanent capital 
structure, instead they represent only a transition period in which debt was allocated to the 
management to enable the purchase (DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 1987). Essentially, L/MBO 
teams give debtholders assurances that paying debt would be their primary objective 
following buyout. Therefore control effects of debt will be reduced in line with declining debt 
                                                          
2
 These studies mainly correspond to the first wave buyouts where evidence from US PTP buyouts shows large 
performance improvements. Financial data for private firms is available in the UK; hence this issue does not 
cause a bias in UK studies (i.e., Weir et al., 2008; Jelic and Wright, 2011).  
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levels in the years to come. Furthermore, PE sponsors of L/MBOs are not permanent 
investors. Most PE firms invest through closed-end funds which raise capital from limited 
partners with the promise of above-market return within a certain time period (Kaplan and 
Stromberg, 2008). When closed-end funds approach to termination, their investors seek a 
return on their capital. Therefore PE sponsors need to realise their investment prior to the end 
of fund life. Successful exists and a good track record allow PE firms to send a positive signal 
to their limited partners and facilitate additional fundraising for future investment funds 
(Schwienbacher, 2002). In addition, PE firms are likely to have exhausted possible 
improvements and restructuring efforts, thus their marginal productivity will be higher if they 
deploy their capital elsewhere (Muscarella and Vetsuypens, 1990). Managers usually hold 
large blocks of equity in buyout firms and they are bound by agreements restricting sales of 
managerial equity. Although these restrictions incentivise managers to stay affiliated with the 
buyout firm and to exert considerable effort in order to improve profitability and performance 
(DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 1987), prolonged form of private ownership may increase costs of 
illiquidity and underdiversification, unless the value of managerial equity is realised by an 
exit transaction (Kaplan and Stromberg, 2008). Hence, buyouts are eventually exited via trade 
sales, IPOs and secondary buyouts (SBO). Kaplan (1991) finds that buyouts represent both 
permanent and transitory forms of ownership structure. 45% of buyouts exit and return to 
public ownership while a significant portion of buyouts continue to stay in private ownership 
for long periods. Jelic (2011) documents that 47% of buyouts stay in private ownership for at 
least 7 years. PE-backed buyouts are more likely to exit than pure buyouts. The evidence 
collectively suggests that buyout is not an inferior organisational form to public ownership. 
Acquisition of the buyout by another company is called trade sale exit. Trade sales are 
reputable exits for PE firms; however, they are potentially unwelcome to management to the 
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extent that buyout is acquired by a larger company and cannot remain independent (Fenn et 
al., 1997). Managers may also risk losing their positions since it is typical for acquirers to 
bring their own team to replace incumbent management team. Buyout investments realised by 
means of an IPO are called reverse LBO. Secondary buyouts represent a number of options 
that may involve complete, partial change or no change in management and in capital 
providers (Wright et al., 2000). A secondary transaction with no change in management and 
partial or full change in capital provider is called secondary management buyout (SMBO). 
Alternatively, incumbent managers can be replaced with new ones at the instigation of fund 
providers. In this case the exit transaction is called secondary management buy-in (SMBI). 
2.5.2 Exit Choice 
The exit choice is critical because investors are able to extract more value from the company 
and achieve higher returns through timing of a good exit strategy (Sousa, 2010). Kaplan and 
Schoar (2005), and Kaplan and Stromberg (2008) show that the amount of capital committed 
to PE funds is associated with past fund returns, which indicates that the return history of 
funds is taken into consideration by limited partners before committing new capital. Given the 
short term nature of the PE investment and implied return characteristics of different exit 
routes, investor should be planning the exit strategy at the beginning of the initial investment 
(Sousa, 2010). Barry et al. (1990) find that MBO firms often adopt equity based incentive 
compensation plans under private ownership. The popularity of the equity based 
compensation plans suggests that PE firms and managers might have been planning a return 
to public ownership for long time. The so-called pre-planned exit strategy is a reasonable 
expectation formed before contracting that PE investors want to abandon their investment 
either by IPO or trade sale (Cumming and Johan, 2008). This expectation is often not revealed 
to the managers since it is not an appealing option, particularly in the case of a trade sale exit. 
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However, they agree to allocate control rights to the PE investor in order to maximise the 
value at the time of exit since they are aware that markets would take into account the 
personally motivated managerial incentives and discount the value of the firm in the absence 
of PE control. 
Existing studies document that IPOs and trade sales are historically the most popular exit 
channels (e.g., Stromberg, 2008; Jelic and Wright, 2011). IPO and trade sale are characterised 
by higher returns and they are considered more reputable routes than secondary buyouts. For 
instance, Nikoskelainen and Wright (2007) report that IPO exits strongly outperform trade 
sales and trade sales outperform secondary buyouts.  Although the higher returns achieved 
through IPO and trade sales explain part of their preferability, reputation considerations also 
play an important role in the exit choice (Schwienbacher, 2002). Bienz and Lenite (2008) 
hypothesise a pecking order of buyout exits where IPO is the primary exit choice of PE 
investors by virtue of its higher return characteristics. In their model, more profitable firms 
seek to exit by IPO, followed by trade sale and secondary buyouts in a decreasing order or 
profitability. Contrary to IPO and trade sale, secondary buyouts are not considered a desired 
exit route (Bienz and Lenite, 2008; Arcot et al., 2015). However secondary transactions have 
recently seen large increases in the frequency and size. Using a comprehensive global dataset, 
Kaplan and Stromberg (2008) show that secondary buyouts account for only 2% of buyouts in 
terms of enterprise value in 1990s, however their share of global buyout market increases to 
25% by 2007. 
Instead of finding an external buyer, PE firms may also opt to sell their holding to the 
incumbent management, which is called a share buyback exit. Share buybacks are particularly 
useful in small buyouts where PE investor has liquidity concerns and cannot find an outside 
buyer (Sousa, 2010). This option might also appeal to managers who want to gain 
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independence. Finally, unsuccessful L/MBOs may declare bankruptcy in what is called 
receivership exit. In the UK, 11.6% of all buyouts from 1985 to 2008 ended up in receivership 
(CMBOR, 2008). The recent financial downturn also led to an increase in receiverships. 
Statistics show that well over half of all buyout exits in 2009 are accounted for by 
receivership exits (CMBOR, 2010). 
2.5.3 Reverse LBOs 
PE investors are experienced players (Cressy et al., 2007) and less experienced buyouts 
sponsors usually invest in syndicates that include more market-savvy ones. Thus they are 
expected to behave rationally and not realise their returns until value maximising restructuring 
activities are completed. Ceteris paribus, buyout sponsors would seek to extract as much value 
as they can from the portfolio firm. Building on this idea, Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1990) 
argue that reverse LBOs represent a case where all benefits of undergoing an LBO are likely 
to have been fully exhausted. By contrast, DeGeorge and Zeckhauser (1993) argue that 
reverse LBOs are usually indicator of good times. LBO managers need to convince capital 
markets of the firm’s favourable future prospects, thus they postpone IPO and wait for a better 
year if the performance is not good enough. This argument known as hidden information 
theory posits that managers know the expected value of the LBO firm and only choose to go 
public when performance is better than average. If performance is below the true potential, 
managers would choose to stay private. Reverse LBO decision is a product of good 
performance and justified by the well informed managers who hold the informational 
advantage over the general public. Shefrin and Statman (1985) find that investors tend to sell 
their winning investments early because of the satisfaction from realising a good investment 
and hold on to their losing investments possibly to avoid regret. Shiller (1988), in a survey of 
IPO investors, shows that most IPO investors are more concerned about non-qualitative 
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aspects of the going public firm and reputation of underwriter than pricing of the IPO in their 
investment decisions. In this case, a company or underwriter with a poor past performance 
cannot attract investors by underpricing and leaving money on table. Instead investors would 
prefer firms with good past performance. The vendors may also be reluctant to sell their 
shares if the offering price is below the true firm potential. This would suggest that reverse 
LBO decision is characterised by selection effects resulting from the opportunistic, 
performance-based timing decisions. Therefore, the buyouts exiting through IPO are expected 
to be good performers since poor performers would be filtered out in the selection process. 
The debt overhang hypothesis (DeGeorge and Zeckhauser, 1993) argues that LBO managers 
may be reluctant to raise outside equity when their debt is severely risky, since it will raise 
price of bonds and part of the IPO proceeds will go to debtholders. This implies that debt 
overhang exerts a selection effect, which leads high risk debt LBOs to stay private while good 
performing LBOs having less risky debt go public. Zingales (1995) argues that going public is 
an equilibrium decision, where incumbent owners who eventually want to sell their stake 
develop a value maximising strategy. Zingales model implies that buyout sponsors aim to 
optimise the governance structure through IPO and take LBOs public when monitoring costs 
begin to exceed benefits of concentrated ownership. In other words, reverse LBOs occur only 
when benefits of dispersed ownership outweigh costs of maintaining existing ownership 
structure.  
2.5.3.1 Pricing and Performance of Reverse LBOs 
Teoh et al. (1998a) suggest that managerial opportunism at the time of equity offerings leads 
to deterioration in performance. Information asymmetries present insiders a window of 
opportunity to manage earnings upwards around the offering. Since inflated earnings must be 
borrowed from future income, accrual reversals would cause underperformance in the long 
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run. IPO process is particularly vulnerable to earnings management due to high information 
asymmetry between insiders and outside investors at the time of going public. This suggestion 
is justified to some extent since evidence points to a lack of media coverage one year prior to 
IPO (Rao, 1993). The scarcity of information forces investors to rely on prospectuses that 
contain up to three years of financial statements (Chou et al., 2006). However, reverse LBOs 
are quite distinct from private firms going public. Jalilvand et al. (1996) assert that 
asymmetric information problems are less severe in LBOs returning to public ownership since 
markets in general have knowledge about the firm due to past trading history of LBO and 
buyout specialists. DeGeorge and Zeckhauser (1993) note that LBO managers have incentives 
to manipulate earnings even though they do not sell their shares. This is because managers 
typically retain a sizable share after IPO and a higher offering price expands their wealth. 
Managers are often aware of the consequences of earnings management, thus they are more 
likely to exert extraordinary effort to improve earnings. However they might also act 
myopically knowing fully that markets cannot be fooled (Stein, 1989). Public investors cannot 
observe manipulation directly; however, occurrence of post-IPO underperformance would 
reveal unobservable characteristics of the reverse LBO.  
The existing literature documents that reverse LBOs do not suffer severe post issue 
underperformance (Holthausen and Larcker, 1996; Jelic et al., 2005; Chou et al., 2006; Datta 
et al., 2013). However, managers and PE funds may opportunistically inflate earnings prior to 
going public (Chou et al., 2006). DeGeorge and Zeckhauser (1993) show that markets have 
considerable information about the LBO at the time of IPO. Holthausen and Larcker (1996) 
propose that performance of reverse LBOs depend on the changes in insider ownership and 
high leverage. Although reverse LBOs often state that debt reduction is a primary objective 
following the offering, their goal might be removal of excessive debt and not to erase 
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disciplinary effect of leverage (DeGeorge and Zeckhauser, 1993). Therefore, to the extent that 
they continue to have higher leverage and more concentrated ownership than industry 
average, these firms might continue to perform their corresponding industries (Holthausen 
and Larcker, 1996).  
2.5.3.2 Private Equity Investors in Reverse LBOs 
Buyout specialists typically hold on to a significant portion of their ownership following 
reverse LBO to signal their confidence (Katz, 2009). Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1990) argue 
that IPO represents the first step of PE exit and followed by a subsequent sale to an external 
investor. These shares are often sold to interested buyers after the expiration of lock-up 
clauses. Therefore IPO pricing and post-offering share performance has substantial wealth 
implications for PE investors. Since PE sponsors are repeat players in the buyout market, they 
may also suffer a reputation loss if their portfolio companies going public prove unsuccessful 
and underperform the market in the long run (Cao and Lerner, 2009). Muscarella and 
Vetsuypens (1990) study 72 reverse LBOs and find that sales from existing stockholders 
represent only 38% of the total offered shares. They conclude that reverse LBOs are means 
for partial investment realisation. Katz (2009) shows that PE investors continue to hold 
between 20.8% and 48.9% ownership share until expiration of lock-ups. Mian and Rosenfeld 
(1993) document that 39% of the reverse LBOs are taken over within three years after going 
public. The reverse LBOs that are subsequently acquired have superior performance over 
other reverse LBOs. This pattern supports the argument that IPO serves as a first step towards 
the ultimate PE exit as well as illustrating motivations of PE firms to strive for value creation. 
2.5.4 Secondary Buyouts 
The preferable exit forms of IPO and trade sale were not easily available after the high-tech 
bubble in the early years of the second millennium. PE firms faced a challenge in their 
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struggle for a timely exit and delivering returns to limited partners (Sousa, 2010), which led 
PE investors to consider SBO
3
 as an alternative exit route (Sormani, 2002). Arcot et al. (2015) 
find that secondary transactions are not the primary choice of investors and pressure to invest 
is an important motivating factor of PE funds to engage in SBOs. Funds under pressure to 
invest or to exit buyout investment more frequently use SBO transactions. Statistics show that 
aggregate value of secondary transactions increased from 4.6% in 2000 to 45% in 2010 in the 
UK (Zhou et al., 2013). The new value creation potential of SBOs has long been subject to 
debate. Kaplan (1991) argues that resolution of agency problems often generates one-off 
performance improvements; hence most of the value creation potential would be used up by 
the first investors in the initial MBO. The new value creation might be particularly difficult if 
the SBO is used as a last resort by the first PE investor to exit poorly performing portfolio 
firms (Wang, 2012). Since the outgoing and incoming PE investors often rely on the same 
mechanisms to create value (Bonini, 2015), the future prospects of SBO might be 
questionable. Jensen (1993) argues that new investors have different skill sets and they 
implement new strategies to sustain value creation. Perhaps the outgoing PE investor has not 
been able to exhaust growth opportunities and SBOs can still offer significant value creation 
potential (Achleitner and Figge, 2014). This might be a reasonable explanation in transactions 
where PE firms decide to exit MBO due to nearing termination of investment fund life 
(Sousa, 2010). Kitzmann and Schiereck (2009) argue that selling and buying PE firms 
specialise in different stages of buyout investment. Therefore new investors might extract 
more value by exercising their distinct skill sets. The re-leveraging of the firm might also 
motivate managers to work harder and create new value creation potential (Bonini, 2015). 
SMBOs have higher debt capacity since the managers are used to work with high debt (Wang, 
                                                          
3
 The secondary buyout (SBO) term is used to jointly refer to secondary management buyouts and secondary 
management buy-ins. 
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2012). If PE investor replaces management team, however, re-leveraging may not offer the 
same potential. 
Although an exit route may be planned at the time of MBO, PE sponsors are usually flexible 
about the actual exit route (Relander et al., 1994). Evidence suggests that PE firms prefer 
trade sales followed by IPO to realise their investment in buyouts (Wright et al., 1993). It is 
unlikely that SBOs will be a preferred exit route at the time of the initial deal (Wright et al., 
2000).  They occur when PE firms that seek to realise their investments cannot find any other 
available exit option (Bonini, 2015).  The search for the optimal exit time and route is likely 
to result in greater buyout longevity for SBO exits compared to IPO and trade sale exits 
(Wright et al., 2000). Kitzmann and Schiereck (1999) hypothesise that SBOs are inferior to 
trade sales since the new investor has lower incentives and ability to invest in monitoring. 
However, the continuing private status of SBOs mitigates managerial entrenchment relative to 
IPOs where dispersed ownership makes monitoring costly for public shareholders (Jensen, 
1989). The concentrated ownership in SBOs offers more efficient governance structure since 
PE funds may more closely monitor activities of the management due to their high equity 
interest.  
2.5.4.1 Empirical Evidence on Secondary Buyouts 
Evidence on secondary buyouts so far has been mixed. Bonini (2015) finds that SBOs do not 
meaningfully improve profitability and operating performance but increase the target 
company’s debt burden. In contrast, Achleitner and Figge (2014) conclude that SBOs are not 
second rate deals, they still offer operational performance improvements and equity returns. 
Sousa (2010) and Wang (2012) show that secondary buyout activity largely depends on the 
capital market conditions and SBOs occur when other exit routes are not available. Kitzmann 
and Schiereck (2009) find that SBOs still offer additional value creation potential by tapping 
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unexploited resources such as further reduction of agency costs. Zhou et al. (2013) document 
that SBO performance is inferior to MBO performance and secondary transactions create little 
additional value. Contrary to the argument that re-leveraging can provide further value 
creation potential in SBOs, they show that high levels of debt are associated with poor 
profitability. Existing evidence also indicates that SBOs are acquired at a premium compared 
to initial buyouts (Achleitner and Figge, 2014; Wang, 2012) and this premium appears to be 
driven by the availability of cheap debt (Axelson et al., 2013). Incoming PE investor is 
unlikely to buy the target at a discounted price since the first PE investor strives to harvest as 
much return as possible from the SBO exit. The new SBO investors, however, may exploit a 
window of opportunity if the outgoing PE sponsor is under pressure to distribute returns to 
limited partners and seeks for a quick exit. Arcot et al. (2015) find that secondary buyout 
pricing is associated with the vendor and buyer funds’ respective pressure to make investment 
or to exit investment. Funds under pressure to invest pay higher multiples, while funds under 
pressure to exit buyout investment sell at lower multiples. When two PE funds under pressure 
become opposite parties to a secondary transaction, it is their respective bargaining power that 
determines the final pricing. 
2.6 The Role of Private Equity and Venture Capital 
The existing research does not make a clear distinction between private equity (PE) and 
venture capital (VC) investments. The two terms are often used interchangeably in the 
research. For example, Bottazzi et al. (2004) survey of European VC industry includes buyout 
specialists. To differentiate VC investments from buyout sponsors they invent a “pure venture 
capital” term purported to represent PE/VC investments excluding buyouts. Others more 
commonly refer to buyout investors as LBO specialist and buyout specialist (e.g., Barry et al., 
1990; Cao, 2008). The common characteristics of the two investment classes include the 
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fundraising and operating methods, investing in private firms with the purpose of developing 
and eventually exiting them to realise a return on investment, holding a portfolio of invested 
firms and actively managing them (Barry et al., 1990; Gilligan and Wright, 2010). They can, 
however, be distinguished by the characteristics of their investment targets. VC funds often 
invest in early stage entrepreneurial companies lacking necessary capital to exploit growth 
opportunities while buyout sponsors invest in late stage companies with predictable cash flow 
(Barry et al., 1990). Therefore, VCs and buyout sponsors are likely to face different 
information asymmetries (Katz, 2009). 
2.6.1 Private Equity Firms as Active Investors 
PE firms are typically active investors who try to create value through long term involvement 
and holding majority equity stakes in their portfolios. Buyout specialists have great incentives 
to take the job seriously since they control an average of 60% of the portfolio firm shares 
(Kaplan, 1989a). A PE provider often specialises in a particular industry (Barry et al., 1990). 
In line with the increasing peer competition and difficulty in creating value, specialisation is 
fast becoming standard in the PE market (Wright and Gilligan, 2010).  
VC and buyout sponsors use a number of strategies to exert control over their portfolio 
companies. They typically control the board of directors and often have the power to replace 
managers (Jensen, 2010). VCs usually provide capital in stages conditional upon meeting pre-
determined targets at important points of company life cycle (Sahlman, 1988; Vanacker et al., 
2011). Staged financing enables VC sponsors periodically to assess their investment risk and 
abandon it should expected performance targets are not met (Barry et al., 1990). Sahlman 
(1988) shows that staged financing solves agency conflicts between VC and entrepreneur 
because the entrepreneur works harder to create value than if all financing were provided at 
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once. In resolving agency conflicts, staged financing is a similar mechanism to the high 
leverage used by buyout specialists in LBOs (Jensen, 1986).  
The involvement of PE in their portfolio companies suggests similarities to the large 
stockholders and active investors. These active investors have the potential to play important 
roles in monitoring and reorganizations (Jensen, 1986). Holderness and Sheehan (1988) point 
out that large shareholders can engage in value increasing or value decreasing activities. Barry 
et al. (1990) argue that frequency of PE investments indicates their value-increasing roles. PE 
firms have reputation concerns due to the fact that they are repeat market players (Cressy et 
al., 2007). Should they fail to create performance, their future fundraising and follow-up 
investments could be jeopardised.  
2.6.2 Private Equity Reputation and Venture Capital Certification 
PE firms have strong incentives to establish a trustworthy reputation. The reputation of 
buyout specialists plays a key role in their ability to raise additional funds from capital 
providers (DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 1987). PE funds have responsibilities towards their 
portfolio firms in the form of value creation and realisation of their investment through a 
successful exit. The grandstanding hypothesis (Gompers, 1996) argues that exit decisions of 
VC firms are influenced by their reputation considerations. Evidence shows that a good 
record of successful exits enhances their reputation and facilitates additional fundraising 
(Schwienbacher, 2002). Fundamental to the continuity of their fundraising activity are their 
responsibilities towards limited partners and debt providers, who seek a high return on their 
committed capital and timely repayment of loans respectively. PEs cannot afford harming 
investor relationships they built over long time. In their efforts to deliver high returns, PE 
firms are accused of asset stripping practice and being short-sighted investors (Jelic and 
Wright, 2011). Jensen (1989) argues that buyout sponsors have a long term vision; however 
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they often seek exit within 3-5 years following deal (Gilligan and Wright, 2010). The buyout 
research suggests little evidence to justify these accusations. Stromberg (2008) finds that 
quick exits account for around 12% of the worldwide buyout exits. The average PE holding 
period is longer than that of large investors in public companies (Gottschalg, 2007) and 
buyouts without PE sponsor (Jelic, 2011). The PE reputation, however, influences the holding 
period. Kaplan (1991) finds that more reputable buyout sponsors are more likely to exit 
within a certain time period. Jelic (2011) shows that PE-backed buyouts go public sooner than 
non-PE-backed buyouts. He concludes that this is more likely to reflect superior screening 
abilities and value creation skills of more reputable PE sponsors, rather than flipping 
investments. 
VC certification hypothesis posits that the presence of a VC sponsor reduces asymmetric 
information between insiders and external investors. The certification effect is particularly 
visible at the time of IPO. Megginson et al. (1991) argue that insiders might exploit their 
informational advantage and conceal adverse information to obtain a higher offering price. 
Investors are only convinced that disclosed information accurately reflects the relevant 
information when a third party with a significant capital at stake certifies the offering. 
Therefore, companies going public often use an investment banker with a good track record. 
Investment bankers can contribute to the market efficiency by confirming the information in 
IPO prospectuses (Jalilvand et al., 1996). Megginson et al. (1991) show that the certification 
role is also played by VC investors at the time of IPO. Their results indicate that VC-backed 
IPO offerings more accurately reflect the relevant information and consequently they are less 
underpriced than non-VC-backed offerings. Barry et al. (1990) document that IPOs backed by 
higher quality VC firms are less underpriced. Similarly, Gompers (1996) find that more 
prestigious VC firms are associated with lower initial returns. Recent evidence also suggests 
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that VC investors constrain earnings management practice in IPO year (Morsfield and Tan, 
2006; Hochberg, 2012). Wongsunwai (2013) documents that offerings certified by more 
prestigious VC sponsors curb earnings management prior to lock-up expiration while 
offerings certified by less prestigious VC firms do not show meaningful differences from non-
VC-certified IPOs. However, the certification role of VC might be less important in reverse 
LBOs since buyouts have a history of trading and the asymmetric information problems are 
less severe (Jelic et al., 2005). Jalilvand et al. (1996) argue that large reverse LBOs could be 
highly underpriced as they try to avoid the possibility of undersubscription. In contrast, Chou 
et al. (2006) find evidence that buyouts specialists tend to overstate earnings prior to reverse 
LBO exits to obtain a higher offering price. The literature shows, however, that PE investors 
do not fully realise their investment at IPO to signal their confidence in the future prospects of 
the firm. Barry et al. (1990) find that managers and VCs hold on to majority of their shares 
following IPO. The reduction in their percentage holding stems from issuance of new shares 
rather than sale in IPO. Likewise, evidence shows that PE firms hold significant equity stakes 
continue to be actively involved in management after IPO/reverse LBO (Muscarella and 
Vetsuypens, 1990; Cao, 2008; Katz, 2009). The continuing involvement of PE firms might 
imply that these firms would perform better than non-PE-backed industry peers (Cao, 2008). 
However, the evidence on long run performance of reverse LBOs is mixed. Muscarella and 
Vetsuypens (1990) find improvements in operating performance subsequent to offering. 
Holthausen and Larcker (1996) document that accounting performance of reverse LBOs is 
better than industry in the next four years following IPO. DeGeorge and Zeckhauser (1993) 
show that operating performance peaks in the pre-offering year; however, deteriorates fast 
following IPO. Cao (2008) finds a similar pattern in the year before IPO. He interprets the 
increase in profits as evidence of potential earnings management. The financial performance 
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of reverse LBOs is also inconclusive. There is evidence that share performance remains at 
market levels (Holthausen and Larcker, 1996) and PE-backed offerings do not outperform 
non-PE-backed offerings in the long run (Jelic et al., 2005). In contrast, Cao and Lerner 
(2009) find that financial performance of reverse LBOs is better than market and other IPOs. 
The evidence from PE-backed buyout exits does not fully support VC certification effect. 
However it is consistent with the scenario that going public MBOs suffer less asymmetric 
information problems and they are likely to be more accurately priced in efficient markets. 
2.7 Conclusion 
This chapter provides an overview of the existing MBO literature and empirical evidence on 
MBO performance. Theories attempting to explain the reasons behind increasing L/MBO 
activity are briefly presented. Vital to the common justification of MBO transactions is the 
purported performance improvements that follow MBOs. The evidence is, however, less 
conclusive than theory in suggesting consistent performance improvements. The empirical 
findings, in general, indicate that buyout performance depends on various factors such as size, 
the extent to which leveraging is used in the purchase, amount of managerial equity, presence 
of an active PE investor and sources of MBO (e.g., public firm, private firm, division). It is 
observed that shifting market dynamics and evolution of buyout transactions in late 1990s and 
2000s produce distinct performance effects. The collective evidence from recent buyouts 
suggests that differences exist in the form of deal trends, magnitude of value gains and 
preferred route of subsequent exit. Specifically, going private and going public MBOs decline 
substantially in line with the increasing risk aversion while value generation becomes harder.  
There is, however, much that needs to be done to explain buyout performance. The theoretical 
literature heavily emphasises the rationale for going private although public-to-private 
buyouts constitute a small portion of all buyouts (Stromberg, 2008). For example, Jensen 
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(1986) admits that free cash flow problems might be restricted to large, public firms with 
dispersed ownership. The accounting manipulation hypothesis is also based on the assumption 
that managers always understate earnings prior to MBO. This might be a reasonable 
assumption in public-to-private transactions; however, it does not attempt to explain how 
managers behave in private firms where the roles of managers and owners are not clearly 
segregated. Should managers overstate earnings, the accounting manipulation hypothesis 
would imply value loss in the years following MBO instead of value gain. Therefore it is 
important to adopt an inclusive approach and recognise that buyouts occur in both private and 
public firms. This study is a step towards recognition of this fact. 
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Table 2-1: Performance of Buyouts   
Authors Country Period/Sample Findings 
Kaplan (1989a) US 
1980-1986, 48 Public-
to-private buyouts 
Operating income and net cash flow increase in the three post-buyout years while 
capital expenditures decrease. Buyouts outperform their industry counterparts in terms 
of profit margins and operating income. 
Smith (1990) US 
1977-1986, 58 Public-
to-private buyouts 
Improvements in operating returns in two post-buyout years. Changes in employment 
is insignificant, buyouts outperform industry firms in terms of operating return and 
cash per employee. 
Opler (1992) US 
1985-1989, 42 Public-
to-private buyouts 
Industry adjusted operating gains increase by 11.6% in the first two years. Cash flows 
increase, R&D and capital expenditures decline. 
Desbrieres and 
Schatt (2002) France 
1988-1994, 161 
Leveraged buyouts 
Industry adjusted return on equity deteriorates after buyout. Buyouts outperform 
industry firms both before and after buyout in terms of return on investment and 
profitability. These findings do not suggest improved performance. 
Cressy et al. (2007) UK 
1995-2002, 122 PE-
backed buyouts 
Buyouts outperform industry counterparts in terms of operating profitability and sales 
growth over the first three years after buyout. Profitability in buyout year is a 
significant determinant of post buyout profitability. 
Weir et al. (2008) UK 
1998-2004, 122 
Public-to-private 
buyouts 
Post-buyout performance deteriorates relative to pre-buyout; however buyouts do not 
perform worse than comparable public firms. PE-backed buyouts perform better than 
industry average, the performance differences between PE-backed and non-PE-backed 
buyouts are insignificant. Employment falls in the first year, subsequently rises. 
Chung (2011) UK 
1997-2006, 886 
Private-to-private & 
122 Public-to-private 
buyouts 
Private-to-private buyouts grow substantially in post-buyout period. PE firms focus on 
growth and mitigating investment constraints rather than operating efficiency. 
Jelic and Wright 
(2011) UK 
1980-2004, 1225 
Management buyouts 
Buyouts improve performance relative to pre-buyout period in terms of profitability 
and output; however do not outperform rivals in post-buyout period. Change in 
employment is positive in every post-buyout year. Findings are robust to different 
performance models. 
Guo et al. (2011) US 
1990-2005, 192 
Public-to-private 
buyouts 
Profit margins deteriorate relative to pre-buyout. Profitability is largely insignificantly 
different from benchmarks. When significant gains occur, they are much smaller than 
those found in early studies. 
 
38 
 
Caselli et al. (2011) UK and Europe 
1998-2007, 344 
Public-to-private 
buyouts 
Buyouts show performance improvements in the short and medium term but cannot 
outperform the market. Performance is less positive in the long run. PE presence 
positively affects performance and efficiency. Capital expenditures initially fall but rise 
again, implying that buyouts invest in growth after restructuring. 
Boucly et al. (2011) France 
1994-2004, 839 
Leveraged buyouts 
Buyouts are more profitable, grow faster than comparable firms and increase capital 
expenditures after buyout. Post-transaction growth is particularly strong in private-to-
private buyouts. PE funds mitigate financial constraints of targets. 
Datta et al. (2013) US 
1978-2006, 208 
Public-to-private 
reverse LBOs 
PTP LBOs have higher leverage than non-LBOs prior to buyout. LBOs outperform 
non-LBOs prior to buyout; however they have lower valuations than non-LBOs. LBO 
value increases subsequent to LBO. LBOs benefit from disciplinary effects of leverage; 
however debt underutilisation is not a motivating factor for buyout. Equity 
undervaluation is the main motivation for LBO deals. 
Cohn et al. (2014) US 
1995-2007, 317 
Public-to-private 
LBOs 
Overcomes private firm financial data issue by using a confidential dataset. LBOs do 
not improve operating performance. Consistent with prior studies, subsample of LBOs 
issuing public debt outperforms non-buyouts; however this result is non-generalisable. 
Debt increases are persistent after buyout, suggesting that value of tax shield is high 
and leveraging is aimed at changing capital structure. 
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Table 2-2: Earnings Management in Management Buyouts 
Authors Country Period/Sample Findings 
DeAngelo (1986) US 
1973-1982, 64 Public-to-
private MBOs 
Managers do not systematically manage earnings prior to MBO due to 
litigation fears and detailed examination of financial statements by public 
shareholders before buyout transactions. 
Perry and Williams (1994) US 
1981-1988, 175 Public-to-
private MBOs 
Going private management buyouts show negative discretionary accruals 
prior to buyout transaction, suggesting that managers manipulate earnings. 
Downwards earnings management does not stem from declining 
performance. 
Wu (1997) US 
1980-1987, 87 Public-to-
private MBOs 
Industry adjusted earnings decline significantly prior to MBO 
announcement. Examination of discretionary accruals shows downwards 
earnings management prior to MBO transaction. 
Chou et al. (2006) US 
1981-1999, 247 Reverse 
LBOs 
Earnings are managed upwards prior to reverse LBOs. Positive 
discretionary accruals prior to IPO exit are negatively associated with post-
exit stock performance. Earnings management can explain post-IPO returns 
of reverse LBOs. 
Fischer and Louis (2008) US 
1985-2005, 138 Public-to-
private MBOs 
Earnings are managed downwards prior to MBO. Managers' earnings 
management motivations are also associated with their need to obtain 
external financing. Managers that have the most reliance on external funds 
manage earnings less. 
Mao and Renneboog (2013) UK 
1997-2007, 163 Public-to-
private MBO and LBOs 
Managers engage in downwards accruals manipulation and real earnings 
management prior to MBO transactions. MBOs exhibit more earnings 
management relative to LBOs and non-buyouts. The need to obtain external 
financing does not affect earnings management. 
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CHAPTER 3: THE PERFORMANCE OF MANAGEMENT BUYOUTS IN THE LAST 
     DECADE 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Buyouts have been at the centre of corporate finance since the intense merger and acquisition 
activities of 1980s led to the development of a vibrant buyout market. The total number of 
UK buyouts has surpassed 10,000 (CMBOR, 2010), representing around 20% of the global 
buyout activity (Stromberg, 2008). At the same time, private equity (PE) funds have grown in 
their size and importance as market players managing around $1 trillion of capital annually; 
two thirds of which is accounted for by buyout specialists (Metrick and Yasuda, 2010). As 
PE firms strengthen their foothold in financial markets, they have come to the receiving end 
of the criticism. Several high profile takeovers and bankruptcies in the last decade intensified 
the public attention on PE funds and their alleged malpractices.
4
 Researchers that analyse 
wealth creation in buyouts have found largely positive results that suggest a favourable effect 
in the wake of a buyout announcement as well as performance improvements during PE 
involvement in the target firm. However, it is understandable that public opinion remains 
divided over the usefulness of buyouts due to the fact that PE funds have a relatively short 
term vision, which results in the abandonment of targets within 3-5 years. Although this short 
term vision would increase PE investors incentives to be more actively involved in the firm to 
obtain the best possible return (Cressy et al., 2007), suspicions over whether economic 
impacts such as employment will contribute to the financial health of the general public, and 
whether the positive consequences of the PE involvement will be sustained in the long run 
are alive. 
                                                          
4
 The acquisition of a FTSE 100 company; Alliance Boots Plc and the bankruptcy of Southern Cross Care 
Homes are arguably the most publicised examples of UK buyouts. Alliance Boots is the largest buyout in the 
UK history, being valued at £11.40 ($22) billion in 2007. Southern Cross Care Homes, an operator of retirement 
houses, was sold to Blackstone Capital in 2004. Shortly after an IPO exit, the company went bankrupt in 2011. 
 
41 
 
A management buyout (MBO) has three distinctive features that make the transaction and its 
consequences remarkably different from a regular acquisition. The takeover of the company 
by its own management team, the presence of PE investors and use of high leverage are 
characteristics of a typical MBO. The value is then created through combined effects of debt, 
managerial incentivisation and an active PE investor which involves in the decision-making 
process and monitors the firm effectively. Value creation is measured as post-deal financial 
gains to pre-buyout shareholders, the post-buyout improvements in operating performance 
and as the return obtained by the PE investor following exit. These measures often suggest 
increases in the share price following the announcement of the buyout (Renneboog et al., 
2007; Geranio and Zanotti, 2010), and improvements in the post-buyout operating 
performance (Kaplan, 1989a; Smith, 1990; Opler, 1992), and large positive returns to PE 
investor in the form of IRR (Nikoskelainen and Wright, 2007). The positive outcomes of 
buyouts prompted Jensen (1989) to anticipate buyout superiority over traditional public 
corporations which would see all companies being eventually reverted to the superior buyout 
form. Although buyout markets collapsed soon after Jensen’s prediction, they quickly 
recovered and survived multiple financial crises confirming a long lasting buyout 
phenomenon. The last decade has been particularly tumultuous; starting with high-tech 
bubble and ending with a global recessionist environment it paved the way for a thorough 
evolution of buyout deals. The gradual demise of IPOs (Gao et al., 2013) and increasing 
investor risk-aversion left PE funds with an exit dilemma, resulting in a decline in the number 
of primary buyouts.
5
 In such circumstances, an interesting question that arises is whether 
Jensen’s theory still holds and whether primary buyouts can still generate value through 
operations. 
                                                          
5
 The UK buyout market recorded only 1 IPO exit in 2008 and 2009. The number of MBOs hit a record low and 
receiverships accounted for 157 of 245 buyout exits in 2009, making it the worst exit environment in the UK 
(CMBOR, 2010). 
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Studies on value creation can be broadly examined in two buyout waves. The general 
tendency in the literature is such that first wave buyouts are characterised by high leverage 
and large performance improvements while debt levels decrease and operating gains become 
smaller in the second wave. Kaplan (1989a) shows large increases in firm value two months 
before buyout announcement to post-buyout period. Industry adjusted operating income and 
net cash flows improve over three years after buyout while capital expenditures decline. 
Smith (1990) finds significant improvements in industry adjusted operating returns from the 
year prior to buyout to one post buyout year. Operational improvements are maintained in the 
medium term and they are not due to layoffs or reductions in expenditures. Similarly, Opler 
(1992) finds that industry adjusted operating cash flow to sales increase by 11.6% in the two 
years after buyout. Consistent with Kaplan (1989a), capital expenditures and R&D decline, 
nonetheless this evidence contrasts with Smith (1990). Guo et al. (2011) find that operating 
gains in the second wave are small or non-existent relative to a control sample matched on 
industry and pre-buyout characteristics. They argue that without larger operating gains, 
sustenance of high returns is unlikely under less favourable market conditions. 
The UK evidence for first wave buyouts is largely consistent with US studies. For example 
Wright et al. (1992) find significant performance improvements after buyout. The second 
wave evidence on performance is less conclusive. Weir et al. (2008) show that buyout 
performance deteriorates relative to pre-buyout period; however not outmatched by the 
performance of comparable public firms. Cressy et al. (2007) find that PE-backed buyouts 
outperform non-buyouts 4.5% in terms of profitability in the three years after buyout. The 
profitability in the buyout year is an important determinant of post-buyout profitability, 
suggesting that selectivity of PE investors could play an important role in good performance. 
In a similar vein, Chung (2011) documents that PE firms target already profitable companies. 
PTPs reduce their size and expenditures, while private-to-private buyouts are associated with 
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substantial post-buyout growth. Jelic and Wright (2011) provide evidence of better 
profitability and improvements in employment and sales, but deterioration in efficiency. 
However most of the improvements remain limited to short term. 
Apart from the changing market conditions, one of the important reasons for documenting 
lower returns in the recent buyout studies is the changing characteristics of samples used in 
the research. The recent buyout literature has increasingly recognised the heterogeneity of 
buyouts; meaning that type of buyout (LBO/MBO/MBI), and source of buyout (PTP, 
divestment, private-to-private) have different characteristics and important implications for 
the subsequent trajectory of the company (Wright et al., 2000; Nikoskelainen and Wright, 
2007). Studies using mixed samples of public-to-private and private-to-private buyouts (e.g., 
Boucly et al., 2011; Chung, 2011; Jelic and Wright, 2011) that allow researchers to more 
closely examine relative performance of different types of buyouts suggest substantial 
differences between buyouts of public and private origin. In particular, studies that utilise a 
large number of private-to-private buyouts often report small performance improvements 
following transaction (e.g., Desbrieres and Schatt, 2002; Jelic and Wright, 2011). These 
studies, however, mostly examine private-to-private buyouts in the classical agency 
framework, which is more suitable to public firms than private firms. A special focus on 
private-to-private buyouts would better address their motives and performance. 
This study examines MBOs in the UK market. This choice is imposed by several 
requirements. The European Union and UK regulations allow us to access private firm 
financial statements which are not publicly available in the US. For this reason, US buyout 
research is mostly restricted to PTP transactions, and in the PTP transactions it is restricted to 
buyouts that issue public debt during private period. However, results obtained from 
subsamples of debt issuing buyouts are likely to be biased (Cohn et al., 2014). The UK choice 
enhances sample representation and mitigates bias. Moreover, the UK market is the largest 
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buyout market in Europe, enabling us to utilise a larger and more representative sample than 
other European markets. 
This study has two main objectives.  First, we aim to examine the performance of buyouts in 
the last decade. This period is chosen due to evolving nature of buyout markets. Second, we 
aim to shed light on the performance of non-public-to-private (PTP) buyouts. Stromberg 
(2008) reports that private-to-private and divisional buyouts account for 78% of all buyouts 
while in 6.7% of the cases a public firm becomes the target of buyout. More efforts need to 
be dedicated to explain the motives and consequences of the non-PTP buyouts given their 
large share in the buyout market. We use a hand-collected sample of 412 UK management 
buyouts completed between 2000 and 2009, of which 308 are private-to-private and 104 are 
divestment buyouts. Our study adds to the growing performance studies of non-PTP buyouts, 
namely Meuleman et al. (2009), Chung (2011), and Boucly et al. (2011).  
The results suggest improvements in industry adjusted profitability and growth following 
buyout. The main focus of the post-buyout company is on growth rather than improved 
profitability and efficiency. However, we find little evidence that changes in performance are 
associated with the MBO transaction. PE-backed buyouts and buyouts in general have an 
increasing trend of profitability prior to transaction, where profitability peaks at year -1 and 
reverts to year -3 levels several years after buyout, which may indicate practice of earnings 
management or selective PE investment prior to buyout. When this potential selection effect 
is controlled, the performance improvements disappear. Divisional and full buyouts do not 
show substantial differences.
6
 The results also support the idea of a pecking order exit for 
buyouts. Buyouts that successfully complete an exit transaction have higher pre-exit 
profitability, lower efficiency and growth than non-exited buyouts. Regression tests confirm 
                                                          
6
  Full buyout refers to non-divisional private-to-private MBO in this study. 
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that PE-backing is not positively associated with performance improvements. Leverage; 
however, significantly impacts profitability, efficiency and growth despite being low. 
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: Section 2 discusses motives of buyout 
transactions and develops hypotheses.  Section 3 describes data and methodology, and 
discusses sample issues. Section 4 presents empirical results. Concluding remarks are offered 
in Section 5. 
3.2 Literature and Hypothesis Development 
3.2.1 Sources of Buyouts 
Jensen (2010) states that managers of public corporations tend to destroy a large part of the 
firm value. Post-Second World War regulations eased the monitoring activities of 
institutional investors, which resulted in extreme managerial discretion and entrenchment 
behaviour to the detriment of shareholders (Fama and Jensen, 1983). In addition, the 
dispersed ownership structure made it harder to monitor managers who invest in negative net 
present value projects because of aspirations for undue corporate expansion. The investments 
in unproductive projects waste free cash flow and the resultant deviation from shareholder 
value maximisation creates agency conflicts between managers and shareholders. Going 
private in leveraged buyout transactions removes a number of agency issues that exist in the 
public company, creating a better form of governance.  Essentially, many of the buyouts are 
financed partly by debt whose re-payments provide the basis for preventing cash 
extravagance. When forced to allocate future cash flows to debt payments, managers are 
unable to squander available funds (Jensen, 1986). In addition, they need to create extra value 
to assure financiers of their capital. Furthermore, going private creates a concentrated 
ownership structure with most of the equity shared between managers and PE investors, 
which limits managerial discretion through increasing monitoring activities and provides 
managers more incentives to meet company targets. 
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On the other hand, buyouts of private firms already have a concentrated ownership structure 
prior to buyout which makes agency motives mostly invalid for undergoing a buyout 
transaction. Instead, the rationale for buyout could be such that private companies might be 
having financial issues that could be resolved by additional equity or debt capital. Being 
unable to stage an IPO or lacking consistent lender relationships, managers of private 
companies may think of a third alternative source of capital: private equity. PE firms are 
known to have good relationships with banks, and their ability to borrow at lower interest 
rates is documented in the literature (Demiroglu and James, 2010). The support of PE would 
relax the financial constraints and facilitate the implementation of new projects that would 
remain in the waiting list without buyout transaction. In fact, the recent evidence from French 
market shows that private-to-private transactions have the strongest post-buyout growth 
among buyouts (Boucly et al., 2011). Then managers of private companies who seek further 
growth and removal of investment constraints would be better off by taking over the 
company with the backing of PE funds. According to Meuleman et al. (2009), succession 
issues in private firms can also form the basis for undertaking an MBO. Following the 
buyout, latent growth opportunities can be realised in cases where the managers have been 
extremely risk-averse. An important element of the MBO is the transfer of knowledge from 
PE investors to firm managers (Bruining and Wright, 2002), which would enable 
management to avoid a time-consuming learning process. The involvement of PE investor in 
the strategic decision-making would also enhance the ability of managers to guide the 
company in the right direction.  
Contrary to private-to-private transactions, private divisional MBOs have substantial agency 
issues prior to buyout. However these issues are related to internal decision systems and 
bureaucracy of the parent company unlike the classic agency problems between managers 
and shareholders. Fama and Jensen (1983) note that the complex systems of the large 
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diversified corporations may create agency problems in the absence of an efficient internal 
control and monitoring mechanism. Additionally, the divisions of large companies might be 
restricted in their ability to implement new projects due to central policies of the parent 
company (Wright et al., 1994). Thus, the over-diversification of the parent company may 
result in the destruction of value that creates an opportunity for division managers to seize. 
These companies are expected to grow fast when parental constraints disappear and they 
focus on the core business independently. Managers that realise the growth potential in the 
division would seek to acquire the company in an MBO transaction. The evidence on 
divisional buyouts is scarce. Meuleman et al. (2009) study the changes in profitability and 
growth potential of 238 PE-backed buyouts between 1993 and 2003.  Their results suggest 
that divisional buyouts do not cause significant changes in profitability; however they result 
in improvements in efficiency and employment growth. The evidence on corporate spin-offs 
also suggests positive changes after a spin-off. For example, Rudisuli (2005) find that market 
response to the spin-off announcement is positive, and both parent and former divisions of 
parents generate more value following the spin-off. 
3.2.2 Hypotheses on Sources of Buyouts 
To summarise above discussion, PTP and divisional buyouts might benefit from the reduction 
of agency costs and create more value following the buyout transactions with the assistance 
of PE investor. Private companies do not suffer from high agency costs since they largely 
have a familial ownership structure; however an MBO can be used to solve family succession 
issues and a buyout might provide private companies an opportunity to clear financial 
constraints. However, we see no reason to think that the subsequent performance of 
divestments and private companies will differ. The present literature on buyouts and spin-offs 
document performance improvements following the transaction, however it does not provide 
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comparative evidence regarding divisional MBO performance. Accordingly we develop 
following hypotheses: 
H1:  Management buyouts will show improvements in performance following buyout. 
H2: Private-to-private and divisional buyouts will not have significant differences in 
performance. 
3.2.3 Hypotheses on the Role of Private Equity in Buyouts 
The importance of PE is manifested in the novel business philosophy they introduced to 
markets. Before the emergence of PE, finance and consulting services were two separate 
activities provided by separate institutions. Fenn et al. (1997) explain that creators of 
organized PE institutions aimed to combine professional counselling and funding activities. It 
is this philosophy that gave birth to PE in the first place. Using their unique skills and their 
expertise in management, they are able to extract the latent potential that would otherwise 
remain unexploited or wasted. Since PE funds hold significant portions of equity, they 
actively participate in the decision-making process and appoint board members to ensure that 
the portfolio firms create value and progress in the right direction (Gompers, 1995; Cotter 
and Peck, 2001). In addition, they have strong incentives to get actively involved in the 
implementation of strategies due to the fact that they are obliged to deliver a return to their 
investors in a limited time period (Cressy et al., 2007). There is limited evidence on the 
operating performance of PE-backed buyouts partly due to difficulties of collecting data 
during private status. The existing literature largely suggests that PE investors add value 
through specialisation (Cressy et al., 2007) and early PE-backed buyouts outperform non-
buyout counterparts (Kaplan, 1989a; Smith, 1990; Opler, 1992; Weir et al., 2008). Contrary 
to the general view, Jelic and Wright (2011) find that PE-backed buyouts do not perform 
better than non-PE-backed buyouts.  
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PE firms are known to be temporary investors. Most buyout specialists invest through closed-
end funds which provide them a limited time to extract returns. Fenn et al. (1997) note that 
most investors commit capital to PE funds for “strictly financial reasons”; meaning that they 
expect to earn above-market return on their capital. Thus ability of PE firms to raise 
additional funds is dependent on delivering superior returns to their investors within a limited 
time period. To convince their limited partners that their funds are worthy of new capital 
commitments, PE firms need to produce a higher return than the average market return. 
Therefore they seek to maximise buyout performance and value. The pro-active policies and 
superior monitoring skills of PE funds, in general, have positive results for buyout companies 
both before and after the exit. The evidence shows that markets view buyouts as promising 
transactions. A buyout announcement leads to increases in the stock price of takeover targets 
(Renneboog et al., 2007), and buyout firms perform better than their non-buyout counterparts 
(Holthausen and Larcker, 1996). The post-buyout performance of the firm also has 
considerable influence on the exit decision (Sudarsanam and Nwaghodoh, 2005) and the exit 
route chosen. Bienz and Lenite (2008) argue that there exist an exit hierarchy where more 
profitable companies are exited through more reputable routes. The remaining buyouts are 
those that take more time to restructure or those unfit for a successful exit. It is well-
documented in the literature that positive consequences of buyouts continue to linger after the 
PE exit, which is best reflected in the share performance of buyouts going public. Most 
notably, stocks of reverse LBOs do not suffer from long run underperformance anomaly after 
going public (DeGeorge and Zeckhauser, 1993; Jelic et al., 2005; Cao and Lerner, 2009). 
This outcome is primarily attributed to investor confidence in PE firms (Megginson and 
Weiss, 1991) and to real improvements in the accounting performance indicators.  
The discussion above produces two more hypotheses: 
H3: Private equity-backed buyouts perform better than non-backed buyouts. 
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H4: Post-buyout profitability of exited buyouts is better than those staying in their original 
buyout form. 
3.3 Data and Methodology 
3.3.1 Data and Sample 
We benefit from two commercial databases and various internet sources in data collection. A 
three-step procedure is followed to construct the sample. First, MBO transactions from 2000 
to 2009 have been obtained from Thomson One Banker (TOB). Using merger and 
acquisitions module, our search resulted in 2,607 UK MBOs.
7
 This list contains information 
about deal date, deal value, target industry and deal synopsis. To identify our sample 
companies, we search each company on TOB and drop those that have missing information 
on PE backing status, past and future acquisitions on company Extel cards, ending up with 
601 transactions. For these 601 firms, we collect deal origin and PE sponsor information from 
deal synopsis. Separately, we obtain the list of secondary buyouts and PTP buyouts from 
TOB, cross check the samples and drop 46 matching PTP deals and 29 secondary buyouts. 
This resulted in 526 remaining MBOs. Table 3-1 summarises the data collection steps. 
     [Table 3-1] 
Necessary financial data to examine operating performance is collected from FAME. Buyouts 
often change their names following completion of the deal. For instance, Thales High Tech 
Optics changed its name to Qioptiq after a Candover Plc backed MBO in 2005. Many 
examples like Qioptiq cause difficulty in tracking companies and often lead researchers to 
exclude a large number of deals from their sample. An advantage of using FAME is that it 
reports changes in company names, which enables us to track them after buyout. To be 
                                                          
7
 The deal coverage of Thomson One Banker is much smaller than that of Centre for Management Buyout 
Research (CMBOR). According to CMBOR (2010), over 4,000 MBOs have been completed between 2000 and 
2009 while Thomson One Banker reports 2,607 MBOs in the same period. 
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included in the post-buyout performance sample, we require companies to have at least one 
year of data –excluding the deal year- after buyout. More generally, we collect data in a (-3, 
+5) event window which corresponds to maximum 9 calendar years around the deal. In many 
cases accounting items are inconsistently reported; repetitive figures in several consecutive 
years are a common characteristic of the data. We discard these years, if not the firms 
entirely, to ensure consistency of data. At the end, we are forced to drop 114 deals that don’t 
have data on FAME, leaving a final sample of 412 MBOs. The data is unbalanced panel, e.g. 
the number of observations is not equal across different years and variables. The number of 
observations changes for three reasons. First, buyouts originating from divestment of a parent 
company rarely report separate financial statements in pre-buyout years. More commonly, 
their performance is absorbed by the parent’s consolidated statements. Second, FAME 
provides access to accounting data of UK companies in the last 10 accounting years. This 
leads to a loss of pre-event data for early decade deals. This issue was also reported in Cressy 
et al. (2007) and Sousa (2010). Third, data attrition is high in the sample. In many cases, 
accounting items are intermittently reported across years. To illustrate these three issues, we 
report figures from operating income (EBIT).  In our sample of 412 MBOs, EBIT is absent 
through three pre-buyout years in 119 deals (29%), which could be attributed to data attrition, 
divisional buyout effect and/or early decade buyout effect. An extreme example of missing 
data would be the cash flow statement. Cash flow from operations is missing through the 
entire event window in 217 (53%) of the companies, while EBIT is fully missing in 20 cases 
(5%) only. 
A final issue is survivorship bias that occurs when successful buyouts leave the sample 
several years after the transaction, potentially causing performance deterioration in remaining 
buyouts. Buyout firms are often sold to trade buyers or floated on exchange markets several 
years after the deal. Less often, they fail and end up in receivership. Inclusion of exited 
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companies in the analysis after their exit would distort the results. Therefore, we exclude 
these companies from the analysis in the years following their exit, if the exit occurs during 
(+1, +5) event window. Researchers must be cautious when interpreting results since their 
exclusion would leave the sample with buyouts that are unable to organise an exit, which is 
likely to have a negative impact on the subsequent performance. The survivorship bias is 
likely to have more effect in longer event windows since most exits in our sample occur in 
the first four years after the deal. We identify exit status of MBOs, exit dates and routes 
through PE sponsor websites, www.unquote.com and www.angelnews.co.uk . We also check 
the exit status via TOB merger and acquisitions, and London Stock Exchange new IPO 
admissions. Lastly, we collect acquisition data from Extel cards previously downloaded from 
TOB. A total of 183 exits are identified through these sources. The most popular exit route in 
our sample is trade sales with 83 MBOs acquired by trade buyers. Secondary (management) 
buyouts are the second popular route with 69 MBOs sold to another PE investor or to the 
management. 23 MBOs end up in receivership and finally 8 MBOs are exited by IPO. 
3.3.2 Selection and Survivorship Bias 
Selection bias arises when a researcher is unable to use the population of interested 
companies. There could be several reasons for selection bias. For example, presence of PE 
sponsor may introduce a selection bias in the sample, because the investment choice of PE 
might not be the result of a random selection process (Katz, 2009; Jelic and Wright, 2011). 
The inclusion criteria of the researcher could also introduce a bias to the sample. Prior 
evidence shows that VC and PE investors carefully examine candidates and often lend 
backing to those with strong growth prospects (Chung, 2011). In this case, performance 
analysis would be upward biased and buyouts would outperform their non-buyout 
counterparts. One way to avoid this bias is to use non-PE-backed buyouts. However, this 
approach would neglect the value added provided by the experience and specialisation of PE 
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sponsor. The major commercial databases are known to have specific size thresholds and 
other inclusion criteria, which could force researcher to drop a portion of the companies of 
interest and introduce a selection bias. In the US, the potential for selection bias is stronger in 
buyout research because financial reporting is mandatory only for private companies that use 
public debt (e.g., Katz, 2009). In order to enlarge the sample size and cover more of the 
buyout transactions, researchers often need to use voluntarily reported financial accounts 
which are likely to be upward biased in terms of performance. The UK buyouts should suffer 
less in this aspect because regulations require private companies to report financial accounts 
without regard to their financial situation and type of the debt used. Therefore, UK buyout 
studies are able to use relatively larger portion of the population available, which would 
mitigate selection bias. 
The existing literature suggests three ways of handling selection bias. The comparison of key 
ratios from population and final samples can be useful to examine bias caused by inclusion 
criteria (Smith, 1990; Wang, 2010), and 2-stage regressions with Heckman’s (1979) 
correction term are used for bias caused by PE sponsors investment choice (Cressy et al., 
2007; Nikoskelainen and Wright, 2007; Cao, 2008; Katz, 2009; Jelic and Wright, 2011).
8
 In 
the US studies, selection bias is also addressed by re-examination of performance using only 
buyouts with publicly held debt (Kaplan, 1989a; Guo et al., 2011). In addition, performance 
benchmarks can be constructed in a manner that mitigates selection bias.  Matching buyouts 
on firms with similar pre-event characteristics would give us an approximation of an 
alternative PE-backed sample. One way to construct such industry group is matching on firms 
with similar pre-event performance as suggested by Barber and Lyon (1996). Then buyout 
performance should be largely purified of selection bias and the analysis would better reflect 
the marginal contribution of PE sponsors. Alternatively, a differences-in-differences 
                                                          
8
 See Li and Prabhala (2005) for a review of selection models in corporate finance. 
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approach can be used. In this study, differences-in-differences and Heckman 2-stage 
regressions are used to address selection bias. 
Survivorship bias occurs when a portion of the sample firms exit and subsequently dropped 
from the sample in the analysis of post-exit years since they are no longer buyouts. Contrary 
to mutual funds where low performers are dropped, the majority of non-survivor buyouts are 
successful ones which causes a downward biased estimate of buyout performance in the years 
subsequent to exit. In our sample, failed non-survivors (receivership exits) comprise 12% of 
all exits while successful ones (trade sale, secondary buyout and IPO exits) constitute 88% of 
all exits.  Survivorship bias is difficult to deal with and literature does not suggest a certain 
way to address it. It is often the case that survivorship bias is acknowledged rather than 
claiming to eliminate it completely. Less often, authors argue that successful and 
unsuccessful exits offset each other (e.g., Caselli et al., 2011), eliminating the bias. In our 
view, this approach makes a far-fetched argument. As previously mentioned, successful exits 
outnumber failure exits which would likely cause a downward biased estimate of subsequent 
performance rather than delivering a balanced estimate. As an alternative approach, survival 
time of buyouts (TIMEX) can be computed and argument can be made based on mean and 
median TIMEX. For example, Guo et al. (2011) state that the first three post-buyout years are 
the most informative because PE sponsors conduct most of their restructuring activities 
during this period and begin to seek exit after the third year. In our sample, mean TIMEX is 
48 months and median TIMEX is 47 months for 183 exits. 70% of all exits occur within five 
years after buyout transaction, 51% occur within four years, 37% within three years and 5% 
within one year. As shown in Table 3-4, mean and median TIMEX for trade sale, secondary 
sale and receivership exits are around four years. In the light of this information we argue that 
the first four post buyout years are likely to suffer less from survivorship bias and the results 
for these years should correctly reflect the status of the average buyout. The IPO exits have 
55 
 
shorter survival time; however this is unlikely to affect the conclusion due to their low count. 
All in all, it is vital that analysis of performance is terminated at exit and non-survivors are 
dropped from the sample to prevent dilution of results by already exited buyouts.  
3.3.3 Methodology 
We construct performance benchmarks following Barber and Lyon (1996). The majority of 
studies that examine post-buyout performance rely on industry adjusted performance models 
(e.g., Kaplan, 1989a; Weir et al., 2008). Although industry adjustment offers the benefit of a 
direct comparison with similar companies, it ignores past performance of sample companies 
which can influence performance in subsequent years. Barber and Lyon (1996) document that 
expected performance models incorporating firm past performance always dominate those 
that exclude past performance. However, depending on the underlying theoretical background 
and formulated hypotheses, both models can reveal useful and informative results for the 
researcher. Therefore, we employ two models of abnormal performance in the light of the 
presented hypotheses, suggestions of Barber and Lyon (1996) and previous studies. 
The first model of expected performance is a buyout firm’s past performance. 
E(Pi, t) = Pi, t-k; t= 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and k= 1, 2, 3.                   
(1) 
Where E(Pi, t) represents expected performance of a buyout company and Pi, t-k 3-year median 
of a certain variable prior to buyout. The abnormal performance is then estimated as: 
Actual – Expected: APi, t = Pi, t - Pi, t-k.                               
(2) 
The second model uses industry median in each event year as expected performance: 
E (Pi, t) = PIi, t; t= 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. Then, 
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APi, t = Pi, t - PIi, t,                                                                       
(3) 
where PIi, t represents median industry performance. 
We first calculate relevant ratios in each event year for each buyout firm. Then we compute 
3-year pre-buyout median for each ratio in order to use in performance benchmark. For the 
second model we first identify matching industry firms based on 2-digit SIC code. Finally, 
we compute relevant ratios for each firm and calculate median performance for each industry 
group. When buyout and control sample 2-digit SIC codes cannot be matched, we use 
industry medians for the entire control sample. To construct industry control groups, we use 
the population of active and inactive private companies with available accounting data. 
Active and inactive samples are merged since benchmarking on active companies alone 
would overestimate industry performance, which would result in downward biased estimates 
of post-event buyout performance. Similarly, benchmarking on inactive companies alone 
would result in upward biased estimates of performance. Therefore, a merger of active and 
inactive samples provides a more balanced performance benchmark. We assess the 
significance of the results with Wilcoxon signed rank test for medians. 
     [Table 3-2] 
Table 3-2 shows definitions for the set of profitability, efficiency and growth variables we 
employ to measure performance. Specifically, the variables are constructed as follows: 
Profitability (ROA) = Earnings before interest and tax divided by total assets, profitability 
(ROS) = Earnings before interest and tax divided by sales, leverage (LEV) = Short term debt 
and overdrafts plus long term liabilities divided by total assets, sales efficiency (SALEFF) = 
Sales divided by total assets, employee efficiency (SALEMP) = Inflation adjusted sales 
divided by number of employees, asset growth (AGRO)= The difference between total assets 
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and 3-year median assets prior to buyout divided by their average, sales growth (SGRO) = 
The difference between sales and 3-year median sales prior to buyout divided by their 
average, profit growth (EBITG) = The difference between earnings before interest and tax 
and 3-year median prior to buyout divided by their average, employment growth (EMPG) = 
The difference between number of employees and 3-year median prior to buyout divided by 
their average. For industry adjusted performance models, growth ratios (AGRO, SGRO, 
EBITG, EMPG) are computed as the difference between year t and t-1, divided by their 
average value following Boucly et al. (2011). This is due to differences between the two 
models; industry adjusted performance considers a cross-section of time while adjusting on 
pre-buyout performance involves time series. 
3.4 Empirical Results 
3.4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3-3 displays the number of MBOs across years and statistics for sample representation. 
We report Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) test for sample representation and separately test 
equality of deal values for potential size bias. The population tends to have a higher number 
of MBOs in the early years and the numbers tend to decrease towards the end of the decade
9
. 
The final sample, however, is heavily dominated by the mid-decade buyouts which may 
imply a selectivity issue in our process. The K-S statistic on yearly number of MBOs 
suggests significant difference between population and final sample (p=0.000). There are also 
differences regarding information disclosure between population and final sample. 43.7% of 
the population firms report deal values while this ratio is 51.7% in the final sample, which 
may result in a small selection bias introduced by the information availability. However the 
difference in disclosure distributions is not significant (p= 0.152). The disclosure rates across 
                                                          
9
 The decrease in deal numbers is in line with the UK trends reported by CMBOR (2010), which shows a 
declining trend in the number of deals starting with 536 MBOs in 2003 and ending with 262 MBOs in 2009. 
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years also suggest that PE firms are becoming more secretive about deals, which is reflected 
by a sharp decline from 55% disclosure rate in 2000 to 21% in 2009. The mean (median) 
buyout size, measured by enterprise value, is $88 ($16) million for population and $71 ($28) 
million for final sample. The sample median is considerably smaller than £30 million 
reported by Jelic and Wright (2011), however larger than £10 million reported by Chung 
(2011). PE-backed buyouts tend to be larger than non-PE-backed buyouts; however the 
differences in means and medians are statistically insignificant. The differences in buyout 
size are partially caused by exclusion of large PTPs and very small private deals, which is 
reflected in the reduced variation of final sample. Tests for equality of mean and medians also 
confirm more homogenous composition of final sample; the difference in means is 
insignificant (p=0.420) while medians are confirmed to be different (p=0.000). It should be 
noted that only MBOs with disclosed deal values can be included in the size statistics. The 
tests also suggest significant differences between the industrial distributions of population 
and final sample. In short, the statistics in Table 3-3 show that the final sample is not a good 
representation of the population and sample selection procedure and data limitations 
introduce bias to the process. 
     [Table 3-3] 
Table 3-4 reports the exits and the distribution of exit routes across PE backing and source of 
buyouts. There are 253 PE-backed MBOs versus 159 pure MBOs in the sample. Full MBOs 
outnumber divestments, with 308 and 104 deals being buyouts of private companies and 
divestments respectively. Trade sales and secondary buyouts are the most popular exit routes, 
while the number of receivership and IPO exits is considerably smaller. PE-backed buyouts 
account for 80% of the all exits while non-PE-backed MBOs constitute 20% of exits. 
Interestingly, PE-backed buyouts stay in the original buyout form for longer periods. 
Unreported statistics show that median holding period is 48 months for PE-backed buyouts 
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while it is 37.5 months in non-PE-backed buyouts. This finding contrasts with Jelic (2011) 
who reports that PE-backed buyouts tend to exit faster. IPO and receivership are the fastest 
and slowest exit routes respectively. Trade sale and secondary buyout exits occur around 4 
years after the initial buyout transaction. The median holding period for all exits is 47 months 
which is longer than 36 months found by Jelic (2011) and 42 months reported by Stromberg 
(2008). This pattern is expected due to characteristics of the period of interest in this study 
that exhibits an increasing trend for longer holding periods (Stromberg, 2008) and since 
arranging a successful exit has become more difficult in the second buyout wave (Sousa, 
2010; Bonini, 2015), which would result in delays on the part of PE sponsors who seek more 
appropriate exit conditions. In line with this scenario, the IPO route, which involves shorter 
holding periods relative to secondary buyout exits (Jelic, 2011) and often includes quick flips 
(Stromberg, 2008; Jelic, 2011), is less frequently used in the recent UK buyout market 
(CMBOR, 2010). Only a fraction of total exits in our sample are going public buyouts while 
IPO exits constitute a larger portion in other studies that cover both first and second buyout 
waves. For example, 42% of total exits are comprised of IPO in Jelic and Wright (2011) 
while in our study 4% of buyouts exit via IPO route. In sum, different sample and exit 
characteristics result in longer holding period for our sample MBOs.  
     [Table 3-4] 
Panel A of Table 3-5 shows the sectoral distribution of sample MBOs across PE-backing, exit 
status and exit routes. Buyouts are concentrated in three major industry groups: Business and 
Industrial, Consumer, Business Services. These industries constitute 69% of all deals and 
58% of the total transaction value. The largest buyouts are in Energy and Financial Services 
industries accounting for 7.5% of deals and 24% of deal value. Our industry composition is 
similar to previous UK studies of Weir et al. (2008), Jelic and Wright (2011), and Chung 
(2011). Overall, the concentration of buyouts in certain sectors is consistent with the view 
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that buyouts mostly occur in mature industries such as chemicals, machinery and retailing 
(Stromberg, 2008). Panel B reports the K-S test statistics for equality of industry distributions 
across PE-backing, exit status and routes. The results do not suggest significant differences in 
industry compositions with the exception of IPO exits.     
     [Table 3-5] 
To summarise, our descriptive statistics suggest significant differences between population 
and final sample. In addition, less information tends to be disclosed about MBO transactions 
towards the end of the decade. This is unlikely to be a result of database issues since known 
commercial databases offer better coverage for more recent periods (Jelic and Wright, 2011). 
Rather, it might reflect increasing reluctancy of PE funds and MBO teams to disclose 
information in line with the difficult market conditions. PE-backed buyouts have higher exit 
rates and longer holding periods compared to pure MBOs. Finally, PE firms maintain their 
core investment base of industries despite the evolution of buyout market. 
3.4.2 Performance of Management Buyouts 
Table 3-6 presents abnormal performance for the entire sample. In the first model only post-
buyout performance can be measured since the performance is benchmarked on pre-buyout 
period. The results for industry adjusted performance are presented for (-3, +5) window. Our 
findings provide little evidence of improvements in profitability. Changes in return on assets 
are insignificant while positive changes in return on sales are small (H1). Buyouts outperform 
industry firms in every year; however better-than-industry performance is not limited to post-
buyout period. There is a tendency for improvements in profitability in the years leading to 
buyout, peaking at one year before the transaction, which could imply practice of earnings 
management prior to buyout. This result contrasts with Boucly et al. (2011), who find low 
pre-buyout profitability followed by 4% increase subsequent to transaction for a sample of 
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French private-to-private LBOs. This pattern may also suggest that profitability plays a role 
in selecting the buyout target. Although this study does not distinguish between these two 
explanations, the evidence shows that post-buyout profitability remains superior in the long 
run. The findings on employee efficiency suggest slight improvements and consistently better 
utilisation of employees in both pre- and post-buyout periods than industry firms. There is a 
sharp deterioration in sales efficiency after buyout; however this result is attributable to the 
increasing asset growth rate. The sample buyouts exhibit substantial growth following the 
transaction. The median buyout has 60% more assets and 40% more sales by the end of fifth 
year. The increase in assets is consistently significant in five years while sales growth stops 
after third year. Similarly, buyouts exhibit significantly higher growth rates than industry for 
three subsequent years following the deal. There is also evidence of improvements in profit 
growth; however the growth in profit remains at industry levels. Finally, buyouts exhibit 
large increases in the number of employees. The employment increases by 24% in the first 
three post-buyout years and slightly declines afterwards. The median buyout displays 
approximately 4% higher employment growth than comparable firms in the first three years 
following buyout. The employment growth prior to buyout is smaller and insignificant, 
suggesting adoption of more growth-focused strategies subsequent to buyout. 
     [Table 3-6] 
In sum, results lend mixed support to H1. Buyouts show positive performance changes in 
terms of return on sales, employee efficiency, and growth rates. However the magnitude of 
improvements appears to be much smaller than those documented for the first wave buyouts. 
In line with Boucly et al. (2011), the results suggest that post-buyout strategies are more 
growth oriented and put less focus on profitability and efficiency improvements. The results 
are also consistent with Chung (2011) and Jelic and Wright (2011) who find weak efficiency 
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accompanied by high growth in sales and employment in UK buyouts. Although our results 
related to post-buyout performance are similar to existing recent evidence, we provide the 
first evidence that that some of the changes in performance are not specific to post-buyout 
period. Specifically, the increasing pattern of profitability prior to MBO indicates that buyout 
transaction alone cannot explain performance. In this regard, other potentially influential 
factors such as earnings management, mean reversion and PE-backing should be considered. 
Below we examine the performance of PE-backed and non-PE-backed MBOs. 
     [Table 3-7] 
Table 3-7 displays the performance of PE-backed buyouts. PE-backed buyouts do not 
improve profitability; however they maintain superior profitability over comparable industry 
firms. The first three years have the highest abnormal performance, and profitability revert to 
pre-buyout levels after fourth year. Both models suggest considerable deterioration in 
efficiency following buyout. Improvements in employee utilisation are not significant while 
sales efficiency drops below pre-buyout levels immediately after the deal. There is also 
strong evidence of high growth in assets and sales; however these changes are limited to the 
first three post-buyout years. Although profits increase by more than 80% by the end of fifth 
year, growth in profits remains at industry levels. The number of employees increases by 
26% in the first four years; however buyouts hire more employees than non-buyouts only in 
the first and third years.  
     [Table 3-8] 
Table 3-8 reports performance differences between PE-backed and pure MBOs. PE-backed 
buyouts have higher profitability starting from two years prior to buyout and persisting until 
the fourth post-buyout year. This finding implies that PE funds assess the prospects of their 
targets relative to their industries and tend to select those with promising potential. Overall, 
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PE-backed buyouts consistently have higher profitability and growth ratios, but lower 
efficiency than pure MBOs. The results for profitability and growth are consistent with 
Cressy et al. (2007), but different from Jelic and Wright (2011) who find that PE-backed 
buyouts perform better only in terms of changes in employment. In contrast, we find 
significant differences in profitability, efficiency and growth rates between PE-backed and 
pure MBOs. Therefore, H3 cannot be rejected. It is important to note that these differences are 
observed only in terms of industry adjusted performance, which does not measure 
performance changes or value added by PE funds. More importantly, differences in both 
profitability and efficiency are observed starting from up to three years prior to buyout. 
Hence it cannot be concluded that the observed differences are a result of PE-sponsorship. 
Rather results imply that differences are associated with firm characteristics, which may 
encourage PE firms to apply a selection effect in their investments. 
     [Table 3-9] 
Table 3-9 presents performance of full and divestment MBOs. We provide the first direct 
analysis of divisional buyouts and their comparison with full buyouts. To our knowledge, the 
only studies to examine performance of divisional buyouts are Meuleman et al. (2009) and 
Boucly et al. (2011) who use a set of similar performance measures; however at the same 
time fail to track performance over time. Meuleman et al. (2009) examine the effect 
divisional buyouts by means of dummy variables in regressions; however do not conduct 
univariate tests to observe changes or improvements in performance through time. Moreover, 
their sample consists of PE-backed buyouts only, which is likely to reduce information 
asymmetries across sample firms and introduce selection bias, potentially resulting in more 
uniform results across sample; an issue they also acknowledge. Their definition of divisional 
buyout dummy also does not correctly reflect the full vs. divisional buyout distinction since 
the other category in their dummy variable includes secondary buyouts as well as private-to-
64 
 
private buyouts, which have different buyout characteristics. Similarly, Boucly et al. (2011) 
rely on regressions to analyse effect of LBO on divisional buyouts. A more comprehensive 
examination of full and divisional buyouts is therefore required. The results in Table 3-9 
show that full MBOs perform better than industry in terms of profitability, efficiency and 
growth with the exception of profit growth. The better performance in profitability and 
efficiency is maintained until fifth year, while growth ratios begin to decline after third post-
buyout year. Notably, the increase in pre-buyout profitability peaks at one year before buyout 
and similar levels of profitability are preserved following the transaction. Divisional buyouts 
draw a less clear picture. Their pre-buyout profitability is inconsistent and post-buyout years 
are accompanied by decreasing profitability levels. Among two efficiency measures, only 
employee utilisation is significantly positive. There is also weak evidence of better post-
buyout growth. The growth in assets and sales are significant in the first two years, while 
profit and employment growth are not significantly different from industry. This result is 
inconsistent with the view that divisions will grow fast following the removal of parental 
restrictions (e.g., Wright et al., 1994). 
     [Table 3-10] 
Table 3-10 shows differences in full and divisional MBOs. In general, full MBOs have better 
profitability, lower efficiency and higher growth than divestments. However, the differences 
in performance are only marginally significant. Consistent with H2, there is little significant 
difference between full MBO and divestment MBO performance.    
     [Table 3-11] 
Panel A of Table 3-11 shows the performance of exited buyouts. In general, buyouts exits are 
characterised by high profitability, weak efficiency and slow growth rates. Return on assets 
and return on sales consistently outperform industry peers in every post-buyout year while 
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the low post-buyout growth is limited to the first three years. In contrast, buyouts staying in 
their original form have lower profitability ratios but consistently stronger efficiency and 
growth rates than industry peers. Comparison of the two groups reported in Table 3-12 
confirms the differences in profitability and efficiency, however the results on growth is 
mixed. This result is consistent with Bienz and Lenite (2008) in that a pecking order of 
profitability exists in buyout exits. The results imply that investors that are able to achieve 
higher profitability rates facilitate their exit from buyout. On the other hand, buy-and-hold 
investors develop long term strategies by focusing on improved efficiency and high growth, 
which might be harvested in the form of higher valuation in the future. 
     [Table 3-12] 
3.4.3 Differences-in-Differences 
In the prior section we examined MBO performance relative to pre-buyout company and 
comparable industry firms. Although these two measures of performance provide useful 
observations regarding pre-post buyout changes in performance and how MBOs perform 
compared to non-buyouts, they do not measure how MBOs perform relative to industry firms 
through time. To illustrate this point, pre-buyout adjusted performance measures changes 
through time and ignores how industry performs in the corresponding time period. In the 
same vein, industry adjusted performance ignores changes in time and measures performance 
relative to comparable firms at a point of time. In other words, pre-buyout adjustment 
considers only time-series while industry adjustment confines the analysis to cross-sections. 
Since our data carries the properties of an unbalanced panel, it is a sensible approach to 
combine these two dimensions and conduct a differences-in-differences analysis which will 
enable us to simultaneously measure performance relative to pre-buyout firm and industry. 
     [Table 3-13] 
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Table 3-13 presents the differences-in-differences analysis for full sample MBOs. The 
performance is measured for post-buyout years only since the post-buyout performance is 
benchmarked on pre-buyout performance. Consistent with previous results, we find no 
significant improvement while there is evidence of deterioration in performance. While most 
measures show negative changes, the performance deterioration most visibly manifested in 
the proxies for profitability (ROA), which is negative and significant in all years except year 
4, and sales efficiency (Saleff). In highly levered deals, the decrease in profitability can be 
attributed to debt repayments, which would have been represented by higher leverage in early 
years and lower in later years. However, we find no evidence of higher leverage for private-
to-private buyouts. On the contrary leverage remains flat and low through most of the post-
buyout period. Similarly, asset growth (AGRO) and sales growth (SGRO) are mostly 
negative and insignificant. The results suggest that private-to-private buyouts are 
characterised by low leverage and growth. While they outperform the industry firms 
following buyout transaction, this result is not associated with performance improvements or 
the perception of buyout superiority (e.g., Jensen, 1989), rather they are mostly attributable to 
pre-buyout firm performance characteristics and when pre-buyout performance is accounted 
for, significant drops in performance are observed. 
     [Table 3-14] 
The results for the subsample of MBOs with PE sponsors are presented in Table 3-14. Results 
of two sample tests for the equality of PE-backed and non-PE backed MBOs is also presented 
in the third row of each variable. Contrary to expectations, PE sponsors add little or no value 
to their portfolio firms. PE-backed MBOs are accompanied by negative levels of profitability 
in all post-buyout years up to 5 years and significant differences are observed between PE-
backed and non-PE-backed MBOs in terms of ROA and employee efficiency. PE-backed 
MBOs underperform non-PE-backed buyouts in both measures of performance. Note that this 
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result is observed despite the fact that PE-backed companies outperform both comparable 
non-buyout firms and non-PE-backed MBOs in industry adjusted performance measures 
(Table 3-7 and Table 3-8). The findings related to full sample are consistent with recent 
evidence from Weir et al. (2008) and Guo et al. (2011) who find that value generation has 
become harder for recent buyouts. The results related to PE-backing are consistent with 
Chung (2011) and Jelic and Wright (2011) who show that PE firms do not improve profit and 
efficiency margins. The results are discussed in more detail in the following section.  
3.4.4 Discussion of Results 
Early studies on buyouts find large and significant performance improvements following 
transaction (e.g., Kaplan 1989a, Smith, 1990). More recent studies, however, paint a less 
positive picture regarding post-buyout performance. Guo et al. (2011) for example, find that 
post-buyout performance is mostly comparable to industry firms and not better. Weir et al. 
(2008) show deterioration in performance following buyout. Similarly, Chung (2011) and 
Boucly et al. (2011) find that buyouts are focused more on growth than profit. The theoretical 
basis for all these studies is provided by Jensen (1986, 1989) who suggests that buyout is a 
superior form of ownership. Based on the theoretical and empirical evidence, we proposed 
and tested four hypotheses. 
If one lesson is to be drawn from existing broad evidence on buyouts, the buyouts are 
heterogeneous and they do not offer a guaranteed uniform performance. Recent studies tend 
to take into account different forms of buyouts and acknowledge their effect in the 
performance properties. Desbrieres and Schatt (2002) for example, acknowledge that their 
sample of French buyouts do not show large performance improvements similar to those in 
the US and UK since their sample consists mostly of private family originated buyouts and 
divestments while most US and UK studies are conducted on samples of publicly listed 
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companies. Cohn et al. (2014) also acknowledge and document for the first time that different 
performance results are obtained when the sample is restricted to public debt issuing buyouts, 
and when full sample performance is observed. Except Cohn et al. (2014), all US studies are 
restricted to public debt issuing buyouts in their performance analysis since private company 
data is not available in the US unless they issue public debt. Another important point of 
difference is to distinguish between public-to-private and private-to-private buyouts. 
Although buyout superiority can be proposed for most types of buyouts as an inclusive 
phenomenon, PTP and private-to-private buyouts have substantial differences and 
motivations to undertake a buyout, which are also reflected in their post-buyout performance. 
Concentrated pre-buyout ownership, low leverage utilisation compared to PTP buyouts (e.g., 
Desbrieres and Schatt, 2002) and frequent occurrence of MBO due to family succession 
issues (e.g., Howorth et al., 2004) are three key distinct characteristics of private-to-private 
buyouts. Of these, low utilisation of leverage reduces the pressure on managers to perform 
well since there is less debt to be repaid. Concentrated pre-buyout ownership removes one of 
the pillars of buyout superiority argument, since it proposes that conversion of pre-buyout 
firm from dispersed ownership to concentrated ownership will mitigate agency problems and 
improve performance. In most private firms, the ownership structure does not undergo such 
transformation during buyout, hence the advantages -e.g., performance improvement 
following buyout- will be limited since there is little agency problem (e.g., Fama and Jensen, 
1983) resulting from ownership structure which can be solved through a buyout. As far as 
buyouts originating from family businesses concerned, they are likely to be undertaking a 
buyout since there is no viable successor among family members. These distinct 
characteristics of private-to-private MBOs would indicate that there is less agency conflict to 
be solved and consequently less room for performance improvement relative to public-to-
private MBOs. The effect of these differences can be observed in studies that employ 
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comprehensive private-to-private or mixed buyout samples in the research (e.g., Desbrieres 
and Schatt, 2002; Chung, 2011, Boucly et al., 2011; Jelic and Wright, 2011).  Documented 
performance improvements in these studies are substantially lower than studies that use only 
public-to-private buyout samples (e.g., Kaplan, 1989a; Smith, 1990; Opler, 1992). Although 
the large improvements in public-to-private samples can be partly attributed to upward biased 
estimates of performance in those studies since they are confined to subsamples of public 
debt issuers which are likely to bias performance upwards (Cohn et al., 2014), the role of 
above-mentioned differences between private and public companies in the trajectory of post-
buyout firm cannot be overstated. 
Our results in general show that although buyouts outperform industry, they are not 
accompanied by performance improvements following MBO. Moreover, better-than-industry 
MBO performance is not associated with buyout transaction; rather MBO candidates 
outperform comparable non-buyout firms starting from two years prior to buyout. Therefore 
H1 is rejected. The findings lend support to the proposition regarding the differences between 
divestment and full buyouts. We find that performance differences between full and 
divestment MBOs are minor and not significant in conventional levels. Hence H2 is 
supported. The hypothesis related to the contribution of PE funds is given support in terms of 
industry adjusted performance measures; however it is worth noting that PE-backed firms do 
not become profitable following MBO. On the contrary, more profitable firms tend to be 
targeted by PE funds and subsequently even though their profitability levels suffer a decline, 
they remain higher than non-PE-backed buyouts. When this selection effect is controlled 
(e.g., by differences-in-differences) they perform no better than non-PE-backed buyouts. 
Therefore H3 which projects a better performance for PE-backed buyouts is rejected. The 
findings related to successful buyout exits and non-exits also support H4, which suggests that 
successfully exited buyouts tend to be more profitable during their buyout period. The results 
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related to PE-backing and buyout performance in general contrast with the overall tendency 
in the literature that projects a positive role for buyouts and PE funds (e.g., Kaplan, 1989a; 
Opler, 1992; Cressy et al., 2007). Our results; however, more consistent with a developing 
literature that acknowledges buyout heterogeneity and recognises the utilisation of potentially 
upward biased samples in public-to-private buyout research (e.g., Desbrieres and Schatt, 
2002; Meuleman et al., 2009; Jelic and Wright, 2011; Chung, 2011; Cohn et al., 2014). 
Apart from firm and sample characteristics, two other explanations can be provided for the 
observed performance patterns. One possible explanation is examined by Cohn et al. (2015) 
who show that performance improvements following buyout might be due to mean reversion 
in profitability rather than real improvements. In this scenario, lower post-transaction profit 
levels could be observed for buyouts with high pre-transaction profitability. Since PE funds 
tend to target more profitable companies before transaction (Table 3-8), it is likely that the 
observed decline in profitability for PE-backed MBOs is due to mean reversion. In addition, 
accrual reversals could also be driving the performance changes following transaction in the 
presence of earnings management. The literature shows that managers involved in MBO 
deals engage in earnings management prior to transaction (e.g., Perry and Williams, 1994). 
Although we do not elaborate on these explanations in this chapter, we test for earnings 
management scenario and its effect on the performance in the subsequent chapter. In either 
scenario, however, evidence points that buyouts are not superior performers and little credit 
can be attributed to PE firms for their contributions in improving performance.  
3.4.5 Determinants of Performance 
We examine value creation mechanisms by means of ordinary lest squares (OLS) regressions. 
Previously, our performance analysis indicated that PE-backed buyouts are significantly 
different from pure buyouts. Important to this finding is the superior pre-buyout performance 
of PE targets, which is likely to reflect a selectivity issue in the sense that PE funds invest in 
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firms with better profitability. To address potential selection bias in the sample, we employ a 
2-step regression commonly referred as Heckman procedure. The procedure involves 
estimation of a probit model to explain determinants of PE investment, where a PE dummy is 
dependent variable. Then the probability of receiving PE investment is calculated from the 
probit as the inverse Mills ratio and added to the following regressions as explanatory 
variable. We model PE-backing as a function of buyout origin, industry, age, pre-buyout 
profitability and size. The industry dummy (Services) is motivated by Stromberg (2008) who 
reports that buyouts are concentrated in traditional industries. The divestment dummy 
(Divest) is inspired by Wright et al. (1994) who project a stronger performance for 
divestments in the wake of the removal of parental restrictions. Pre-buyout performance 
variable (PreROA) is added due to the fact that PE-backed firms might target firms with 
superior profitability. Size variable (LnSize) is motivated by the fact that PE-backed buyouts 
tend to be larger than non-PE-backed buyouts (Stromberg, 2008). Finally, a company age 
variable is added to the right hand side since PE firms are more likely to invest in mature, late 
stage companies (e.g., Katz, 2009). All variables are defined in Table 3-2. This results in the 
following probit model: 
PEi = α + β1Divesti + β2Servicesi + β3PreROAi + β4Agei + β5LnSizei + Ɛi    (4). 
In the second stage regression, we model performance as a function of PE sponsorship, 
leverage (LEV), change in leverage (∆LEV) and buyout origin (Divest). Dependent variables 
are changes in industry adjusted profitability (ROA), sales efficiency (Saleff) and asset 
growth (AGRO). As in Guo et al. (2011) we control for pre-buyout ROA in profitability 
regressions. Following Jelic and Wright (2011) we also control for high growth industries 
(h1, h2, h3) since they might have different performance properties. Other controls include a 
size control and a crisis dummy is included to control for changes in recession years. Fitted 
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probability of receiving PE investment (Lambda) is included to control for selection bias. All 
variables are defined in Table 3-2. The following model is estimated: 
Perfit = α + β1PreROAi + β2PEi + β3LEVi + β4∆LEVi + β3Divesti + β4LnSizei + β5Crisisi + 
β6Lambdai + β7h1i + β8h2i + β9h3i + Ɛit                                           (5). 
     [Table 3-15] 
The results of the probit are reported in Table 3-15. PE investment is positively associated 
with the size (LnSize) and industry (Services) of buyouts. The size and industry coefficients 
are significant at conventional levels while Age coefficient is only marginally significant. 
Multivariate regressions for determinants of changes in profitability, efficiency and growth 
for three post-buyout years are presented in Table 3-16. The variation explained by models 
(R
2
) ranges from 13.26% for efficiency regression to 76.19% for profitability regression. All 
models are significant at 1% level. The first three columns show that changes in profitability 
are associated with PE dummy, level of leverage and change in leverage. While the univariate 
tests in Table 3-6 and Table 3-13 do not show large and significant increases in leverage, 
regression results indicate that leverage and change in leverage are positively and 
significantly related to profitability. The large and positive coefficients on both variables 
imply that existence of debt exerts a disciplinary pressure on managers to perform better. 
Consistent with univariate results in Table 3-13, PE-backing dummy is negatively associated 
with changes in profitability after controlling for selection bias. Although the negative 
coefficients are only marginally significant, they indicate that PE-backed buyout profitability 
is 14% and 24% less than non-PE-backed buyouts in year 1 and year 3. Buyout origin 
(Divest) appears unrelated to changes in profitability. The selection control lambda is 
significant at 1%, highlighting the importance of controlling for selection bias. Pre-buyout 
profitability and size controls are also significantly associated with changes in profitability. In 
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the efficiency and growth models, only leverage change is significantly associated with 
performance. The coefficients on ∆LEV variable remain large in both models; however they 
carry opposite signs. In the efficiency model, the positive sign of ∆LEV coefficient indicates 
that increasing debt levels have a positive effect on the sales efficiency. On the contrary, the 
negative sign of ∆LEV in growth model shows that increasing debt levels have an adverse 
effect on growth. Both results are consistent with Jensen’s agency view of buyouts in the way 
that higher debt levels apply pressure on managers to create value through improving 
efficiency and allocation of cash to debt payments delays new investments and hamper 
further growth. They are also consistent with the results of Guo et al. (2011) and Cohn et al. 
(2014), who project a similar role for leverage in the post-buyout firm. Contrary to prior 
literature on divestment buyouts that they are likely to grow fast following buyout transaction 
(Wright et al., 1994) and improve efficiency (Meuleman et al., 2009), we find no significant 
relation between divestments and changes in growth and efficiency. Divestments are 
associated with growth only in the first year following buyout. Selection control lambda is 
only significant in profitability regressions and insignificant in efficiency and growth 
regressions, indicating that PE firms tend to target firms that have higher profit ratios relative 
to industry average. However, regression results do not show a significant role for PE firms 
in improving efficiency or facilitating company growth. 
     [Table 3-16] 
We repeat the regressions using raw performance changes (pre-buyout adjusted. The 
economic and statistical interpretation of the results remains the same. Lambda, however, 
becomes insignificant in the profitability model. This result is expected since PE selection is 
expected to be associated with relative performance with industry firms, rather than raw 
performance. We also repeat the tests excluding Heckman correction term Lambda. The 
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results remain the same except for PE dummy which becomes significant at 1% level. This 
shows the importance of controlling for selection bias not to draw misleading conclusions. 
Overall, the regression results are consistent with findings in univariate tests. We find that PE 
backing is not associated with performance improvements in terms of profitability and 
efficiency, and it is not significantly associated with growth. The main driver of performance 
appears to be leverage change which is significant in all regressions. Consistent with previous 
results, divestment buyouts are not associated with a differential effect on performance. The 
results related to PE-backing contrast with a major part of the prior literature (e.g., Kaplan, 
1989a; Smith, 1990; Opler, 1992; Cressy et al., 2007) who find that PE firms improve 
performance by adding value. The results are more consistent with recent studies that show 
little or no improvements in performance following buyout (e.g., Desbrieres and Schatt, 
2002; Weir et al., 2008; Guo et al., 2011; Jelic and Wright, 2011). As discussed in the 
previous sub-section, this outcome is attributable to distinct sample and buyout characteristics 
used in previous studies as well as potential mean reversion and earnings management. 
3.5 Conclusion 
This study examines the performance of management buyouts using 412 UK companies from 
the last decade. In recognition of the heterogeneity of buyouts we differentiate between PTP, 
private-to-private and divestment buyouts. While MBOs outperform comparable non-buyout 
firms in general, we find no significant performance improvement following buyout 
transaction. PE-backed firms have better profitability and growth rates while pure MBOs 
have better efficiency. However, PE-backed buyouts outperform non-PE-backed buyouts and 
industry peers starting from two years before transaction, suggesting that these findings are 
not due to contribution of PE funds in terms of governance and value creation. Rather we find 
that PE funds undertake selective investments by targeting firms with better performance. 
Although changes in leverage are low; leverage is still a significant driver of post-buyout 
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performance. The buyout profitability in general is the highest in the year preceding buyout 
transaction which may indicate practice of earnings management. In line with Boucly et al. 
(2011) we find that full MBOs have better profitability and higher growth rates. Nonetheless, 
performance differences between divisional and full MBOs are largely insignificant. Finally, 
we find evidence in support of Bienz and Lenite (2008) who argue that profitability is the 
most important driver of exit choice. We document that exited buyouts have higher post-
buyout profitability, but lower efficiency and growth compared to non-exited buyouts. The 
results of multivariate regressions are consistent with the univariate results which suggest that 
PE-backing is not a significant determinant of performance, while PE selection must be 
controlled. Leverage is the main driver of performance changes, while differences between 
divisional and full buyouts appear irrelevant. Future studies may explore earnings 
management practice prior to buyout deals and the effect of accrual reversals on performance. 
This may also help explain the high profitability preceding buyouts and distinguish between 
PE selection and earnings management scenarios. 
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Table 3-1: Sample Selection 
This table presents an overview of our sample selection process. We follow a three step procedure to collect 
deal value, deal synopsis, data on private equity provider, accounting data and final status of the buyout deal. 
We start with downloading the population of MBO transactions between 2000 and 2009 from Thomson ONE 
Banker database. The population include public-to-private, private-to-private and secondary management 
buyouts. 
Procedure       MBOs 
Population: Thomson ONE Banker; 2000-2009 2607 
  We manually search each transaction on Thomson ONE Banker and collect company Extel 
cards where available. Extel cards include information on private equity backing and 
acquisitions involved. We exclude 2006 companies that do not supply Extel cards. 
-2006 
  Remaining sample 601 
  
For each of the 601 transactions, we collect data on deal origin and type of buyout from deal 
synopsis. Separately, we obtain the list of public-to-private buyouts and secondary buyouts 
from Thomson ONE Banker database. After checking with our sample, we drop 46 matching 
public-to-private and 29 secondary buyouts. For the remaining sample transactions, we collect 
private equity sponsor data from Extel cards and deal synopsis. 
-75 
  Remaining sample 526 
  
We further check 526 companies with FAME database to collect data on accounting items. 
FAME doesn't supply financial statements for 114 sample companies or reports data in an 
inconsistent manner. Therefore we exclude these buyouts, ending up with 412 final sample 
buyouts. 
-114 
  Final sample 412 
  
In the final step, we collect data on buyout status through reported acquisitions in Extel cards, 
LSE initial public offerings, www. Unquote.com, www.angelnews.co.uk and private equity 
firm websites. As a result of this search, we identify a total of 183 exits; of which 83 are trade 
sale, 69 secondary buyout, 8 IPO and 23 receivership exits. 
0 
  Final sample 412 
 
  
77 
 
Table 3-2: Variable definitions 
This table presents definitions of all variables used in this chapter. Variables obtained from financial statements are 
presented with their Fame item code. 
Variable Source Definition 
MBO TOB 
A buyout acquisition led by members of incumbent management team as stated in 
deal synopsis provided by Thomson One Banker. 
ROA FAME Earnings before interest and taxes in t divided by total assets in t. (F12/F70) 
ROS FAME Earnings before interest and taxes in t divided by sales in t. (F12/F1) 
LEV FAME 
Short term debt and overdrafts plus long term liabilities, divided by total assets. 
[(F52+F85)/F70] 
SALEFF FAME Sales in year t divided by total assets in year t. (F1/F70) 
SALEMP TOB+FAME Inflation adjusted sales in year t divided by number of employees in year t. 
AGRO FAME 
The difference between total assets in t and 3-year median assets prior to buyout, 
divided by their average. 
SGRO FAME 
The difference between sales in t and 3-year median sales prior to buyout, divided 
by their average. 
EBITG FAME 
The difference between earnings before interest and tax in year t and 3-year 
median prior to buyout, divided by their average. 
EMPG FAME 
The difference between number of employees in year t and 3-year median prior to 
buyout, divided by their average. 
AGRO, SGRO, 
EBITG, EMPG 
(Industry adj. 
performance) FAME 
For industry adjusted performance models, growth in assets, sales, profit and 
employment is computed as the difference between year t and t-1, divided by their 
average value. 
Age FAME Natural logarithm of MBO company age at the time of buyout 
LnSize FAME Natural logarithm of inflation adjusted total assets prior to buyout.  
∆LEV FAME The difference in leverage between year -1 and year of buyout. 
PE TOB A dummy variable that equals 1 if the transaction is PE-backed and 0 otherwise. 
PreROA FAME Industry adjusted return on assets in the year prior to buyout transaction. 
Divest TOB 
A dummy variable that equals 1 if the MBO is previously subsidiary of a parent 
company and 0 otherwise. 
Crisis TOB 
A dummy variable that equals 1 for buyouts completed in 2008 and 2009, 0 
otherwise. 
Services TOB 
A dummy variable that equals 1 if the MBO company is in Business Services 
industry, 0 otherwise. 
Lambda Probit reg. 
The probability of receiving PE-backing calculated from the first stage probit 
regression as inverse Mills ratio. 
h1 TOB 
A dummy variable that equals 1 if the MBO is in Internet and Computers 
industry, 0 otherwise. Based on Gompers et al. (2008). 
h2 TOB 
A dummy variable that equals 1 if the MBO is in Biotech and Healthcare 
industry, 0 otherwise. Based on Gompers et al. (2008). 
h3 TOB 
A dummy variable that equals 1 if the MBO is in Communications and 
Electronics industry, 0 otherwise. Based on Gompers et al. (2008). 
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Table 3-3: Sample selection and distribution of deals across years 
This table presents the statistics for UK buyout transactions in the last decade. The presented values are in $ million 
(unadjusted). % columns represent the proportion of firms disclosing deal values to all buyouts in relevant years and 
samples. "Total" columns represent the aggregated value of all disclosed deals in relevant years and samples. Panel B 
reports p values for equality tests for sample representation. Mean and median tests are for the equality of deal size. T tests 
for equality of means are performed under the assumption of unequal variances (Welch's test). T tests for equality of 
medians are performed by Mann-Whitney (MW) Test for unmatched samples. Two sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) 
Test is performed under the null hypothesis that the samples have the same distribution. A total of 1139 and 213 buyouts 
disclosed deal values for the population and final sample respectively. Deal value proxies for buyout size. 
Panel A Number of deals Transaction size 
 
      % disclosure Total value 
Year 
Population Final S. % of 
populati
on 
Population Final S. Population Final S. 
N n % % ($ millions) ($ millions) 
2009 111 23 21 20.7 21.7 712.12 215.31 
2008 173 23 13 30.0 39.0 2713.42 518.94 
2007 245 53 22 33.1 37.7 32346.43 2296.92 
2006 253 61 24 32.4 42.6 8253.97 1562.58 
2005 237 57 24 42.6 56.1 9962.86 2494.36 
2004 280 50 18 47.9 64.0 14760.86 2386.63 
2003 333 41 12 50.8 53.7 6219.38 1119.95 
2002 287 38 13 46.0 60.5 5635.63 1719.45 
2001 335 25 7 52.5 64.0 11743.65 1381.59 
2000 353 41 12 55.4 68.3 8283.09 1321.91 
Sample 2607 412 16 43.7 51.7 100631.4 15017.6 
Panel B K-S Test: Population vs. Final Sample T test MW Test 
 
All MBOs across 
years 
Information disclosure 
across years 
By industry Mean Median 
 Tests for 
equality 0.000 0.152 0.006 0.420 0.000 
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Table 3-4: Exit routes across private equity backing and sources of buyout 
This table presents statistics for exit types across private equity status, source of buyout and TIMEX. PE 
status displays the number of private equity backed and non-backed exits within their respective exit route. 
Full MBO and Divestment indicate acquisition of an independent company and acquisition of a former 
subsidiary respectively. % column reports the proportion of buyouts using an exit route to final sample. Other 
columns report absolute numbers. TIMEX stands for time-to-exit and represents the number of months a 
sample firm stays in its original buyout form across relevant exit routes. 
 
PE status Source of buyout 
  
TIMEX 
Type of exit PE Non-PE Full MBO Divest. All % Mean Median 
Trade sale 62 21 57 26 83 2 48.5 50 
Secondary 63 6 56 13 69 17 48.8 45 
IPO 7 1 3 5 8 2 23.6 20.5 
Receivership 14 9 18 5 23 6 52.2 51.5 
All exits 146 37 134 49 183 44 48 47 
Non-exit 107 122 174 55 229 56 - - 
All 253 159 308 104 412 100 - - 
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            Table 3-5: Distribution of MBOs by industry, private equity backing and exit routes 
Panel A of this table presents distribution of sample buyouts by industry group and enterprise value at entry for respective sectors. Presented percentage columns are 
the proportion of sample firms in an industry group to the relevant sample and the proportion of total deal valuation for each industry group to the total sample 
valuation respectively. n column reports the number of sample firms in each industry group. Panel B reports p values from two sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for 
equality of industry distributions in relevant samples. Industry classification is adapted from Gompers et al. (2008).  
Panel A   % 
  
 
  PE status Exit status Exit route 
 
Industry n E Value PE Non-PE Exit 
Non-
exit 
Trade 
Sale Second. IPO Rec. All 
Internet and Computers 19 3 4 6 6 3 10 3 13 0 5 
Biotech and Healthcare 25 4 8 3 7 5 8 6 0 9 6 
Communications and 
Electronics 40 5 9 11 8 11 8 6 0 17 10 
Consumer 91 24 19 26 22 22 17 26 0 35 22 
Business and Industrial 123 23 28 33 32 30 33 30 25 22 30 
Energy 9 8 3 1 1 3 0 1 13 0 2 
Financial Services 22 16 5 6 6 5 6 6 13 4 5 
Business Services 70 11 21 11 16 17 17 17 25 9 17 
All Others 13 6 4 3 2 3 1 4 13 4 3 
Sample 412 100 61 39 44 56 20 17 2 6 100 
Panel B: Differences in industry distributions 
K-S Test 
Population 
vs. Final 
Sample 
PE vs.  non-
PE 
Exits vs. 
non-Exits 
Trade S. vs. 
Second. 
Trade S. vs. 
Rec. 
Second. vs. 
Rec. 
IPO vs. 
Trade S. 
IPO vs. 
Second. 
p value 0.006 0.352 0.989 0.352 0.126 0.352 0.004 0.004 
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Table 3-6: Performance of Management Buyouts 
This table presents median abnormal performance (AP) measures for the entire sample. For pre-buyout adjusted performance, AP is measured as AP i, t = P i, t – P i, t-k, 
where Pi represents actual performance in a given post-buyout year and P i, t-k 3-year median performance prior to buyout. Industry adjusted performance is measured as 
AP i, t = P i, t – PI i, t, where P i,t represent buyout performance in a given year and PI i, t  median performance of industry  group matched on 2-digit SIC code in the same 
year. Performance is measured by 9 ratios and presented in 4 categories as follows: (1) Profitability: measured by return on assets (ROA) and return on sales (ROS), where 
ROA= earnings before interest and tax/total assets, and ROS= earnings before interest and tax/sales. (2) Leverage: measured as short term debt and overdrafts plus long 
term liabilities/total assets. (3) Efficiency: measured by output per employee (SALEMP) and sales per unit of assets (SALEFF), where SALEMP=inflation adjusted real 
sales/number of employees, and SALEFF=sales/total assets. (4) Growth: measured by asset growth (AGRO), sales growth (SGRO), profit growth (EBITG) and 
employment growth (EMPG). (4.a) Pre-buyout adjusted growth: AGRO= Total assets in year t minus 3-year pre-buyout median assets divided by their average. The 
remaining growth ratios are calculated in the same fashion. (4.b) Industry adjusted growth: AGRO= Total assets in year t minus total assets in year t-1 divided by their 
average. The remaining growth rations are calculated in the same fashion. The calculations are terminated at exit and non-survivor buyouts are dropped from sample in 
subsequent years. The significance of medians is tested by Wilcoxon signed rank test. ***, ** and * represent significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent respectively. Z-statistics 
are shown in parentheses. 
  
T-3 T-2 T-1 T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 
Profitability 
        ROA Pre-buyout 
adjusted 
- - - 
0.003 -0.018 -0.013 0.002 -0.016 
 
(-.824) (-1.437) (-1.437) (-.878) (-1.415) 
 
Industry 
adjusted 
0.048*** 0.027*** 0.066*** 0.063*** 0.058*** 0.053*** 0.050*** 0.055*** 
 
(3.657) (3.91) (8.01) (7.828) (7.116) (7.253) (6.552) (5.282) 
ROS Pre-buyout 
adjusted 
- - - 
0.009** 0.006** 0.005 0.009*** 0.001 
 
(1.967) (2.011) (1.556) (2.351) (.657) 
 
Industry 
adjusted 
0.018*** 0.022*** 0.036*** 0.039*** 0.034*** 0.033*** 0.030*** 0.022*** 
  (3.225) (3.412) (7.154 (6.628) (6.561) (6.785) (6.098) (3.909) 
Leverage 
        LEV Pre-buyout 
adjusted 
- - - 
-0.014 -0.04 -0.048 -0.042 0.003 
 
(-1.351) (-1.583) (-1.598) (-1.431) (.689) 
 
Industry 
adjusted 
-0.01 -0.04 -0.071* -0.066 -0.032 -0.034 -0.061 -0.024 
  (-.041) (-.626) (-1.67) (-.582) (-.034) (-.087) (-.903) (.168) 
Efficiency 
        SALEMP Pre-buyout 
adjusted 
- - - 
6.14*** 7.59*** 8.66*** 9.51*** 11.39*** 
 
(4.716) (4.713) (4.438) (4.04) (4.24) 
 
Industry 
adjusted 
67.58*** 85.11*** 56.66*** 46.75*** 51.16*** 57.32*** 51.76*** 50.91*** 
 
(5.11) (6.136) (6.358) (6.905) (7.051) (6.838) (5.897) (4.714) 
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SALEFF Pre-buyout 
adjusted 
- - - 
-0.057** -0.164*** -0.168*** -0.102*** -0.257** 
 
(-2.023) (-2.894) (-2.569) (-2.603) (-1.91) 
 
Industry 
adjusted 
0.264** 0.236*** 0.289*** 0.168*** 0.134*** 0.147*** 0.137*** 0.459*** 
  (2.312) (3.448) (3.865) (3.318) (2.865) (3.514) (3.04) (4.149) 
Growth 
        AGRO Pre-buyout 
adjusted 
- - - 
0.266*** 0.340*** 0.434*** 0.497*** 0.591*** 
 
(8.27) (8.632) (8.497) (8.052) (6.792) 
 
Industry 
adjusted  
0.017* 0.050*** 0.028*** 0.054*** 0.044*** 0.012 0.037 
  
(1.906) (2.82) (2.952) (4.306) (3.031) (.925) (.997) 
SGRO Pre-buyout 
adjusted 
- - - 
0.264*** 0.326*** 0.424*** 0.376*** 0.404*** 
 
(7.05) (7.34) (7.231) (6.408) (5.726) 
 
Industry 
adjusted  
0.047*** 0.021 0.044*** 0.030** 0.088*** -0.001 0.043** 
  
(2.688) (1.486) (3.118) (2.027) (4.377) (-1.317) (2.238) 
EBITG Pre-buyout 
adjusted 
- - - 
0.441*** 0.520*** 0.614*** 0.663*** 0.709*** 
 
(4.409) (3.256) (4.326) (4.016) (2.795) 
 
Industry 
adjusted  
0.134 0.031 0.020 0.040 0.023 0.003 0.092 
  
(1.026) (.736) (.276) (.061) (-.536) (-.546) (1.635) 
EMPG Pre-buyout 
adjusted 
- - - 
0.108*** 0.164*** 0.239*** 0.188*** 0.230*** 
 
(5.168) (4.826) (5.188) (4.125) (3.747) 
 
Industry 
adjusted 
 
0.018* 0.017 0.037*** 0.033** 0.047*** -0.002 0.013 
    (1.651) (1.224) (3.581) (2.341) (4.82) (-.281) (.578) 
 
83 
 
Table 3-7: Performance of PE-Backed Buyouts 
This table presents median abnormal performance (AP) for the PE-backed subsample. For pre-buyout adjusted performance, AP is measured as AP i, t = P i, t – P i, t-k, 
where Pi represents actual performance in a given post-buyout year and P i, t-k 3-year median performance prior to buyout. Industry adjusted performance is measured as 
AP i, t = P i, t – PI i, t, where P i, t represent buyout performance in a given year and PI i, t median performance of industry group matched on 2 digit SIC code in the same 
year. Performance is measured by 9 ratios and presented in 4 categories as follows: (1) Profitability: measured by return on assets (ROA) and return on sales (ROS), 
where ROA= earnings before interest and tax/total assets, and ROS= earnings before interest and tax/sales. (2) Leverage: measured as short term debt and overdrafts plus 
long term liabilities/total assets. (3) Efficiency: measured by output per employee (SALEMP) and sales per unit of assets (SALEFF), where SALEMP=inflation adjusted 
real sales/number of employees, and SALEFF=sales/total assets. (4) Growth: measured by asset growth (AGRO), sales growth (SGRO), profit growth (EBITG) and 
employment growth (EMPG). (4.a) Pre-buyout adjusted growth: AGRO= Total assets in year t minus 3-year pre-buyout median assets divided by their average. The 
remaining growth ratios are calculated in the same fashion. (4.b) Industry adjusted growth: AGRO= Total assets in year t minus total assets in year t-1 divided by their 
average. The remaining growth rations are calculated in the same fashion. The calculations are terminated at exit and non-survivor buyouts are dropped from sample in 
the subsequent years. The significance of medians is tested by Wilcoxon signed rank test. ***, ** and * represent significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent respectively. Z-
statistics are shown in parentheses. 
  
T-3 T-2 T-1 T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 
Profitability                 
ROA Pre-buyout 
adjusted 
- - - 
-0.015 -0.023 -0.023* -0.002 -0.027 
 
(-1.606) (-1.425) (-1.789) (-1.167) (-1.597) 
 Industry adjusted 
0.054*** 0.054*** 0.090*** 0.079*** 0.078*** 0.063*** 0.061*** 0.054*** 
 
(3.737) (4.273) (6.896) (6.276) (6.594) (6.305) (5.506) (4.663) 
ROS Pre-buyout 
adjusted 
- - - 
0.012 0.008 0.007 0.013* 0.005 
 
(1.276) (1.54) (1.194) (1.859) (0.88) 
 Industry adjusted 
0.036*** 0.040*** 0.055*** 0.061*** 0.052*** 0.039*** 0.047*** 0.029*** 
 
(3.364) (4.36) (6.04) (5.839) (6.421) (6.122) (5.576) (3.883) 
Leverage                 
LEV Pre-buyout 
adjusted 
- - - 
-0.022 -0.045 -0.064** -0.052* -0.026 
 
(-1.62) (-1.456) (-2.002) (-1.913) (-.502) 
 Industry adjusted 
-0.006 -0.071 -0.073 -0.021 0.003 0.003 -0.060 -0.021 
 
(.435) (-.463) (-.994) (.532) (.972) (.535) (-.698) (.176) 
Efficiency                 
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SALEMP Pre-buyout 
adjusted 
- - - 4.62*** 6.10*** 8.12*** 4.99*** 10.62*** 
 
(3.508) (3.256) (2.73) (2.653) (3.251) 
 Industry adjusted 
38.47** 33.02*** 43.22*** 25.24*** 25.05*** 35.42*** 27.16*** 25.65*** 
 
(2.41) (2.991) (3.323) (4.01) (4.125) (4.216) (3.606) (2.826) 
SALEFF Pre-buyout 
adjusted 
- - - 
-0.061** -0.183*** -0.218*** -0.120*** -0.257** 
 
(-1.941) (-2.458) (-2.789) (-2.683) (-2.263) 
 Industry adjusted 
0.238* 0.327*** 0.30*** 0.127** 0.075 0.066** 0.045 0.277** 
 
(1.907) (2.68) (3.168) (2.111) (1.584) (1.983) (1.543) (2.506) 
Growth                 
AGRO Pre-buyout 
adjusted 
- - - 
0.303*** 0.369*** 0.484*** 0.540*** 0.599*** 
 
(7.248) (7.242) (6.941) (6.531) (5.907) 
 Industry adjusted  
0.060*** 0.086** 0.045*** 0.059*** 0.058*** 0.021 0.044 
  
(2.604) (2.506) (3.123) (3.692) (3.474) (1.443) (1.539) 
SGRO Pre-buyout 
adjusted 
- - - 
0.281*** 0.358*** 0.444*** 0.442*** 0.394*** 
 
(6.087) (6.099) (5.416) (4.908) (4.382) 
 Industry adjusted  
0.042** 0.030 0.047*** 0.032 0.103*** 0.016 0.021* 
  
(2.457) (1.564) (2.866) (1.401) (3.907) (-.096) (1.807) 
EBITG Pre-buyout 
adjusted 
- - - 
0.598*** 0.565*** 0.728*** 0.776*** 0.811** 
 
(3.283) (3.239) (4.302) (3.063) (2.159) 
 Industry adjusted  
0.289*** 0.031 0.090* 0.058 0.026 0.026 0.037 
  
(2.915) (.595) (1.848) (.188) (-.74) (-.087) (.545) 
EMPG Pre-buyout 
adjusted 
- - - 
0.129*** 0.210*** 0.234*** 0.26*** 0.23*** 
 
(4.852) (4.25) (3.825) (3.357) (2.634) 
 
Industry adjusted 
 
0.004 0.029** 0.038*** 0.018 0.047*** 0.006 0.009 
    (.874) (2.043) (2.922) (1.141) (3.532) (.809) (.496) 
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Table 3-8: PE-Backed vs. non-PE-Backed MBOs 
This table presents the p values for two sample Mann-Whitney test for equality of abnormal performance in 
private equity backed and non-backed subsamples. PBA stands for pre-buyout adjusted performance and IndA 
stands for industry adjusted performance. ">" and "<" indicate superior and inferior performance of private 
equity backed subsample respectively. Significant p values are in bold. 
    T-3 T-2 T-1 T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 
Profitability                 
ROA PBA - - - <0.11 <0.45 <0.15 <0.35 <0.32 
 
IndA >0.10 >0.00 >0.00 >0.04 >0.00 >0.10 >0.09 <0.90 
ROS PBA - - - >0.83 >0.99 >0.93 >0.88 >0.66 
 
IndA >0.07 >0.00 >0.00 >0.00 >0.00 >0.02 >0.02 >0.12 
Leverage                 
LEV PBA - - - <0.29 <0.51 <0.16 <0.19 <0.10 
 
IndA >0.63 <0.82 <0.67 >0.17 >0.21 >0.43 >0.90 >0.90 
Efficiency                 
SALEMP PBA - - - <0.55 <0.05 <0.22 <0.32 <0.38 
 
IndA <0.02 <0.00 <0.00 <0.00 <0.00 <0.00 <0.02 <0.08 
SALEFF PBA - - - <0.55 <0.47 <0.27 <0.28 <0.32 
 
IndA <0.48 >0.63 >0.64 <0.33 <0.34 <0.09 <0.11 <0.02 
Growth                 
AGRO PBA - - - >0.14 >0.24 >0.21 >0.15 >0.17 
 
IndA 
 
>0.05 >0.85 >0.09 >0.38 >0.03 >0.21 >0.24 
SGRO PBA - - - >0.15 >0.22 >0.64 >0.48 <0.82 
 
IndA 
 
<0.30 >0.48 >0.58 >0.90 >0.47 >0.08 <0.64 
EBITG PBA - - - >0.96 >0.34 >0.02 >0.41 >0.56 
 
IndA 
 
>0.01 <0.95 >0.00 >0.81 >0.64 >0.51 <0.21 
EMPG PBA - - - >0.08 >0.19 <0.74 >0.37 <0.72 
  IndA   <0.72 >0.08 >0.95 <0.33 >0.88 >0.09 <0.95 
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Table 3-9: Performance of Full MBOs 
Panel A of this table presents abnormal performance of full MBOs. Panel B presents abnormal performance 
for divestment MBOs. Results are based on industry adjusted performance measures. The calculations are 
terminated at exit and non-survivor buyouts are dropped from sample in subsequent years. The significance of 
medians is tested by Wilcoxon signed rank test. ***, ** and * represent significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent 
respectively. Z-statistics are shown in parentheses. 
Panel A T-3 T-2 T-1 T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 
ROA 0.033*** 0.032*** 0.063*** 0.063*** 0.065*** 0.063*** 0.052*** 0.055*** 
 
(3.497) (4.137) (6.922) (7.173) (7.071) (6.851) (6.147) (4.478) 
ROS 0.011*** 0.020*** 0.030*** 0.039*** 0.037*** 0.035*** 0.032*** 0.026*** 
 
(2.671) (3.502) (5.526) (6.19) (6.482) (6.298) (5.938) (3.618) 
LEV -0.022 -0.065 -0.070 -0.086 -0.056 -0.062 -0.085 -0.039 
 
(-.16) (-1.399) (-1.466) (-.757) (-.49) (-.495) (-1.209) (-.212) 
SALEMP 45.51*** 79.43*** 60.6*** 46.38*** 43.2*** 54.19*** 53.32*** 26.87*** 
 
(4.105) (5.047) (5.661) (6.001) (5.923) (5.609) (4.944) (3.26) 
SALEFF 0.212** 0.347*** 0.434*** 0.196*** 0.128** 0.139*** 0.137*** 0.552*** 
 
(1.982) (3.623) (4.319) (3.218) (2.467) (3.188) (2.902) (3.9) 
AGRO 
 
0.034** 0.072*** 0.028*** 0.054*** 0.046*** 0.011 0.048 
  
(2.141) (2.95) (2.935) (3.483) (2.564) (.359) (1.438) 
SGRO 
 
0.054*** 0.023* 0.037*** 0.021 0.087*** -0.007 0.040** 
  
(2.778) (1.674) (2.752) (1.259) (3.499) (-1.469) (2.32) 
EBITG 
 
0.134 0.064 0.027 0.027 0.007 -0.032 0.094 
  
(.92) (.787) (.921) (-.881) (-.336) (-1.208) (1.25) 
EMPG 
 
0.028 0.021** 0.041*** 0.037** 0.048*** -0.007 0.017 
    (1.561) (2.185) (3.67) (2.19) (4.644) (-.52) (.817) 
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Panel B: Performance of Divestment MBOs 
 
T-3 T-2 T-1 T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 
ROA 0.067* 0.008 0.088*** 0.062*** 0.039** 0.029*** 0.038*** 0.042*** 
 
(1.957) (.265) (3.584) (3.018) (2.128 (2.65) (2.794) (2.725) 
ROS 0.040* 0.029 0.070*** 0.038** 0.019** 0.033*** 0.018** 0.015* 
 
(1.708) (.958) (3.432) (2.21) (1.998) (2.746) (2.195) (1.861) 
LEV -0.004 0.055 -0.095 0.028 0.028 0.042 -0.049 -0.016 
 
(.17) (1.2) (-.86) (.322) (1.039) (.928) (-.056) (.292) 
SALEMP 67.93*** 87.87*** 53.81*** 50.71*** 94.42*** 89.87*** 60.95*** 113.47*** 
 
(2.883) (3.456) (2.806) (3.388) (3.793) (3.968) (3.316) (3.666) 
SALEFF 0.388 -0.118 -0.08 0.102 0.062 0.147 0.063 0.181 
 
(1.285) (.581) (.031) (.871) (1.132) (1.225) (.779) (1.306) 
AGRO 
 
-0.015 0.011 0.024 0.030*** 0.043* 0.012 0.017 
  
(-.114) (.417) (.644) (2.363) (1.753) (1.204) (-.295) 
SGRO 
 
0.021 0.005 0.115 0.035* 0.079** 0.04 0.067 
  
(.571) (.157) (1.482) (1.703) (2.567) (.106) (.689) 
EBITG 
 
0.18 -0.018 0.016 0.188* 0.034 0.11 0.051 
  
(.524) (.196) (-1.248) (1.678) (-.322) (.612) (.92) 
EMPG 
 
-0.0221 -0.023 0.014 0.004 0.03 0.01 0.008 
    (-.317) (-.277) (.833) (.672) (1.4) (.443) (.023) 
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Table 3-10: Full MBOs vs. Divestment MBOs 
This table presents the p values for two sample Mann-Whitney test for equality of abnormal performance in full 
MBO and divestment MBO subsamples. The results are based on industry adjusted performance. ">" and "<" 
indicate superior and inferior performance of full MBO subsample respectively. Significant p values are in 
bold. 
  T-3 T-2 T-1 T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 
ROA <0.68 >0.12 <0.53 >0.45 >0.10 >0.11 >0.20 >0.74 
ROS <0.92 <0.55 <0.29 >0.23 >0.12 >0.14 >0.08 >0.81 
LEV <0.78 <0.09 >0.58 <0.76 <0.28 <0.27 <0.43 <0.67 
SALEMP <0.54 <0.71 >0.86 <0.89 <0.51 <0.46 <0.92 <0.10 
SALEFF <0.99 >0.18 >0.04 >0.45 >0.74 <0.46 >0.35 >0.28 
AGRO 
 
>0.32 >0.29 >0.47 >0.71 >0.62 <0.34 >0.30 
SGRO 
 
>0.21 >0.44 <0.65 <0.51 >0.60 <0.31 <0.77 
EBITG 
 
<0.82 >0.95 >0.21 <0.07 <0.93 <0.23 >0.93 
EMPG   >0.16 >0.31 >0.33 >0.56 >0.24 <0.48 >0.63 
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Table 3-11: Performance of exited MBOs 
Panel A of this table presents abnormal performance of exited MBOs. Panel B presents abnormal 
performance for MBOs that are still in their original buyout form. Results are based on industry adjusted 
performance measures. The calculations are terminated at exit and non-survivor buyouts are dropped from 
sample in subsequent years. The significance of medians is tested by Wilcoxon signed rank test. ***, ** and 
* represent significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent respectively. Z-statistics are shown in parentheses. 
Panel A T-3 T-2 T-1 T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 
ROA 0.048** 0.057*** 0.081*** 0.077*** 0.079*** 0.052*** 0.046*** 0.073*** 
 
(2.103) (2.768) (5.06) (5.158) (4.917) (4.959) (3.788) (3.75) 
ROS 0.033** 0.032*** 0.053*** 0.067*** 0.056*** 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.042*** 
 
(2.103) (2.898) (4.59) (4.813) (4.821) (4.08) (3.841) (3.082) 
LEV -0.022 -0.104* -0.028 -0.076 -0.043 -0.082 -0.041 -0.077 
 
(-.682) (-1.882) (-.525) (-.703) (.122) (-.417) (-.669) (-.431) 
SALEMP 40.03 60.01** 14.78** 25.24*** 8.42*** 32.92*** 9.26** 23.11 
 
(1.568) (2.524) (2.183) (3.136) (2.646) (2.984) (2.032) (1.477) 
SALEFF 0.045 0.041 0.102 0.028 -0.095 0.083** 0.137 0.540** 
 
(.156) (1.188) (1.284) (.122) (.062) (1.858) (.876) (2.458) 
AGRO 
 
-0.009 0.065 0.024** 0.028* 0.050** 0.018 0.064 
  
(-.152) (1.486) (1.959) (1.904) (2.112) (.63) (1.263) 
SGRO 
 
0.017 0.012 0.035** 0.018 0.105*** -0.041** 0.062 
  
(1.025) (1.159) (2.276) (1.053) (3.261) (-2.079) (1.356) 
EBITG 
 
0.126 -0.072 0.048 0.01 -0.052 0.07 0.372*** 
  
(1.234) (.606) (1.308) (-.141) (-.909) (.506) (3.199) 
EMPG 
 
0.008 -0.011 0.016** 0.032 0.053*** -0.003 -0.006 
    (-.241) (.162) (2.251) (1.344) (3.248) (-.179) (-.278) 
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Panel B: Performance of non-exited MBOs 
 
T-3 T-2 T-1 T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 
ROA 0.057*** 0.022*** 0.066*** 0.059*** 0.043*** 0.053*** 0.049*** 0.043*** 
 
(3.782) (3.061) (6.156) (6.212) (5.579) (5.524) (5.229) (3.807) 
ROS 0.021*** 0.018*** 0.036*** 0.019*** 0.023*** 0.032*** 0.027*** 0.013*** 
 
(2.839) (2.686) (4.895) (4.844) (4.773) (5.644) (4.634) (2.628) 
LEV -0.024 -0.015 -0.140* -0.058 -0.023 -0.032 -0.070 0.009 
 
(-.294) (.27) (-1.716) (-.682) (-.377) (.525) (-.615) (.656) 
SALEMP 79.65*** 92.88*** 68.02*** 75.38*** 83.19*** 84.07*** 63.57*** 67.80*** 
 
(4.538) (5.448) (5.795) (5.83) (6.431) (6.047) (5.581) (4.473) 
SALEFF 0.299** 0.313*** 0.309*** 0.334*** 0.240*** 0.143** 0.180*** 0.357*** 
 
(2.211) (3.066) (3.446) (3.637) (2.971) (2.379) (2.912) (3.058) 
AGRO 
 
0.017** 0.048** 0.030*** 0.059*** 0.037*** 0.006 0.017 
  
(2.019) (2.55) (2.624) (3.976) (2.712) (.445) (.229) 
SGRO 
 
0.058** 0.021 0.059*** 0.032 0.082*** 0.028 0.04 
  
(2.488) (1.002) (2.728) (1.476) (2.921) (.168) (1.516) 
EBITG 
 
0.145 0.065 -0.058 0.059 0.037 -0.050 -0.028 
  
(.918) (.515) (-.822) (.639) (.252) (-1.515) (-.425) 
EMPG 
 
0.030** 0.021 0.045*** 0.032** 0.043*** -0.005 0.019 
    (2.283) (1.345) (2.911) (2.011) (3.442) (-.125) (.602) 
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Table 3-12: Exited vs. non-exited MBOs 
This table presents the p values for two sample Mann-Whitney test for equality of abnormal performance in 
exited MBO and non-exited MBO subsamples. The results are based on industry adjusted performance. ">" 
and "<" indicate superior and inferior performance of exited MBO subsample respectively. Significant p 
values are in bold. 
  T-3 T-2 T-1 T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 
ROA <0.95 >0.24 >0.29 >0.21 >0.06 <0.45 <0.98 >0.03 
ROS >0.89 >0.20 >0.31 >0.13 >0.06 >0.91 >0.40 >0.06 
LEV >0.81 <0.23 >0.27 <0.83 <0.87 <0.43 >0.99 <0.47 
SALEMP <0.19 <0.47 <0.12 <0.06 <0.02 <0.06 <0.03 <0.04 
SALEFF <0.43 <0.58 <0.38 <0.01 <0.08 <0.87 <0.22 >0.95 
AGRO 
 
<0.35 >0.87 <0.76 <0.63 >0.57 >0.78 >0.33 
SGRO 
 
<0.76 <0.80 <0.96 <0.72 >0.28 <0.06 >0.81 
EBITG 
 
<0.50 <0.83 >0.16 <0.58 <0.33 >0.20 >0.00 
EMPG   <0.14 <0.55 <0.68 <0.80 >0.54 >0.92 <0.53 
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Table 3-13: Differences in differences: full sample 
This table presents results of differences in differences performance tests for full sample for 5 years 
following buyout. For each post-buyout year, the abnormal performance is computed as industry 
adjusted performance in relevant post-buyout year minus industry adjusted performance in year -1. 
Variables are defined in Table 3-2. The results are tested by Wilcoxon signed rank test. Z-statistics are 
in parentheses. ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at 1%, 5 and 10% level respectively. 
  n T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 
ROA 173 -0.011* -0.024** -0.033** -0.017 -0.084*** 
  
(-1.753) (-2.065) (-2.128) (-1.547) (-2.672) 
ROS 152 0.011 -0.002 0.003 0.011 -0.014 
  
(-0.344) (0.05) (-0.024) (0.966) (-1.27) 
LEV 138 -0.011 -0.035* -0.025 -0.032** 0.025 
  
(-1.276) (-1.681) (-1.524) (-2.245) (0.823) 
SALEMP 142 -5.061 -9.684 -5.449 -10.089 -3.741 
  
(-0.125) (-1.133) (-0.65) (-0.283) (0.566) 
SALEFF 152 -0.068 -0.177* -0.121* -0.167*** -0.081 
  
(-0.903) (-1.942) (-1.822) (-2.746) (-0.949) 
AGRO 169 -0.003 0.01 -0.033 -0.045* -0.011 
  
(-0.418) (-0.425) (-1.095) (-1.603) (-1.07) 
SGRO 113 -0.026* -0.052* 0.013 -0.029 0.084* 
  
(-1.932) (-1.68) (0.556) (-1.138) (1.874) 
EBITG 126 -0.207 0.049 -0.118 -0.121 0.127* 
  
(-0.939) (0.605) (-0.976) (-0.331) (1.605) 
EMPG 105 0.001 -0.042** 0.006 0.001 -0.054* 
    (-0.519) (-2.539) (-1.14) (-0.667) (-1.758) 
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Table 3-14: Differences in differences: performance of PE-backed MBOs 
This table presents results of differences in differences tests for PE-backed and non-PE-backed 
MBOs for 5 years following buyout. First row of each variable displays performance of PE-backed 
MBOs. Second row displays z-statistics and third row shows p-values for Mann-Whitney test for 
performance differences between PE-backed and non-PE-backed MBO subsamples.  For each post-
buyout year, the abnormal performance is computed as industry adjusted performance in relevant 
post-buyout year minus industry adjusted performance in year -1. Variables are defined in Table 3-2. 
The results are tested by Wilcoxon signed rank test. Z-statistics are in parentheses.  M-W test p-
values are in brackets. ">" and "<" indicate superior and inferior performance of PE-backed 
subsample respectively. Significant M-W p-values are in bold. ***, ** and * represent statistical 
significance at 1%, 5 and 10% level respectively. 
  n T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 
ROA 98 -0.051** -0.054** -0.064*** -0.054** -0.162*** 
  
(-2.302) (-2.181) (-2.983) (-2.144) (-2.603) 
  
<[0.061] <[0.088] <[0.013] <[0.092] <[0.020] 
ROS 86 -0.001 -0.008 -0.014 0.002 -0.041 
  
(-0.252) (-0.525) (-1.044) (0.187) (-1.185) 
  
<[0.682] <[0.298] <[0.117] <[0.366] <[0.350] 
LEV 80 -0.022 -0.058* -0.054** -0.045** 0.021 
  
(-1.353) (-1.601) (-2.174) (-2.194) (0.514) 
  
<[0.514] <[0.492] <[0.119] <[0.506] <[0.862] 
SALEMP 81 -9.375 -20.442*** -20.926 -11.692 -8.481 
  
(-1.448) (-2.941) (-1.502) (-1.401) (-0.747) 
  
<[0.058] <[0.005] <[0.166] <[0.189] <[0.086] 
SALEFF 86 0.005 -0.177 -0.228** -0.267*** -0.318 
  
(-0.381) (-1.285) (-2.056) (-2.731) (-1.412) 
  
>[0.696] >[0.905] <[0.264] <[0.267] <[0.245] 
AGRO 90 -0.008 0.008 -0.047 -0.053 -0.002 
  
(-0.424) (-0.353) (-0.52) (-1.305) (-0.889) 
  
>[0.877] <[0.895] <[0.778] <[0.596] <[0.787] 
SGRO 58 -0.02 -0.151** -0.056 -0.076 0.004 
  
(-1.312) (-2.205) (-0.098) (-1.286) (0.135) 
  
>[0.876] <[0.144] <[0.472] <[0.470] <[0.220] 
EBITG 65 -0.127 0.024 -0.392** -0.076 -0.114 
  
(-0.31) (-0.022) (-2.284) (-1.177) (-0.14) 
  
>[0.616] <[0.463] <[0.048] >[0.197] <[0.189] 
EMPG 58 -0.001 -0.055** -0.08 -0.018 -0.091* 
  
(-0.554) (-2.236) (-1.602) (-0.48) (-1.68) 
    <[0.806] <[0.489] <[0.186] <[0.991] <[0.599] 
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Table 3-15: Determinants of PE-backing 
This table presents results of probit estimation for the probability of receiving PE backing 
(equation 4). Dependent variable: PE is a dummy variable that equals 1 if MBO received PE 
backing and 0 otherwise). Independent variables: Divest is a dummy variable that takes value 
of 1 if buyout is formerly a subsidiary, 0 otherwise. Services is a dummy variable that equals 1 
if MBO is in business services industry, and 0 otherwise. PreROA is the industry adjusted 
return on assets in the year prior to buyout. Age is natural logarithm of MBO company age at 
the time of buyout, and LnSize is natural logarithm of inflation adjusted total assets prior to 
buyout. The model converged after four iterations. Reported results are for robust variance 
estimates.  P-value for Wald test is for probability > chi2. N is the number of sample buyouts 
used for the probit estimation. Z-statistics are reported in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗, represent 
significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively. 
 
Regressor       Coefficient 
     Divest 
   
-0.069 
    
(-0.31) 
Services 
   
0.585** 
    
(2.34) 
PreROA 
   
0.318 
    
(1.20) 
Age 
   
-0.261* 
    
(-1.83) 
LnSize 
   
0.185*** 
    
(2.58) 
Intercept 
   
-0.894 
    
(-1.16) 
Log likelihood 
   
-131.0415 
N 
   
204 
Wald Chi2 
   
16.65*** 
Pseudo R
2
 (%)       6.23 
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Table 3-16: Determinants of post-buyout performance 
This table presents the results of cross-sectional regressions for determinants of post-buyout performance (equation 5). Dependent variables in the regressions 
are changes in industry adjusted Return on Assets (ROA), Sales/Assets (Saleff) and Asset Growth (AGRO). For dependent variables, changes are measured 
from year -1 to relevant post-buyout years. Other variables are defined in Table 3-2. PreROA is the industry adjusted return on assets in the year prior to 
buyout. PE is a dummy variable that equals 1 if MBO received PE backing and 0 otherwise). LEV is short term debt plus long term debt divided by total 
assets in the year prior to MBO. ∆LEV is the difference in leverage between year -1 and year of buyout. Divest is a dummy variable takes value of 1 if buyout 
is former subsidiary of a parent company, and 0 otherwise. Lambda is the inverse Mills ratio computed from the probit estimation in the 1st stage. LnSize is 
natural logarithm of inflation adjusted total assets prior to buyout. Crisis is a dummy variable that equals 1 if MBO transaction is completed in either of 2008, 
2009 and 0 otherwise.  h1, h2 and h3 are high-tech industry dummies based on Gompers et al. (2008) classification that correspond to Internet and Computers, 
Biotech and Healthcare, Communications and Electronics industries respectively. N is the number of firm-year observations in each model. All models are 
estimated via OLS regressions with robust standard errors and omitted collinear covariates. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗, represent significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels 
respectively.  
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Table 3-16: Continued 
 
ROA1 ROA2 ROA3 
 
Saleff1 Saleff2 Saleff3 
 
AGRO1 AGRO2 AGRO3 
PreROA 1.518*** 1.85*** 1.828*** 
        
 
(3.27) (3.46) (4.61) 
        PE -0.147* -0.104 -0.242* 
 
0.318 0.019 -3.124 
 
-0.038 0.05a 0.184 
 
(-1.88) (-1.28) (-1.92) 
 
(1.08) (0.08) (-1.21) 
 
(-0.36) (0.45) (0.96) 
∆LEV 1.38*** 1.734*** 1.454*** 
 
2.217*** 2.298*** 7.133* 
 
-9.002*** -7.616** -1.265*** 
 
(4.31) (4.54) (4.46) 
 
(3.1) (3.49) (1.6) 
 
(-3.14) (-2.49) (-3.23) 
LEV 0.603*** 0.852*** 0.623*** 
 
-0.065 0.058 2.119 
 
0.114 0.204 -0.071 
 
(2.7) (3.22) (2.86) 
 
(-0.18) (0.16) (1.05) 
 
(0.63) (1.00) (-0.28) 
Divest -0.103 -0.011 0.063 
 
-0.251 -0.237 -0.715 
 
0.269** 0.078 -0.069 
 
(-1.18) (-0.13) (0.51) 
 
(-0.98) (-0.92) (-0.74) 
 
(2.46) (0.79) (-0.38) 
Lambda 1.613*** 1.958*** 1.842*** 
 
1.006 1.167 -6.889 
 
0.279 0.371 0.391 
 
(3.84) (3.9) (3.8) 
 
(1.19) (1.53) (-0.47) 
 
(0.91) (1.41) (0.77) 
LnSize 0.184*** 0.219*** 0.224*** 
 
0.104 0.167* -0.249 
 
0.052 0.026 0.018 
 
(3.58) (3.83) (4.07) 
 
(1.17) (1.88) (-0.82) 
 
(0.98) (0.64) (0.27) 
Crisis 0.191* 0.101 
  
0.322 -0.185 
  
0.172 0.016 
 
 
(1.87) (0.65) 
  
(1.22) (-0.85) 
  
(1.26) (0.12) 
 h1 -0.039 -0.134 -0.101 
 
-0.229 -0.245 -0.437 
 
-0.008 0.373** 0.121 
 
(-0.46) (-0.91) (-0.46) 
 
(-0.98) (-1.06) (-0.28) 
 
(-0.05) (2.3) (0.72) 
h2 -0.182 -0.042 -0.007 
 
0.392 0.699 0.798 
 
-0.875*** -0.446*** 0.983* 
 
(-0.79) (-0.31) (-0.03) 
 
(1.02) (1.42) (0.78) 
 
(-3.15) (-2.68) (1.73) 
h3 0.038 0.116 0.051 
 
1.35 1.457 -0.576 
 
-0.164 -0.256 -0.074 
 
(0.25) (0.67) (0.24) 
 
(0.79) (1.09) (-0.64) 
 
(-1.01) (-1.28) (-0.27) 
Intercept -3.263*** -3.988*** -3.839*** 
 
-1.94 -2.644* 9.352 
 
-0.819 -0.605 -0.638 
 
(-3.84) (-4.02) (-4.28) 
 
(-1.32) (-1.92) (0.74) 
 
(-1.11) (-0.98) (-0.58) 
N 120 102 77 
 
108 95 73 
 
95 77 54 
R
2
 (%) 62.65 71.95 76.19   14.42 21.57 13.26   33.43 29.45 37.74 
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 CHAPTER 4: EARNINGS MANAGEMENT AND MBO PERFORMANCE 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The combined effects of ownership concentration and high leverage of buyouts ensure 
creation of a company with superior structure and performance compared to public 
companies (Jensen, 1986; 1989). Much research has documented improvements in company 
performance after buyouts, providing support for the above argument.
10
 However, public-to-
private buyouts have previously been described as perverse transactions where managers and 
large shareholders take advantage of their power and insider knowledge in order to structure 
deals to their benefit (Sommer, 1974; Longstreth, 1983). This moral hazard problem becomes 
stronger in management buyouts (MBO) where managers stand as both vendors and buyers. 
If managers have strong personal incentives, they might be tempted to exploit their 
informational advantage to acquire firm for less than its true value. For example, the $24 
billion MBO of computer maker Dell by incumbent management team led by its founder and 
CEO faced lawsuit by shareholders who argued that managers abused their insider status and 
knowledge to significantly undervalue the MBO deal (Feeley, 2013).  
The literature has documented presence of earnings management before public-to-private 
buyouts (Perry and Williams, 1994; Wu, 1997; Fischer and Louis, 2008). The managerial 
self-interest accompanying MBO transactions provides sufficient incentives and forms an 
ideal setting for managers to exercise their discretion over accruals and understate earnings to 
pay an undervalued equity price. The collective evidence from public-to-private buyouts 
supports this notion. However the evidence comes only from public-to-private buyouts and 
managers accounting practices before private-to-private buyouts have not been documented. 
In this study we examine earnings management prior to private-to-private MBOs. Our private 
                                                          
10
 See Gilligan and Wright (2010) for a review of evidence on buyout performance. 
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firm choice is motivated by the fact that private-to-private MBOs constitute the largest 
portion of worldwide buyouts (Stromberg, 2008) whose undisputable economic value is not 
given enough attention in the literature. One of the reasons for the lack of evidence on 
private-to-private buyouts is that US private firms are not required to report financial 
statements. Therefore research is limited to publicly listed corporations whose managers need 
not disclose financial information after going private (Perry and Williams, 1994). In Europe, 
all private firms are subject to the same accounting standards and reporting requirements as 
public firms
11
 (Ball and Shivakumar, 2005), although minor exemptions for specific 
accounting items exist for certain private firms. The similarities in the publication of annual 
accounts between public and private firms allow us to obtain results that are comparable with 
public firm evidence, as well as enabling us to utilise a fairly large sample of private-to-
private MBOs. Furthermore, the private firm literature provides limited evidence regarding 
earnings management. Research is either based on case studies (Howorth et al., 2004), or on 
large, multi-country level private firm populations (e.g., Coppens and Peek, 2005; 
Burgstahler et al., 2006). The data considerations also play a part in sample choice and 
research design. Focusing on a single event would substantially reduce the number of firm-
observations with available data to do such analysis. We deal with this issue by relying on the 
UK market, the second largest buyout market after the US. The UK choice allows us to 
narrow down population-based samples in previous research to a specific earnings 
management inducing event where incentives are stronger and earnings management is more 
likely. 
Much research has investigated the relevance of the MBO to firm performance (Kaplan, 
1989a; Guo et al., 2011; Jelic and Wright, 2011). The present literature also provides us 
                                                          
11
 Since 2005 UK public firms have to prepare their consolidated financial statements in accordance with 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). In the case of our private sample, however, 290 firms 
prepare their annual accounts in accordance with UK historical convention and only 1 firm follows IFRS 
principles.  
99 
 
ample evidence regarding earnings management practices around major corporate events and 
the effects of accrual reversals following equity issues in public firms (Rangan, 1998; Teoh et 
al., 1998a; 1998b; Jo et al., 2007). This study explores new grounds by investigating the 
effect of earnings management on operating performance of MBOs. Specifically, we examine 
the impact of pre-buyout accrual management on the post-buyout company through a hand-
collected sample of private-to-private buyouts.  
We examine earnings management in 291 UK private-to-private MBOs between 2004 and 
September 2012 using cross-sectional version of Jones (1991) model developed by Defond 
and Jiambalvo (1994) and its performance adjusted version by Kothari et al. (2005). Our 
main findings contrast with prior evidence reported for public-to-private MBOs. Contrary to 
predictions that managers understate earnings in the years before transaction, we find 
evidence of strong income-increasing earnings management in the year preceding MBO. This 
year coincides with large positive changes in total accruals and earnings. Separate 
examination of PE-backed and non-PE backed MBOs reveal that managers of PE-backed 
MBOs are less likely to engage in earnings management. These findings remain consistent 
across cross-sectional and performance adjusted cross-sectional discretionary accruals models 
and remain robust to the choice of accruals. The results still hold after tests with various 
subsamples. The performance analysis is carried out with 254 MBOs for which the data 
requirements are met. The univariate analysis of performance, measured by return on assets 
(ROA) shows that MBO performance peaks in the first year before buyout and begins to 
deteriorate after the first post-buyout year. MBOs continue to outperform industry in the 5 
years examined; however performance drops to industry levels when PE-backed buyouts are 
excluded. On the other hand, PE sponsors invest in firms with already high levels of 
profitability and no significant performance improvement is detected in PE-backed buyouts 
after PE investment. Therefore results do not suggest a positive PE role in buyout 
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performance. Spearman correlation test and cross-sectional tests of discretionary total 
accruals show that earnings management is negatively associated with performance changes 
and discretionary accruals is a significant determinant of changes in performance. 
Our study makes two important contributions to the existing body of research. We extend 
case study evidence of Howorth et al. (2004) and add to the MBO literature by providing the 
first formal analysis of earnings management in private-to-private MBOs. More broadly, we 
contribute to the private firm literature by providing the first analysis of earnings 
management in a specific corporate event. Previously, emphasis has been given to the 
analysis of institutional settings across different markets due to lack of information on 
earnings management inducing events (Coppens and Peek, 2005; Burgstahler et al., 2006). 
We also add to the private equity (PE) literature by providing an analysis of earnings 
management in PE-backed and non-PE-backed MBOs. Bargeron et al. (2008) raise the issue 
that managers of buyout targets might be collaborating with PE investors to pay a lower 
price. Such an analysis is important to shed light on lingering suspicions over the role of PE 
funds in their target investments. While there is a large body of literature on corporate 
governance mechanisms of venture capital (VC) and PE firms (e.g., Lerner 1995, Kaplan and 
Strömberg, 2003), relatively few studies examine their role in earnings management practices 
of their portfolio companies. The findings of this study are complementary to the existing 
evidence on earnings management in VC-backed initial public offerings (IPOs) (Morsfield 
and Tan, 2006; Hochberg, 2012; Wongsunwai, 2013) and role of buyout sponsors in reverse 
leveraged buyouts (Chou et al., 2006; Wang, 2010). 
The second contribution we make is to the value creation debate surrounding buyouts and PE 
firms. It comes in the form of an exploration of the connection between earnings management 
and post-buyout performance; a link that has been examined in the context of equity offerings 
but missing from buyout literature. By documenting a negative correlation between earnings 
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management and performance changes, and showing that upwards (downwards) earnings 
management results in deterioration (improvement) in subsequent buyout performance, this 
study complements research on equity offerings, Rangan (1998) and Teoh et al. (1998b) in 
particular, and retrospectively helps us develop a more insightful understanding of buyout 
performance. The negative correlation between earnings management and performance 
implies that previous MBO performance studies (e.g., Kaplan, 1989a) might have been 
contaminated and buyout performance overstated due to their omission of earnings 
management factor prior to buyout and led to the erroneous conclusion that buyouts perform 
better following MBO deal. Taken in isolation, profitability ratios are not indicators of the 
real buyout performance and effects of earnings management must be controlled to draw 
conclusions.  
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. In Section 2, we review literature and develop 
hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data and discusses methodology. Section 4 presents the 
results of cross-sectional and times series model estimations of discretionary accruals. 
Section 5 examines earnings management and subsequent performance. Section 6 discusses 
the results and Section 7 concludes the chapter. 
4.2 Literature and Hypothesis Development 
4.2.1 Earnings Management in Buyouts 
There is ample anecdotal and empirical evidence regarding existence of agency conflicts 
between different stakeholders. Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that agency conflicts will 
largely disappear in the wake of the acquisition of total shares by insiders because they will 
themselves incur agency costs should they continue to pursue their self interests. The same 
argument goes for MBOs where managerial incentives are aligned with those of shareholders 
in the post-MBO period through various tools such as high levels of debt (Jensen, 1986). 
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Although this argument may well be true, the acquisition process might generate its own 
moral hazard issues.  
One such problem arises from managers’ implementation of Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles (GAAP). The managerial discretion over accounting practices allows managers to 
adjust specific items in the desired direction. Healy and Wahlen (1999) explain that earnings 
management can occur to influence stock market perceptions, to avoid violation of contracts 
and to evade intervention by regulatory bodies. In special corporate events such as MBO, the 
motivations for earnings management could be stronger. In MBO transactions, the reasons for 
managing earnings stem from the two-sided standing of the managers. Managers can use their 
superior knowledge and their vast discretion over accruals to acquire the company in an 
undervalued transaction. To achieve this aim, they might understate earnings and take 
deliberate decisions in a way that negatively affects company value. In the occurrence of 
income-decreasing earnings management prior to transaction, an MBO is likely to produce 
post-transaction gains for managers resulting from shareholder wealth expropriation. The 
existing evidence shows that earnings in public firms are often managed upwards to achieve 
targets (Gore et al., 2007), to meet analysts’ earnings forecasts (Athanasakou et al., 2009) and 
for managers’ personal benefits from bonus schemes (Healy, 1985). Managers of private 
firms also tend to inflate earnings prior to IPOs (Teoh et al., 1998a). In the special MBO 
setting, however, an increase in earnings would cost managers more in terms of their personal 
wealth. Therefore incumbent managers might benefit from a decrease in the firm value, 
which provide them incentives to understate earnings and reap post-transaction gains. 
The collective evidence from US public-to-private MBOs conclusively shows downward 
earnings management or no earnings management. For example, DeAngelo (1986) concludes 
that the detailed scrutiny accompanying MBOs prevent managers from systematically 
manipulating earnings. Perry and Williams (1994) provide evidence of income-decreasing 
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accruals management one year before MBO date. Wu (1997) documents significant decline 
in industry-adjusted earnings and existence of negative discretionary accruals one year before 
MBO, lending support to earnings management. Similarly, Fischer and Louis (2008) found 
negative accrual changes in the year before MBO. They hypothesise a two-pronged situation 
where manipulative motives are influenced by managers’ ability to finance deal with their 
personal wealth and their need to obtain external financing. 
The presented evidence reported for public-to-private MBOs suggests a negative relationship 
between buyout transaction and discretionary accruals. Unlike US market, however, UK 
MBOs do not operate under full financial information blackout after transaction. Regardless 
of their public status, EU regulations still require them to report audited financial statements 
which are publicly accessible.
12
 Due to fear of detection, managers of UK firms might have 
reduced incentives to manage earnings.  
4.2.2 Earnings Management in Private-to-private Buyouts 
Schulze et al. (2003) argue that governance mechanisms designed for public companies do 
not work as planned when firms are private. Private companies are often owned by a few 
individual blockholders in contrast with public companies where equity is dispersed across a 
large number of investors. This ownership concentration allows managers and shareholders to 
establish more personal relationships (Fama and Jensen, 1983) and to use private 
communication channels to exchange information (Burgstahler et al., 2006). Many private 
firms are run by families where the roles of managers and owners are not clearly separated. 
The unclarity of borders between managerial and ownership roles invalidate inferences based 
on the standard principal-agent relationship. However different types of private firms might 
                                                          
12
 EU 4
th
 Directive Article 47(1) and 51(1) respectively state that companies must make their annual reports 
publicly accessible and have their financial accounts audited. The Fourth Directive also clarifies that member 
states can lighten publication requirements of annual accounts for small and medium sized companies and 
auditing exemptions can be introduced for small companies. 
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introduce different issues within the organization. Howorth et al. (2004) report that 
information asymmetries can be strong in private non-family firms which have a separate 
ownership and management structure. Family firms too may incur severe agency costs, not 
because of conflicting goals of managers and owners, but because family members can be 
driven by non-economic objectives and make irrational decisions that are not always in the 
best interest of company (Dawson, 2011). MBOs therefore act as a viable way to deal with 
succession issue in family firms. It allows the family to realise investment and maintain the 
independence of the company (Howorth et al., 2004; Scholes et al., 2008). In this case, the 
purchasing team is likely to have good relations with the family, which would minimise 
conflicts of interest. Their incentives to manage earnings for personal gain are then 
substantially reduced. 
The evidence points to a complex mix of asymmetric forces related to markets and company 
structure. While private companies are often considered to have less agency conflicts (e.g. 
Fama and Jensen, 1983), evidence from European private firms consistently shows the 
presence of earnings management and that the incentives to do so remain in place (Coppens 
and Peek, 2005; Burgstahler et al., 2006). Various incentives for earnings management has 
been examined in prior literature, with an emphasis on comparing private and public 
companies, and on the effects of institutional settings. Of particular interest is how private 
firms perform in the absence of capital market pressures. Beatty et al. (2002) find that private 
banks exhibit less earnings management than publicly held banks. Coppens and Peek (2005) 
argue that the absence of capital market pressures does not eliminate motives for earnings 
management. Private firm managers adjust their standing to the particular legal system and 
market, and exercise discretion over accounting practices. Burgstahler et al. (2006) present 
evidence that private firms exhibit more severe earnings management than public firms. They 
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argue that public markets serve to mitigate manipulative incentives through various 
monitoring activities that private markets are unable to provide.  
Our study shares most aspects of the private firm studies presented above. As every other 
private company, our MBOs have concentrated ownership and their managers are not under 
pressure of strict capital market scrutiny. In addition to other manipulative forces, however, 
MBO managers have additional incentives stemming from their acquisition of company. Note 
that the expected direction of earnings management is not the same. While managers often 
adjust earnings upwards for the fear of loss-reporting, MBO event provides them stronger 
incentives to adjust earnings downwards, thus acquiring a higher percentage of ownership at 
a lower price. Our sample private firms are, however, subject to a different set of influential 
factors than US public-to-private MBOs. In private family firms where MBO acts as an 
acceptable succession tool (Howorth et al., 2004); the friendly nature of the deal would 
substantially mitigate incumbent managers’ incentives to manage earnings to their benefit.  
Moreover, European private firm managers are unable to operate under cover due to 
differences in reporting requirements between US and European private firms. Perry and 
Williams (1994) note that a main driver of earnings management prior to US MBOs is the 
disappearance of detection fear resulting from regulatory cover in post-buyout period for the 
newly private firm. Since our sample private firms do not undergo a change in their reporting 
requirements after buyout, a considerable reduction in managers’ personal wealth motivations 
is expected. In general, we conjecture that conflicting considerations related to family 
succession issues, differences in reporting regulations and managers’ personal wealth factor 
will impose a divergent outcome with respect to the existing evidence reported for public-to-
private MBOs, and offset managers’ incentives for earnings management.  
H1: Managers of private-to-private MBOs do not understate earnings prior to buyout. 
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4.2.3 Private Equity Backing 
The importance of separate examination for PE-backed and non-PE-backed buyouts has 
recently been pointed out in the literature (Jelic and Wright, 2011). PE firms are not ordinary 
sponsors; the influential role they play in their portfolio companies and the resulting 
differences between MBOs with and without PE sponsors might generate divergent 
managerial behaviour prior to buyout transaction. PE firms invest through closed-end funds 
which have a limited life span, thus they require divesting their holdings and extracting return 
on their investments. They provide the experience of business professionals and external 
financing in one package (Fenn et al., 1997). Venture capitalists and buyout specialists are 
known to be repeat market players (Cressy et al., 2007) who have the ability to go beyond 
financial statements and extract managers private information (Hand, 2005). Their skills, 
specialisation and market experience give them an advantage in managing their portfolio 
companies. However, their ability to realise scale of economies and create synergy by 
acquisitions are limited or non-existent (Bargeron et al., 2008), whereas public and private 
acquirers can merge their business with the target company and generate more value.   
The activities of PE firms have been subject to widespread suspicion and criticism. They 
have been repeatedly accused by politicians and trade unions of asset stripping in several high 
profile bankruptcies (Godley, 2011). The literature presents us conflicting evidence regarding 
the role of PE in the process leading to the buyout and after the buyout transaction. While 
performance improvements are documented in the post-transaction firm (Kaplan, 1989a; Jelic 
and Wright, 2011), the evidence related to their pre-buyout involvement is less positive. 
Acharya and Johnson (2010) show presence of large insider trading in PE-backed buyouts. 
Bargeron et al. (2008) find that PE funds pay lower acquisition premiums than other 
acquirers. They argue that this could be a reflection of their limited capacity to generate 
synergy gains and their limited time to extract returns; nonetheless it also raises the question 
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of whether PE firms collaborate with target management in MBOs. With managers lacking 
the funds to acquire the total equity, the financial assistance of PE could benefit both parties 
in an undervalued acquisition.  
On the other hand, PE firms are known to have a positive bias for better performing firms 
(Jelic and Wright, 2011). The performance provisions related to PE funding might lead 
managers to seek better performance to attract PE investment. Fischer and Louis (2008) argue 
that managers’ desire for personal gain might be offset by their need for external financing. 
Their incentives for earnings management are related to their financial independence and 
personal ability to finance MBO deal. If managers cannot finance transaction with their 
personal wealth, they might manage earnings upwards to show their firm as an attractive 
investment option. However, PE firms would detect earnings management practice if their 
screening skills allow them to fully extract managers’ private information. Moreover, PE 
firms are repeat market players who have serious reputation considerations. Collaborating 
with managers to understate earnings would taint their credibility in the case of detection by 
regulators. European private firms report audited financial statements, which would increase 
the probability of detection and reduce manipulative incentives related to the going private 
notion raised for US MBOs. 
The evidence from IPOs suggests that effective monitoring and reputation concerns of VC 
firms constrain earnings management around IPO. For example, VC-backed IPO firms tend 
to show lower abnormal accruals and exhibit more conservative earnings management than 
comparable non-VC backed IPOs (Morsfield and Tan, 2006; Hochberg, 2012). In the same 
vein, Wang (2010) finds that presence of buyout sponsors leads to improvement in 
discretionary accruals in reverse leveraged buyouts. One exception is Chou et al. (2006) who 
find that buyout sponsors engage in upwards earnings management prior to IPO exit. Lee and 
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Masulis (2011), Wongsunwai (2013) and Brau and Johnson (2009) report negative 
association between earnings management and VC reputation.  
We expect the opposing considerations related to managers incentives for personal gain, their 
need for external financing and reputation concerns of PE firms to temper the incentives for 
earnings management in either direction. Therefore we propose that: 
H2: There are differences in earnings management between PE-backed and pure buyouts. 
H3: PE-backed private-to private MBOs do not exhibit earnings management prior to buyout. 
4.3 Data and Methodology 
4.3.1 Sample Selection 
We construct our sample and subsamples by the following procedure. First, MBOs completed 
between 2004 and September 2012 are identified from Thomson One Banker Deal Analysis 
(TOB) database. We select deals based on three criteria: Target must be registered in the UK, 
the target of acquisition must be a private company, and deal must be led by an incumbent 
management team. Our search resulted in 1004 MBOs. TOB provides deal announcement 
and completion dates, firm industry and SIC codes, deal value where available, and deal 
synopsis that gives information on bidders, presence of PE investor and the origin of 
acquisition target. From deal synopsis, we identify secondary buyouts, former subsidiaries, 
public-to-private buyouts and management buy-ins (MBI) for exclusion from sample. These 
buyouts are excluded to obtain a homogenous sample of private-to-private MBOs since 
mixing with other types of buyouts with different characteristics and motivations might dilute 
the results and lead to erroneous conclusions that do not correctly reflect the motivations for 
earnings management. We also drop formerly bankrupt targets following Perry and Williams 
(1994). Finally we drop financial firms following the standard practice in corporate finance 
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research. A total of 144 firms are identified and dropped in this step, leaving us with 860 
private- to-private buyouts. 
Second, for the remaining 860 private companies we collect financial statements from Fame 
database. A minimum of 2 year historical data is required to calculate changes in accruals and 
perform the cross-sectional version of Jones regression. Therefore we eliminate firms with 
missing data in any of the immediate 2 years before MBO and firms with fewer than 2 years 
of pre-buyout data. We also drop MBOs which occurred in 2003 since we cannot obtain 
financial statements to construct industry/year portfolios in this year. At the end of this step 
we are left with 291 MBOs for which the required data is available. Our final sample contains 
291 MBOs. 
     [Table 4-1] 
Table 4-1 presents the distribution of MBO transactions and their deal values across years. 
The TOB population holds 860 deals between 2004 and September 2012 of which 291 are 
included in the cross-sectional analysis. This number is larger than any of previous related 
studies. A comparison with Perry and Williams (1994) sample reveals that their 175 public-
to-private MBOs have an aggregated market value of approximately $54 billion, whereas the 
total value of our sample remains around $9 billion. The large difference between the two 
samples arises for two reasons; the first one is that private-to-private MBOs are, in general, 
smaller than public-to-private MBOs (Stromberg, 2008), and the second reason being that 
private firms are not required to disclose deal information. The latter is important since only 
one third of our final sample firms have disclosed deal value, leading to a low aggregate 
sample valuation. There is substantial deal clustering at the time referred to as mega buyouts 
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period.
13
 The highest number of deals is reported in 2006. Two of the sample years (2005, 
2006) collectively account for more than 40% of our sample buyouts. Over 80% of deals are 
completed between 2004 and 2008 and the number of buyouts drops after 2008. The last 
three years (2009, 2010, 2011) coinciding with stagnation period account only for 15% of the 
total. This pattern is consistent with the sharp fall in worldwide buyout activity around 2008 
(Scholes and Wright, 2009; Gilligan and Wright, 2010). However, our sample represents a 
good portion of the UK population, comprising 64% of the aggregated transaction value 
where deal information is disclosed. In terms of total number of private-to-private buyouts, it 
represents 34% of the MBO population. Considering the reporting exemptions related to 
small and medium sized private firms and extensive pre- and post-buyout data requirements, 
our sample covers a sizeable section of the private-to-private MBO market. 
4.3.2 Data Issues and Attrition Rate  
The present literature (Perry and Williams (1994); Wu (1997); Fischer and Louis, (2008)) 
relies on Compustat for financial data. In the UK, Fame is the main source to obtain financial 
statements of private companies. Another database published by the same company, 
Amadeus, also offers private company information for European firms as well as UK firms. It 
has previously been used in multi-country level earnings management studies of Coppens and 
Peek (2005), and Burgstahler et al. (2006) where their particular research settings impose 
Europe-wide company coverage. Fame, however, has a special focus on UK and Ireland 
companies. Although Amadeus offers more detailed financial statements compared to Fame, 
the latter is chosen due to its better coverage of UK companies.
14
  
                                                          
13
 Loosely defined, the buyout market revival in mid-2000 is often referred to as mega buyouts age. Nine of the 
ten largest buyouts occurred during this period (Samuelson, 2007). These include the largest buyout in history; 
$45 billion TXU Corp. deal and the largest UK buyout Alliance Boots valued at $22 billion. 
14
 Fame database covers more than 7 million active and inactive UK companies, while Amadeus covers around 
2.5 million UK companies. 
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The limitations of commercial databases have been discussed in Stromberg (2008) and Jelic 
and Wright (2011). A major disadvantage of Fame is that historic financial data is limited to 
the last 10 years, which means that we have no access to data before 2003 at this point of 
time. Another issue with Fame is that some accounting items are reported under different 
names than those in Compustat. We examine formulas and enumeration of Compustat items, 
annual reports and Fame financial statements to ensure consistency and that we use 
appropriate accounting items in calculations.
15
  
The sample includes a large number of small and medium sized companies which are allowed 
to report modified or abridged accounts. Companies classified as small do not have to file 
income statement while companies classified as medium do not need to report sales. These 
reporting exemptions introduce data intermittence across years and consequently a significant 
data loss to our sample since models require items from both balance sheet and income 
statement. 
4.3.3 Measuring Accruals 
We follow the balance sheet approach where total accruals are computed as non-cash 
working capital minus depreciation expense.
16
 This definition is the same as in Perry and 
Williams (1994), Dechow et al. (1995) and Burgstahler et al. (2006).
17
 It is argued that 
current accruals are more relevant when measuring year-to-year discretion since non-current 
                                                          
15
 This is done to ensure consistency with US MBO research on earnings management. The names and formulas 
of equivalent accounting items are: Cash & cash equivalents (C1) = Bank and deposits (F42); Plant, property & 
equipment (C7) = Tangible assets (F31); Current maturities of long term debt (C44) = Short term loans & 
overdrafts (F52); Sales (C12) = Turnover (F1). C and F indicate Compustat and Fame data item numbers 
respectively. 
16 We compute total accruals as follows (Fame data items are indicated in parentheses): Total Accrualst = 
[∆Current Assetst (48) - ∆Casht (42)] - [∆Current Liabilitiest (66) - ∆Short term debtt (52)] - Depreciationt (21). 
Items displayed by Fame with a negative sign are multiplied by -1 prior to calculating total accruals. These 
items are current liabilities and short term debt. Variables are defined in Table 4-2. 
17
 Hribar and Collins (2002) argue that earnings management studies using balance sheet items to calculate 
accruals are likely to be contaminated and recommend a cash flow based approach. However private companies 
are not required to file cash flow statements and thus we are limited to a balance sheet approach in accruals 
calculation. 
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portion of discretionary accruals may not reflect the recent accounting practices (Jones, 1991; 
Teoh et al., 1998b). There has been increasing use of working capital accruals (Gore et al., 
2007; Athanasakou et al., 2009) and many studies rely on both total and working capital 
accrual measures to examine manipulative behaviour. Arguably, working capital accrual 
models are more useful in cases where disclosures are quarterly, (e.g., public companies, 
equity offerings) and might convey less information in cases of private companies that 
publish their accounts annually. Kothari et al. (2005) performance modification to the 
original model is also useful to correct misspecifications and errors in cases that companies 
are likely to exhibit extreme financial performance.  
Table 4-3 provides descriptive statistics for MBO firms with respect to changes in total 
accruals, sales and earnings. The variables are obtained as first differences scaled by lagged 
total assets. Only MBOs with sufficient time series observations are used in the table to 
ensure consistency and avoid large differences in the number of observations across years. 
First-differencing extends data requirements for variables, hence making it unlikely to use 
cross-sectional sample MBOs. Accordingly, 101 MBOs that have enough historical data are 
used for the table. 
     [Table 4-3] 
As shown in the table, the changes in total accruals are generally small and positive in the 
years prior to MBO year. They maintain a normal behaviour that indicates no manipulative 
activity until the first year before MBO. A considerable percentage of firms have negative 
changes in accruals in the second year prior to buyout. These negative changes in year -2 
transform into strong positive changes in year -1. However t-tests and Wilcoxon tests show 
that neither year represents significant changes in total accruals.  A similar pattern is seen in 
the changes in earnings. The year -1 is preceded by small and mostly insignificant positive 
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changes, however the mean (median) change in year -1 grows to 0.035 (0.026). This change 
in earnings is significant at (p=0.003) using two-tailed t-test and at (p=0.000) using two-tailed 
Wilcoxon test. We do not interpret this as a sign of upward management due to repeated 
cautions in the literature that changes in earnings and total accruals may represent other 
underlying forces (e.g., Jones, 1991; Defond and Jiambalvo, 1994). Rather these statistics are 
presented for descriptive purposes. We conduct formal tests in section 4.4 to examine 
earnings management. 
4.3.4 Model Selection 
We employ a cross-sectional variant of Jones (1991) time series regressions introduced by 
Defond and Jiambalvo (1994) and Kothari et al. (2005) performance adjusted model to test 
earnings management. These models use a measure of aggregate accruals as dependent 
variable and three explanatory variables to estimate model parameters. Both cross-sectional 
and time-series models require partition of total accruals into discretionary and non-
discretionary portions and estimating the unobservable discretionary accruals based on 
expected value of non-discretionary part. As far as data availability is concerned, the cross-
sectional variant provides an advantage over original pooled time series regressions, 
especially in the case of private companies where historical accounting data is scarcely 
available. The main difference between two models is that pooled time-series regressions 
assume constant coefficients during the entire test period, while cross-sectional regressions 
estimate coefficients separately for the each specific year examined. Performance adjusted 
model is especially useful to correct model misspecification when the sample tested has 
extreme performance (Kothari et al., 2005). Since MBOs are likely to have abnormal 
performance around buyout, performance adjustment adds a useful additional control to our 
earnings manipulation tests. 
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Recently there has been increasing use of models that examine specific accruals or statistical 
properties of earnings distributions to detect manipulative behaviour. Both approaches make 
a number of assumptions and impose different data requirements that constrain their area of 
application. As discussed in McNichols (2000), specific accruals models have a particular 
emphasis on unique industry settings where a single accrual is judged to be vulnerable to 
manipulation due to industry-specific circumstances. On the contrary, our study does not 
have a particular interest in a single accrual or industry, rather it incorporates 52 different 
industries measured by 2-digit SIC code. The strict data requirements would also make 
application of this approach impossible in our private firm setting. Distributional approaches 
(e.g., Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997) examine frequency and statistical properties of earnings 
around manipulative event. Although these models do not require many data items, their use 
in MBO context, in our opinion, will be flawed since substantial restructuring is carried out 
following buyout. In addition, managers might continue to manage earnings in the first year 
after buyout. Hence, we argue that earnings in the immediate year after buyout may not 
represent the real performance and may not contain as much information as we would like. In 
the context of this study, we examine earnings by the means of univariate performance 
analysis and consider Kothari et al. (2005) performance adjusted regressions a better model 
choice due to the explicit performance focus that this study has. In the light of these concerns 
related to specific accruals and distributional approaches, our choice of cross-sectional 
discretionary accruals models is justified. 
4.3.5 Control Firms 
A control sample is created by matching each MBO firm on industry and year with private 
non-buyout firms. The non-buyout private firm sample is collected from Fame as 160,000 
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active and inactive UK companies with available data.
18
 These firms are used for the analysis 
of cross-sectional model as well as comparison purposes. For cross-sectional model of 
expected accruals we construct groups of firms in the same year and 2-digit SIC code, which 
are called industry/year portfolios or estimation portfolios. Our matching procedure relies on 
the standard assumptions that firms in the same sectoral groups are subject to similar 
economic and market forces. One drawback of such method is noted by McNichols (2000) 
who argues that firms are more likely to manage earnings if their competitors engage in such 
practice. Our industry portfolios may not provide a correct representation of a comparable 
manipulation-free setting should this argument materialise. In our private firm case, however, 
the flow of information among market players is weaker than in public markets, which makes 
detecting and mimicking a particular behaviour more difficult. Our industry portfolios also 
contain considerably large number of firms, with a mean of 1,288 and median of 665 firms in 
each portfolio. Hypothesising a homogenous mimicking behaviour for so many firms would 
not be a realistic assumption. Finally our buyout firm managers have distinct incentives for 
earnings management stemming from the occurrence of a major corporate event that other 
private firm managers do not possess. The unique characteristics of our study therefore 
provide a realistic basis for us to perform such analysis. The detailed statistics on 160 
industry/year control portfolios are given in Table 4-4. 
     [Table 4-4] 
Table 4-5 provides descriptive statistics and compares MBOs and their corresponding 
estimation portfolios with respect to total assets, sales and earnings in the two years prior to 
MBO announcement. Presented mean and medians for estimation portfolios are calculated 
                                                          
18
 Specifically, we impose search criteria such that each private firm in the UK must have data on each of the 
Tangible assets, Bank and deposits, Current assets, Total assets, Short term loans & overdrafts, Current 
liabilities, Long term liabilities, Turnover, Taxation, Net profit, and Depreciation in at least one of the years 
between 2003 and 2011 to be included in the control sample. 
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from medians of 225 unique portfolios. For comparison purposes, a paired difference score is 
calculated by subtracting portfolio median from MBO firm value. Significance of paired 
differences is tested by parametric t-test and non-parametric Wilcoxon test. 
     [Table 4-5 here] 
The statistics on assets and sales of Table 4-5 indicate that MBO firms are, on average, 8 
times larger than their non-buyout counterparts. This difference in size is significant at 1% 
level for both t-tests and Wilcoxon tests (2-tailed). This result is expected since our control 
sample utilises a fairly large number of private firms, many of which are classified as small 
and medium sized companies. Although we are not aware of any size-effect related to 
earnings management incentives, matching on size is previously used in the literature by 
Perry and Williams (1994) to eliminate its potential effects. We control for size in section 
4.4.4 using a propensity score matching method. The earnings panel shows that MBO firms 
are highly profitable in the years preceding transaction. The number of MBO firms with 
negative earnings are considerably small (15%) in both years and the magnitude of earnings 
are comparable with control firms. Paired difference scores indicate that control firms are 
slightly more profitable than MBOs. The differences, however, are not significant, thus 
lending support to representativeness of our control firms.  
4.4 Tests of Earnings Management 
4.4.1 Cross-sectional Tests 
4.4.1.1 Discretionary Total Accruals 
We test earnings management during two years preceding buyout. For cross-sectional tests, 
we use portfolios of industry firms matched on two-digit SIC codes to estimate parameters. 
Our MBO sample has 53 two-digit industry groups for 291 firms. We are able to match 52 
industry groups with control firms and derive estimation portfolios for 291 MBOs. The top 
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three two-digit industry groups with the largest number of MBOs (SIC code 50 (Whole sale-
durable goods), SIC code 73 (Business services) and SIC code 87 (Engineering, accounting, 
research, management, and related services)) account for around one third of our sample. In 
total, there are 160 unique industry/year combinations across 8 calendar years. 42 (79% of) 
industry portfolios and 64 (38% of) industry/year combinations are used for multiple 
MBOs.
19
 225 unique regressions are performed to obtain parameters. In the discretionary 
total accruals model, total accruals are a function of inverse lagged assets, revenues and 
tangible assets.  
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where TAijt = total accruals for estimation portfolio i matched with MBO firm j on      
industry in year t; ∆REVijt = changes in turnover for estimation portfolio i matched with 
buyout firm j on industry in year t; PPEijt = tangible assets for estimation portfolio i matched 
with buyout firm j in year t; εijt = error term for estimation portfolio i matched with buyout 
firm j in year t; i = 1, ...., I, estimation firm index for the number of firms in estimation 
portfolios (number of firms in portfolios ranges from 14 to 9,268); j = buyout firm index, 1, 
…., 291; and t is prediction year (the first or second year prior to buyout). All variables in the 
regression are scaled by lagged total assets to mitigate heteroskedasticity. The parameters of 
the model; β1jt, β2jt and β3jt are estimated with OLS regressions. The discretionary accruals 
are then computed as: 
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where DAjt = discretionary accruals, or non-standardised prediction error for MBO firm j in 
year t; TAjt = total accruals for buyout firm j in year t; 1/Assetsj,t-1 is the inverse value of 
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 There are 49 two-digit industry groups and 128 industry/year combinations in year -2. 
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lagged total assets for buyout firm j in year t; ∆REVjt = changes in turnover for MBO firm j in 
year t; PPEjt = tangible assets for MBO firm j in year t; and β1jt, β2jt, β3jt are estimated 
parameters obtained from model (1). In the absence of managerial discretion, there will be no 
unobservable decisions and therefore no error term in the equation (2). In this case total 
accruals will be equal to non-discretionary accruals. Thus, the left-hand side of the equation 
would equal the right-hand side. When managerial discretion is involved, there will be 
additional noise and unobservable error term will have a non-zero value. Therefore 
discretionary accruals are obtained as actual total accruals minus computed (non-
discretionary) total accruals: 
Descriptive statistics for the regression parameters obtained from model (1) are presented in 
Table 4-5. The number of firms in industry portfolios ranges from 14 to 9,268, with a mean 
of 1288 and median of 665 firm observations. The median adjusted R
2 
is 77%, which is 
higher than any of the public-to-private MBO studies. The parameters exhibit expected signs. 
Mean and median revenues coefficient (β2) is positive, and PPE coefficient (β3) is negative. 
More than 50% of all coefficients are significant at conventional levels. Since our portfolios 
include large number of private firms, potential influence of extreme values on the estimated 
parameters cannot be ruled out. Hence we re-estimate parameters using data winsorised at 1% 
and 99% levels. The results are statistically and economically consistent with our previous 
estimates. 
     [Table 4-6] 
Discretionary accruals or non-standardised prediction errors are calculated for 2 years prior to 
MBO. We obtain prediction errors from model (2) and also calculate standardised prediction 
errors following Jones (1991). Standardised prediction errors are computed by dividing each 
prediction error to its standard deviation estimated from the related cross-sectional regression. 
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Error standard deviations are computed as:                  where RSS = residual sum of 
squares, T = the number of observations in related industry/year portfolio, k = number of 
parameters in the regression. The significance of standardised prediction errors are tested by a 
Z statistic introduced by Patell (1976):  
                                                                     (3) 
where Vij is standardised prediction error for estimation portfolio i matched with buyout firm 
j, Tij is the number of observations in the estimation portfolio i for buyout firm j, and k is the 
number of parameters in the cross-sectional model.  
The results of the cross-sectional tests are presented in Table 4-7. The first two columns show 
prediction errors for the year immediately before MBO transaction. Statistics for the second 
year before MBO are also presented because the MBO planning might not be limited to 
preceding year. Our results follow a different pattern than those found in previous earnings 
management studies. Past studies hypothesise that MBO firms will exhibit negative 
discretionary accruals and thus report one-tailed p-values. On the contrary, we do not make 
prediction about the direction of earnings management, rather our hypotheses attempt to 
discover whether earnings management is present or absent in private firms. We therefore 
present 2-tailed p-values to maintain consistency with our hypotheses and to highlight the 
differences of our findings.
20
 The first column indicates that the mean and median non-
standardised prediction errors are positive and significant in both parametric and non-
parametric tests (p = 0.000, two-tailed). The standardised prediction errors in the second 
column are also significant using Wilcoxon test (p = 0.002, two-tailed). The third and fourth 
columns show negative accruals, with the exception of mean non-standardised prediction 
error. The positive mean in the third column is significant (p = 0.013, two-tailed), the 
                                                          
20
 The unreported results obtained from winsorised data are qualitatively identical to Table 6. 
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negative median and non-standardised mean/median in fourth column are not significant (p > 
0.1, two-tailed). Therefore it is not possible to draw conclusion for the second year prior to 
buyout. The results of year -1 indicate strong upward management, contrary to existing 
evidence for public-to-private MBOs which suggests that buyouts are preceded by 
downwards earnings management. Rather it shows that private firm managers have stronger 
incentives to make upward adjustment than their potential wealth benefits from downward 
adjustment. This result is consistent with our H1 and Howorth et al. (2004) who suggest that 
family succession plays an important role in private-to-private MBOs. Our findings 
underscore the differences in agency motives between public and private firms prior to MBO 
transactions, where a public firm’s accounting practices are characterised by the pursuit of 
managerial self interest while the private one is characterised by the family succession issues. 
In the next section, we present results from performance adjusted model estimations. 
     [Table 4-7] 
4.4.1.2 Performance Adjusted Discretionary Accruals 
Kothari et al. (2005) suggest two ways of performance adjustment. The first one involves 
matching each MBO on a firm with the same industry and nearest profitability. The second 
one is carried out by augmenting the original regression by an additional profitability (return 
on assets – ROA) variable. Both methods are widely used in the earnings management 
literature. We estimate the augmented cross-sectional Jones regression as follows: 
 
     
            
        
 
            
        
       
            
         
      
            
         
      
            
     (5), 
where TAijt = total accruals for estimation portfolio firm i matched with MBO firm j on 
industry in year t, ∆REVijt = changes in turnover for estimation portfolio firm i matched with 
MBO firm j on industry in year t, PPEijt = Tangible assets for estimation portfolio firm i 
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matched with MBO firm j in year t, ROAijt = Net income divided by assets for estimation 
portfolio firm i matched with MBO firm j on industry in year t, Assetsi,jt-1 = Total assets one 
year before manipulation year . 
     [Table 4-8] 
The results presented in Table 4-8 give support to the previous findings that private-to-private 
MBOs manage earnings upwards in the year preceding buyout. Consistent with results from 
discretionary total accruals tests, prediction errors in year -1 are positive and year -2 are 
negative, while only those in year -1 are significant. There is a visible drop in the mean and 
median non-standardised accruals, which we attribute to the correction of type II errors due to 
performance adjustment as explained in Kothari et al. (2005). The mean and median non-
standardised prediction errors and median standardised prediction errors in year -1 are 
significant at 5%. The negative prediction error statistics for year -2 are not significant. 
Overall, the results are consistent with the previous inferences that private-to-private MBOs 
engage in upwards earnings manipulation in the year preceding buyout and this earnings 
management phenomenon does not extend back to the second year prior to buyout. 
4.4.1.3 Working Capital Discretionary Accruals 
We estimate cross-sectional regressions with working capital accruals (WCA) to examine the 
management of short term accruals. WCA are computed as non-cash working capital, and can 
be obtained by subtracting depreciation from total accruals. Since depreciation represents a 
long term accrual, removal of it leaves short term accruals in the equation. In the same vein, 
PPE explanatory variable is dropped from model because it is associated with depreciation. 
The model used to estimate WCA model parameters is as follows: 
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The obtained results are presented in Table 4-9. In general, estimates of cross-sectional model 
with working capital accruals are consistent with previous estimates with total and 
performance adjusted accruals. The non-standardised mean and median prediction errors in 
year -1 are positive and significant at 5% and 1% respectively, and median standardised 
prediction errors is significant at 1%. In line with previous findings, negative prediction 
errors in year -2 are not significant. Overall the results from 3 cross-sectional models suggest 
that private-to-private MBOs manage earnings upwards in the year preceding buyout. Given 
the previous MBO evidence on earnings management (Perry and Williams, 1994; Wu, 1997) 
that public-to-private MBOs understate earnings, this behaviour is consistent with the notion 
that different agency problems and regulatory environment of private companies impose 
distinct motives on managers for undertaking a buyout. The differences are then reflected in 
the way managerial discretion is exercised. 
     [Table 4-9] 
4.4.2 Pooled Time Series Tests 
To assess robustness of our results, we re-estimate discretionary accruals using Jones (1991) 
pooled time series model.
21
 The expected accruals model to obtain parameters is: 
    
           
         
 
           
         
      
           
         
     
           
                (7), 
where TAjt = total accruals for buyout firm j in estimation period year; ∆REVjt = changes in 
turnover for buyout firm j in estimation period year t; PPEjt = tangible assets for buyout firm j 
in estimation period year t; Assetsj,t-1 = lagged total assets for buyout firm j in estimation 
period year t; j = 1, ..., 101, buyout firm index; t= 1, ..., Tj, year index for buyout firm j’s 
estimation period length, Tj ranges from 4 to 8 years. 
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 A limitation of this approach is that a minimum of 6 years data required to compute Patell (1976) Z statistic 
for standardised prediction errors. Therefore sample is substantially reduced in the calculation of standardised 
prediction errors. 
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The number of years in the estimation period ranges from 4 to 8, with a mean of 5.4 and a 
median of 5 years.
22
 As in cross-sectional models, the coefficients of revenues and PPE 
generally carry their expected signs. However there is a considerable decrease in the overall 
parameter significance. Less than half of the coefficients are significant at conventional 
levels. The median adjusted R
2 
is 32.9%, which is lower than Perry and Williams (1994) but 
higher than Jones (1991). The Durbin-Watson test statistics indicate that serial correlation is 
not present in the average test. 
     [Table 4-10 here] 
The results of time-series tests presented in Table 4-10 are partly consistent with cross-
sectional results. Mean and median prediction errors are positive in year -1 and negative in 
year -2. The magnitude of non-standardised prediction errors is similar to those in cross-
sectional tests. However all prediction errors are insignificant with the exception of non-
standardised prediction error in year -1, which is significant at 5% using 2-tailed t test. The 
drop in significance levels is attributable to the short estimation windows used in the 
expected accruals model as well as the low observation count in standardised accruals tests. 
The results from pooled time series estimations confirm the findings of cross-sectional tests 
that private-to-private MBOs are not preceded by income-decreasing earnings management. 
These findings are in contrast with the existing evidence from public-to-private buyouts 
(Perry and Williams, 1994; Wu, 1997; Fischer and Louis, 2008) that MBO managers 
understate earnings for ex post personal gains. A plausible explanation for this behaviour 
could be that combined effects of conflicting factors such as family succession and 
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 Note that 8 is the maximum number of years possible for private companies. Researchers often use longer 
estimation windows. For example the mean and median values for Perry and Williams (1994) sample are 11.3 
and 12 years respectively, with a minimum of 4 and a maximum of 16 years in the estimation period. However, 
availability of data for private companies is more constrained. Therefore our estimation windows are smaller 
than those in public firm studies. 
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differences in reporting regulations faced by UK private firm managers prevent their pursuit 
of self-interest and override their personal wealth goals. 
4.4.3 Private Equity Backed MBOs 
To examine the effect of PE involvement in earnings management the sample is stratified 
based on PE sponsor status. Segregation of PE-backed and non-PE-backed buyouts is 
important to gain more insight into post-buyout MBO performance. Slightly more than half 
of the sample MBOs has PE sponsors. There are 151 and 52 PE-backed MBOs in the cross-
sectional and time-series samples respectively. The descriptive statistics for changes in total 
accruals, sales and earnings for the PE-backed subsample are presented in Table 4-11. Time-
series sample is used for descriptive analysis to maintain consistency with the whole sample 
statistics presented in Table 4-3. The significance of mean and medians is tested by one-
sample t-tests and Wilcoxon tests.  Two-sample Mann-Whitney tests for the equality of 
medians are also performed in PE-backed and non-PE-backed MBOs. 
The patterns observed in PE-backed subsample are in line with statistics in Table 4-3. The 
changes in total accruals are largely positive, except year -2, and changes in earnings are 
positive throughout 4 years examined. The largest changes in statistics occur in the first year 
before MBO, where both total accruals and earnings grow by 3% from the year prior. Mean 
changes in earnings are significant at 5% (p = 0.033, 2-tailed) and median changes at 1% (p = 
0.000, 2-tailed). Mann-Whitney p-values indicate that the differences between PE-backed and 
non-backed MBOs are not significant. In sum, presented statistics do not suggest a significant 
role for PE sponsors in the accounting practices of managers prior to MBO transaction. 
However these statistics should not be interpreted as evidence of presence or absence of 
earnings management as they are only for descriptive purpose. The results of formal tests are 
presented in the next table. 
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              [Table 4-11] 
Table 4-12 displays the results of cross-sectional tests for PE-backed and non-PE-backed 
subsamples. The whole sample statistics are also presented for ease of comparison.
23
 
Consistent with the expectations, PE-backed buyouts do not show significant upwards 
earnings management in year -1. The mean discretionary total accruals and median working 
capital discretionary accruals are weakly significant. The non-PE-backed sample, on the other 
hand, shows significant upwards management in all 3 models tested. We previously 
hypothesised that PE-backed and pure buyout behaviour will be different as far as earnings 
management is concerned. The results demonstrate support for H3 that PE-backed buyouts do 
not engage in earnings management while confirming that accounting practices of PE-backed 
buyouts differ from those of non-PE-backed buyouts, highlighting the differences in 
motivations, PE firms continuing involvement in the markets and their reputation concerns. 
Our findings related to PE backing support the evidence from IPOs that PE firms constrain 
earnings management (Morsfield and Tan, 2006; Wongsunwai, 2013) whilst we find no 
support for the argument that PE firms collude with managers prior to MBOs to understate 
earnings (Bargeron et al., 2008). Overall, our findings are consistent with a positive venture 
capital certification role for PE firms (Megginson and Weiss, 1991).  
     [Table 4-12] 
4.4.4 Additional Accruals Tests 
In previous sections we used 3 cross-sectional and 1 time-series models to examine earnings 
management. The consistent results of the tests provide sufficient evidence that upwards 
earnings management occurs prior to private-to-private MBOs.  However, there might be 
concerns associated with private company regulations that the results might not be 
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 Time-series tests are not presented due to lack of sufficient observations and the powerless tests statistics 
resulting from short parameter estimation windows. 
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extrapolated to the public companies. For example, EU member states might introduce 
disclosure and audit exemptions for small and medium sized firms. Since previous studies 
examine public-to-private MBOs that do not face such exemptions, it might be useful to 
repeat the tests excluding these firms and to obtain more comparable results. In addition, 
there might be concerns about the large differences between the observation numbers in 
industry/year control portfolios. Table 4-4 showed that the largest portfolio has 9268 firm 
observations while the smallest portfolio has 14 firm observations. The standard deviation is 
1781 firms. This large standard deviation is a by-product of the big industries in the private 
company population numbering in several millions.
24
 These big industries are also heavily 
represented in our sample pushing up the standard deviation.
25
 Some might argue that the 
large standard deviation might cause a bias in the test statistics, with large portfolios yielding 
powerful tests and small portfolios yielding weak tests. In the light of Defond and Jiambalvo 
(1994) method where portfolios are constructed from the population of companies with 
available data, this argument is not justified. In fact the bias might occur if big industries are 
purposefully trimmed to obtain a smaller standard deviation. Still, it might be useful to 
exclude the largest and smallest portfolios – and corresponding MBOs accordingly- and 
repeat the tests to verify our findings. The results of the experiments with 4 subsamples are 
presented in Table 4-13. 
     [Table 4-13] 
Panel A reports the statistics for MBOs filing audited accounts. Panel B reports statistics for 
MBOs that report full accounts from the date of buyout to the last year they that filed 
accounts. This is done to obtain a more homogenous sample in terms of audit and disclosure. 
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 Portfolios constructed from public companies do not suffer from large standard deviation in the number of 
observations since the public company population is relatively small. 
25
 Table 3 shows the industry/year portfolios and number of matched MBOs for each portfolio. The most 
heavily represented big industries are 2-digit SIC code 50 (23 MBOs), 2-digit SIC code 73 (43 MBOs) and 2-
digit SIC code 87 (29 MBOs). 
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Although all sample MBOs must file full accounts in the 2 years preceding MBO to be 
included in the sample, using registered account types (e.g., full accounts, small company, 
total exemption etc.) would provide formal results. Panel C excludes the MBOs matched on 
smallest portfolios that are likely to yield weak tests and Panel D presents the results 
excluding the bottom and top portfolio deciles. Since whole sample tests do not show 
earnings management in year -2, only results for year -1 are presented in the table. Consistent 
with previous findings, all models yield positive and significant discretionary accruals 
suggesting that private-to-private MBOs are preceded by upwards earnings management. 
Finally we use propensity score matching (PSM) to estimate earnings management. Contrary 
to dimension-to-dimension matching applied in the previous three cross-sectional models, 
PSM controls for multiple dimensions to select a matching firm with similar characteristics 
(Li and Prabhala, 2005). We estimate a probit regression to predict likelihood of being a 
buyout target, where dependent variable is a dummy that equals 1 for sample MBOs and 0 for 
non-buyouts and independent variables are sales growth, size (natural logarithm of assets), 
ROA and asset turnover (sales/assets). The regression is executed in each calendar year 
instead of pooling the data. After the balancing property of regression is satisfied, for each 
MBO firm we select a non-buyout with the nearest propensity score with replication. The 
PSM discretionary accruals are calculated as MBO firm discretionary total accruals minus 
PSM matched firm discretionary total accruals. The results presented in Table 4-14 show that 
MBOs manage earnings upwards prior to transaction. The results related to the provision of 
PE-backing also suggest that PE-backed MBOs engage in less earnings management relative 
to non-PE-backed MBOs. Overall, findings are consistent with prior estimations and private-
to-private MBOs conclusively exhibit upwards earnings management. 
     [Table 4-14] 
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4.5 Earnings Management and MBO Performance 
The existing body of research from initial public offerings (IPO) and seasoned equity 
offerings (SEO) documents that earnings management around equity issues has substantial 
impact on subsequent firm performance (Teoh et al., 1998a; 1998b; Rangan, 1998; Li et al., 
2006; Jo and Kim, 2007; Jo et al., 2007; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Kothari et al., 2012). The 
negative association between discretionary accruals and performance is well documented 
(Rangan, 1998; Teoh et al., 1998b). The income increasing earnings management prior to 
share issues results in post-issue accrual reversals and leads to deterioration of operating 
performance and stock returns in the following periods. The effects of earnings manipulation 
are also manifested in the form of subsequent delisting method, where IPOs associated with 
conservative earnings management are more likely to be merged or acquired and IPOs 
associated with aggressive earnings management are more likely to delist involuntarily from 
markets (Li et al., 2006).  
The question of whether buyouts bring good returns to their investors and how they perform 
in their buyout form was of particular interest since the buyout boom of 1980s. For example, 
Kaplan (1989a) showed large improvements in operating performance and increases in 
market value following buyout transaction. Attempts were also made to explain determinants 
of buyout performance and returns to investors (Guo et al., 2011; Jelic and Wright, 2011). 
The performance dimension is important to show that buyouts create value and since it plays 
an influential role in the way investors realise their returns. Initial public offerings (IPO) and 
trade sales have historically been the most preferred exit channels to realise investments 
(Stromberg, 2008; Jelic and Wright, 2011) due to their perceived superiority and higher 
return characteristics over other exit routes. Nikoskelainen and Wright (2007) document that 
such superiority indeed exists in the form of subsequent returns to investors. Bienz and Lenite 
(2008) formulate the relation between performance and exit channel into a pecking order, 
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where the most profitable company is exited by IPO, followed by trade sales and secondary 
buyouts in a decreasing order of profitability. Cumming and Johan (2008) and Sousa (2010) 
suggest that buyout teams and investors plan their exit strategy prior to consummation of 
buyout transaction. Although buyouts are unlikely to exit using the conceived channels 
(Wright et al., 1992), the inherent properties of a pre-determined strategy are likely to be 
significant elements of post-buyout performance of the company. Hence substantial influence 
on performance is expected as a result of the actions taken before buyout. 
Starting with DeAngelo (1986), the role of accrual manipulation in MBO value creation is 
debated. Contrary to equity offerings where issuers possess opportunistic incentives to inflate 
earnings in order to maximise stock price, MBO teams tend to deflate earnings prior to 
transaction in order to pay less. Perry and Williams (1994) and Fischer and Louis (2008) 
study pre-buyout accrual management and provide evidence that managers understate 
income. However these studies make no attempt to explore the impact of expected accrual 
reversals following buyout. Since accrual management effectively means shifting income 
from one period to another, a set of influential post-transaction outcomes is expected. In this 
section we attempt to shed light on the buyout performance from an earnings management 
viewpoint. In line with the evidence from equity offerings, we expect that earnings 
management will be inversely related to subsequent buyout performance. In the light of the 
above discussion and prior evidence, we propose that: 
H4: Aggressive earnings management results in performance deterioration. 
H5: Discretionary accruals are negatively associated with performance changes after buyout. 
4.5.1 Performance Sample Industry Distribution 
Table 4-13 reports industry characteristics of the performance sample. Panel A displays 
detailed industry statistics and Panel B shows industries based on Gompers et al. (2008) 
130 
 
venture capital classification. Both panels show that the sample is clustered by industry, i.e. 
computer equipment and services industries account for over 18% of the sample. Gompers et 
al. (2008) venture capital classification reveals clustering around three industry groups. 
Consumer, Business and Industrial, and Business Services industries account for over 73% of 
the sample. This pattern of buyout concentration around business and service industries is 
consistent with the UK and worldwide market trends.
26
 
     [Table 4-15] 
4.5.2 Net Income Performance of MBOs 
If we follow the agency line of argument advocated by Jensen (1986, 1989), the mere 
realisation of a buyout transaction should result in performance and governance 
improvements due to its superiority over traditional company structures. This argument is 
well suited for public-to-private buyouts where pre-buyout earnings understatement (e.g. 
Perry and Williams, 1994) may account for part of the performance improvements after 
buyout. In private-to-private buyouts the relation between performance and earnings 
management can be more complex. Since we find an upwards earnings management pattern, 
the expected income-decreasing effect of future accruals reversals will pull earnings down 
while the improved corporate structure (e.g. Jensen, 1989) will push them upwards. To 
examine whether upwards or downwards earnings management introduce distinct 
performance outcomes, we stratify the sample by direction of earnings management and 
repeat the tests. We also rank MBOs by magnitude of discretionary accruals into aggressive 
and conservative quartiles.  Each quartile contains 64 firms, with varying numbers of firm-
year observations in the years examined. Then we perform Spearman rank correlation and 
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 For example Stromberg (2008) notes that mature industries such as machinery and retailing are popular 
buyout targets. Jelic (2011) documents the rise of service industries in the UK buyout market over time. Our 
sample industry distribution is comparable to Weir et al. (2011) and Jelic and Wright (2011). For example, 
Consumer, Business and Industrial, and Business Services industries constitute 65% of the Jelic and Wright 
(2011) sample. 
131 
 
cross-sectional regression tests to determine the link between earnings management and post-
buyout performance. The expected sign of relation between performance and discretionary 
accruals is negative without regard to the direction of earnings management. 
Table 4-16 reports net income performance in the 6 years around MBO transaction. We limit 
our performance analysis to three post-buyout years for mainly two reasons. First, most of the 
corporate governance and performance changes & improvements occur in the first three years 
following buyout (Guo et al., 2011). Second, buyout sponsors are more likely to exit after the 
first three years. Average holding period in the UK for PE-backed buyouts is around 3.5 
years (Nikoskelainen and Wright, 2007; Jelic, 2011). Hence the first three years would offer a 
better representation of the MBOs. Top two panels display medians for the entire sample and 
bottom two panels present performance by PE sponsor status. Year 0 is the buyout year and 
year -1 is the first year before buyout where earnings management activity is observed. We 
measure performance in two ways: raw operating performance which is calculated as net 
income divided by beginning assets and industry adjusted net income performance. Industry 
adjustment is performed by subtracting the medians of firms in the corresponding industry 
matched on 2-digit SIC code and year from raw MBO net income. Performance changes are 
computed as year-to-year differences in net income. Net income is Fame item 18 (Profit & 
loss for period). Reported statistics represent median performance for the relevant samples 
and years. Since performance measures scaling income by lagged assets can inflate 
performance, we repeat the tests using net income scaled by current assets and find similar 
results. 
     [Table 4-16] 
Observed patterns for the entire sample suggest improvements prior to buyout and slight 
deterioration after. Unadjusted performance rises from 7.7% to 8.9% in year -1. Industry 
adjusted performance observes a similar improvement from year -2 to -1. Performance peaks 
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in year 0 (10.5% unadjusted and 2.9% industry adjusted), then begins to decline in year 1 
before eventually reverting to pre-buyout levels in year 3. Performance improvements before 
buyout are significant as shown by industry-adjusted change of 2.1%. The percentage of 
firms with negative performance changes rises from 41% in year -1 to 58% in year 2. The 
post-buyout changes are significant at conventional levels. It should be noted that despite 
decreasing levels of net income, MBOs continue to outperform their industry peers in all 
three post-buyout years examined. This performance pattern is consistent with Jensen’s 
(1989) agency view and prior studies on buyout performance. 
Analysis of PE-backed and non-PE backed samples reveals substantial differences in buyout 
performance. PE-backed MBOs are more profitable throughout and at least two times more 
profitable than non-backed MBOs in the post-buyout period. Unadjusted performance of PE-
backed sample peaks at year 1 while non-PE sample performance monotonically declines 
following buyout. More importantly, industry-adjusted performance of PE-backed buyouts 
shows improvements and significantly outperforms industry from year -1 to year 3 while 
non-backed buyouts remain at the same industry levels. Mann-Whitney (MW) test statistics 
show that performance differences between medians are significant. It appears that better-
than-industry post-buyout performance is driven solely by PE sponsored buyouts. The 
reported performance changes in the bottom panel exhibit a similar pattern. Industry adjusted 
performance increases in the earnings management year by 1.9% and 2.6% and declines 
following buyout. The differences in performance changes between PE-backed and non-
backed samples are not significant at conventional levels. In sum, PE sponsorship is 
associated with higher performance, however does not prevent deterioration of performance 
in post-buyout period. 
Prior studies (Rangan, 1998; Teoh et al., 1998b; Jo and Kim, 2007) show that incentives to 
manage earnings may remain in place for a certain time after equity issues. This also appears 
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to be the case in MBOs. Although we cannot estimate discretionary accruals after buyout due 
to data issues, Panel B of Table 4-16 shows significant performance improvements in year 0 
relative to year -1. In general, the performance drops are observed only after the end of year 
0. The buyout year, year 0 in our tables, is known to be a transition period where major 
restructuring activities take place and it is often not seen as an unbiased indicator of buyout 
performance. However it is useful to take note of the good performance observed in year 0. 
     [Table 4-17] 
The performance of MBOs stratified by the direction and magnitude of earnings management 
are reported in Table 4-17. Upwards-downwards earnings management categorisation is 
based on discretionary total accruals.
27
 The levels of performance presented in Panel A 
suggest that upwards earnings managers tend to be more profitable prior to buyout and less 
profitable afterwards. The opposite pattern is true for the downwards earnings managers. The 
downwards subsample registers significant performance improvements from pre- to post-
buyout period. While they underperform industry by a median of 2.8% two years before 
buyout, by the end of year 3 they outperform industry by a median of 3%. Upwards 
subsample performance, on the other hand, declines to industry levels in year 3. The results 
presented in Panel B for aggressive and conservative earnings management quartiles are 
consistent with prior evidence that aggressive earnings managers subsequently experience 
performance deterioration (e.g., Teoh et al., 1998b). Unadjusted earnings for aggressive 
quartile MBOs are around 10% of assets which is then reduced to just over 6% in the year 3. 
In contrast conservative quartile MBOs register higher earnings in all post buyout years. 
Moreover, aggressive earnings managers fail to perform better than industry after buyout 
while conservative earnings managers outperform the industry in all post-buyout years. MW 
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 Similar patterns are observed in unreported tests of performance based on working capital accruals and 
performance adjusted accruals. 
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p-values show that the performance differences between aggressive and conservative 
quartiles are significant in year 1 and year 2. 
Overall, the univariate analysis offers support to the proposition that earnings management 
prior to buyout influences performance after buyout. In the specific context of private-to-
private MBOs, accrual reversals following upwards earnings management gives result to 
deterioration in performance and vice versa. The H4 is also supported. Upwards earnings 
managers outperform industry only in two years while aggressive earnings managers do not 
outperform the industry in any years. The results so far imply a negative relationship between 
earnings management and performance. In the next section OLS regressions are conducted to 
examine this relationship (H5). 
4.5.3 Regression of Post-Buyout Performance and Discretionary Accruals 
Spearman rank correlations between discretionary accruals and performance changes 
(∆ROA) are reported in Table 4-18. In correlations and regressions, we present results with 
both unadjusted and industry adjusted changes in net income for robustness purposes. Panel 
A and Panel B display unadjusted and industry adjusted correlations respectively. 
Correlations in both panels are consistent, discretionary accruals are negatively correlated 
with performance changes in all years; however with varying degrees of significance. The 
correlations with discretionary total accruals (DTA) are significant in all years, while 
correlations with performance adjusted discretionary total accruals (PDA) are only significant 
in year 1 and correlations with WCA are not significant. Therefore we conclude that only 
discretionary total accruals predict the long term buyout performance. 
     [Table 4-18] 
Prior literature provides evidence of the negative relation between earnings management and 
performance in equity issues (Rangan, 1998; Teoh et al., 1998b; Jo et al., 2007). Consistent 
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with previous studies, our H5 posits that earnings management is negatively associated with 
post-buyout performance changes. To examine this prediction we estimate cross-sectional 
regressions in each of the three post-buyout years. We first run univariate regressions of 
performance on discretionary accruals and then we control for other factors that are likely to 
influence performance. Performance and discretionary accruals variables are winsorised at 1
st
 
and 99
th
 percentiles to reduce the effect of outliers. The following regression is estimated. 
∆ROAt= α+ b1DTA+Ɛit,            (8) 
Panel A of Table 4-19 reports univariate regressions. The dependent variables are unadjusted 
and industry-adjusted changes in ROA relative to year -1. DTA is the common independent 
variable in all regressions. The first and last three columns display results for unadjusted and 
industry adjusted ROA changes respectively. Consistent with previous studies, the results 
demonstrate that DTA is negatively associated with post-buyout performance changes. In 
Panel B we control for several other variables following prior literature as follows: 
∆ROA3= α+ b1DTA+ b2PE+ b3SGRO+ b4SIZE+ b5g1+ b6g2+ b7g3+ Ɛit,                            (9) 
where ∆ROA3= raw and industry adjusted net income change in year 3. DTA= discretionary 
total accruals in year -1; PE= dummy variable, equals 1 if MBO is PE-backed and 0 
otherwise; SGRO= percentage growth in sales from year -2 to -1, included following Rangan 
(1998); SIZE= inflation adjusted log of total sales in year -1; g1, g2 and g3 are industry 
dummies for buyouts in high-tech industries defined as in Gompers et al. (2008), included 
following Jelic and Wright (2011).
28
  The models R
2
 ranges from 7.68% to 16.7%. Our main 
variable of interest DTA maintains a negative sign and remains statistically significant in all 
regressions. Consistent with the findings in univariate performance analysis, PE is not 
                                                          
28 High-tech industry classification in Gompers et al. (2008) corresponds to Internet and Computers, Biotech 
and Healthcare, Communications and Electronics industries respectively 
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significantly associated with performance changes. To assess economic significance of 
results, we calculate the effect of one standard deviation change in DTA on dependent 
variable by multiplying its coefficient with its sample standard deviation following Rangan 
(1998) and Teoh et al. (1998b). The sample standard deviations and economic impact of DTA 
are presented in Table 4-18. The results show a consistent trend of increasing negative impact 
on earnings from year 1 through year 3.  For example, accruals reversals are associated with a 
2.66% negative impact on raw performance changes in the first year following buyout, which 
rises to a cumulative 4.75% impact in the third year. For industry adjusted income, 
discretionary accruals are associated with 2.29% decline in performance, rising to 4.35% in 
the third year. The implied economic impact of discretionary accruals in univariate and 
multivariate tests are consistent and quantitatively similar. These results are economically 
important in the sense that earnings management explains more than 4% of the performance 
changes in the three years following MBO, which is the approximate improvement or 
deterioration in earnings reported by recent buyout studies (Chung, 2009; Boucly et al., 
2011). Prior literature also documents that most of the improvements in earnings are limited 
to first two or three years subsequent to buyout (Kaplan, 1989a, Smith, 1990; Opler, 1992). 
Therefore our findings provide useful insights into post-transaction performance of buyouts. 
In unreported multivariate regressions with changes in ROA in year 0 as dependent variable, 
DTA also carries a negative sign; however not significant at conventional levels. Hence the 
coefficients in year 0 do not have economic importance. Contrary to evidence from equity 
offerings as in Rangan (1998), Jo and Kim (2007), and Jo et al. (2007) that show a short-term 
relationship between earnings management and performance, accrual reversals in buyouts 
appear related to long term performance than as well as short term. 
     [Table 4-19] 
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In sum, our results show that upwards earnings management in the immediate year before 
MBO coincides with increases in net income. Consistent with an accrual reversals 
explanation, buyout transactions are followed by deterioration in performance in the three 
subsequent years. Earnings management proxied by discretionary total accruals is a 
significant determinant of post-buyout performance changes. Given the fact that prior studies 
document performance improvements subsequent to public-to-private buyouts (e.g., Kaplan, 
1989a; Boucly et al., 2011; Guo et al., 2011) and earnings understatement prior (Perry and 
Williams, 1994), our findings retrospectively suggest that income decreasing earnings 
management prior to buyout transaction may account for part of the post-buyout performance 
improvements. 
     [Table 4-20] 
4.6 Discussion of Results 
We used Jones pooled time-series and several versions of cross-sectional Jones model to 
examine accruals management in MBO transactions. The tests of earnings management 
conclusively show upwards earnings management in the immediate year prior to MBO. 
Important to explain this finding is complex and varying ownership structures of private 
firms introducing different agency issues throughout sample firms. While prior research on 
buyouts (e.g., Perry and Williams, 1994) finds downwards earnings management in PTP 
buyouts, the interpretation of this result is straightforward. The wealth considerations of 
public firm managers arising from separation of ownership and control in addition to their 
acquisition of the company introduce a self-interested bias in the accounting practices, which 
would result in them understating earnings to offer a lower bid for the acquisition. Private 
company ownership structures, on the other hand, cannot be discounted to one formula since 
they possess various types of owner and manager relationships. Although private firms 
typically have concentrated ownership, the degree to which managers and owners influence 
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decisions varies from one firm to another. Many private firms have a familial ownership 
structure in addition to some minority shareholders and many other private firms are held by 
owner/managers. Consequently, each private firm has a different motivation for undertaking 
an MBO, which would also affect the practices of earnings management. For example, if the 
majority shareholder or owner/manager sells his shares in the MBO, he is highly likely to 
have enough incentives and power to engage in upwards earnings management. In family 
owned firms, on the other hand, earnings management is less likely due to the fact that MBO 
is triggered by family succession issues (Howorth et al., 2004) and wealth considerations are 
minimal or non-existent due to a pervasive family identity in the firm (Stockmans et al., 
2010). It is, therefore, necessary to examine them separately to infer conclusions.
29
 
We also examine the link between accruals manipulation and subsequent performance, and 
show that earnings management results in mean reversion in performance following buyout. 
Aggressive earnings managers perform worse than conservative earnings managers; 
moreover they do not outperform industry following buyout. Similar results are detected for 
upwards and downwards earnings managers. While downwards earnings managers show an 
increasing trend of profitability following buyout, upwards earnings managers’ profitability 
decreases to industry level in the third year after buyout. The regression results also 
consistently suggest statistically and economically significant impact for earnings 
management. These results imply that PTP buyout performance, which is the main focus of 
buyout literature, is often overstated due to omitted accruals reversal component of 
profitability. Should PTP buyouts understate earnings prior to MBO as pointed by the 
existing literature, then subsequent performance will be upward-biased. The opposite holds 
for private-to-private buyouts which we show in this chapter. Overall, earnings management 
                                                          
29
 We examine earnings management in private-to-private MBOs across different types of ownership in the next 
chapter. 
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is an important determinant of post-buyout performance and discussion of accrual reversals is 
necessary to have an unbiased debate about value creation in buyouts.  
4.7 Conclusion and Further Research 
Based on a unique sample of 291 UK MBOs, we test earnings management prior to private-
to-private buyouts and whether accrual reversals can explain subsequent buyout performance. 
We hypothesise that the different agency problems faced by private firm managers and the 
resulting distinct motives for undertaking buyout will affect the exercise of earnings 
management practices relative to existing evidence from public-to-private MBOs. Supportive 
of this hypothesis, we find significant income-increasing earnings management in the year 
preceding buyout transaction. This year coincides with large increases in total accruals and 
earnings. In separate tests for PE-backed and non-PE-backed subsamples we find evidence of 
PE involvement inhibiting earnings management. Buyouts without PE sponsor, however, 
exhibit significant upwards earnings management behaviour. These findings are robust across 
several prediction models and to the choice of accruals. Overall our results highlight the 
differences in agency problems between private and public companies while the results 
related to PE backing are consistent with a venture capital certification explanation.  
The performance analysis suggests that pre-buyout earnings management can explain post-
buyout performance. The results of univariate analysis show significant drops in performance 
following buyout in aggressive earnings managers and upwards earnings managers. 
Aggressive earnings managers fail to outperform industry peers while upwards earnings 
managers cease to outperform industry after second post-buyout year. The results of 
univariate and multivariate regressions suggest that performance drops can be explained by 
upwards earnings management prior to buyout. Earnings management proxy discretionary 
total accruals are statistically and economically significant in all regressions. Consistent with 
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the prior evidence from equity offerings, the results suggest that earnings management is a 
significant determinant of buyout performance. 
This research makes several important contributions for practitioners and regulators. It shows 
that earnings management is not a generic phenomenon in MBOs and there is considerable 
heterogeneity with respect to the existence as well as direction of earnings management. The 
heterogeneity exists in the form of public and private companies, and between companies 
with and without PE sponsors. The distinction between public and private companies is 
manifested by their starkly contrasting earnings management practices. Private firm managers 
overstate earnings whilst literature shows that managers of public firms understate earnings in 
pursuit of personal wealth. The presence or absence of PE sponsor also leads to divergent 
accounting practice by private firm managers. PE sponsors substantially constrain exercise of 
managerial discretion and inhibit earnings management in both directions. The findings 
related to performance analysis underline challenges in value creation and difficulties in 
assessing it, as well as demonstrating that the classic agency view of Jensen does not fully 
explain post-buyout performance in private-to-private buyouts. The results suggest that 
earnings management accompanying buyouts is a significant explanatory element of buyout 
performance, rather than the buyout transaction itself. It is highly likely that previous studies 
lending support to Jensen’s buyout superiority view overstate performance due to downwards 
earnings management preceding public-to-private MBOs and their negligence of earnings 
management element in post-buyout performance. This study calls for more research on 
value creation in buyouts, paying particular attention to accrual reversals and the role they 
play in buyout performance. 
This study does not attempt to explore earnings management practices in other types of 
buyouts. Although the results suggest substantial heterogeneity, relevant inferences are made 
based on prior evidence from public-to-private buyouts. Therefore a useful area for further 
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research would be to examine earnings management in all major types of buyouts, 
distinguishing between public and private firm governance structures (e.g., family firms, 
agent-led firms) and deal type (e.g., management buy-in, divestment, secondary buyout). 
Further research can separately examine family and non-family MBOs, full MBOs and 
divisional MBOs to fully analyse the implied heterogeneous behaviour and shed more light 
on the motives of earnings management. 
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Table 4-1: Distribution of deals across years and value 
This table presents the distribution of sample and population MBO deals across years. Population and sample 
statistics exclude 57 and 20 financial firms respectively. 244 MBOs in the population and 104 MBOs in the final 
sample disclosed deal values. ND indicates that sample MBOs in the related year did not disclose deal values. 
 
Number of deals 
Sample as  % 
of population 
Transaction value 
Sample as % 
of population 
Year 
Population 
(N) 
Sample       
(n) 
Population ($ 
mil) 
Sample      
($ mil) 
2004 147 29 20 4521 3157 70 
2005 150 54 36 2308 968 42 
2006 154 64 42 2258 1126 50 
2007 128 51 40 2606 2457 94 
2008 101 34 34 769 486 63 
2009 51 9 18 14 ND - 
2010 52 19 37 177 89 50 
2011 40 15 38 367 139 38 
2012 37 16 43 460 258 57 
Total 860 291 34 13480 8681 64 
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Table 4-2: Variable definitions 
This table presents definitions of all variables used in 4th and 5th chapters. Variables obtained from financial 
statements are presented with their Fame item code (in parentheses). 
Variable Source Definition 
MBO TOB 
A buyout acquisition led by members of incumbent management team as stated in 
deal synopsis provided by Thomson One Banker. 
Total Accruals FAME 
Non-cash working capital minus depreciation: [∆Current Assets (F48) - ∆Cash 
(F42)] - [∆Current Liabilities (F66) - ∆Short term debt (F52)] - Depreciation (F21).  
Working Capital 
Accruals FAME 
Non-cash working capital: [∆Current Assets (F48) - ∆Cash (F42)] - [∆Current 
Liabilities (F66) - ∆Short term debt (F52)].  
∆REV FAME Difference between sales in the year of earnings management and prior year. (F1) 
PPE FAME Tangible assets in the year of earnings management. (F31) 
ROA FAME 
Net income in the year of earnings management divided by lagged total assets. 
(F18/F70) 
∆ROA FAME 
Difference in raw ROA between relevant post-buyout year and the year prior to 
buyout for three years following buyout. 
∆IROA FAME 
Difference in industry adjusted ROA between relevant post-buyout year and the 
year prior to buyout for three years following buyout. 
DTA Estimated Discretionary total accruals obtained from cross-sectional regressions (eq. 2). 
PE TOB A dummy variable that equals 1 if the transaction is PE-backed and 0 otherwise. 
SGRO FAME 
Difference between sales in the year of earnings management and prior year, 
divided by prior year sales. 
SIZE FAME Natural logarithm of inflation adjusted total sales prior to buyout.  
g1 TOB 
A dummy variable that equals 1 if the MBO is in Internet and Computers industry, 
0 otherwise. Based on Gompers et al. (2008). 
g2 TOB 
A dummy variable that equals 1 if the MBO is in Biotech and Healthcare industry, 
0 otherwise. Based on Gompers et al. (2008). 
g3 TOB 
A dummy variable that equals 1 if the MBO is in Communications and Electronics 
industry, 0 otherwise. Based on Gompers et al. (2008). 
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Table 4-3: Descriptive statistics for changes in Total Accruals, Sales and Earnings 
This table presents changes in total accruals, sales and earnings in the 4 years preceding MBO. Year 0 is 
MBO year. Total accruals are defined as: [(∆Current Assets - ∆Cash) - (∆Current Liabilities - ∆Short term 
debt) - Depreciation]. Earnings are net income. The variables are obtained as first differences scaled by lagged 
assets. P-values are obtained from 2-tailed t test and Wilcoxon test under the null that mean and median 
change = 0.  
  Year -1 Year -2 Year -3 Year -4 
  n = 101 n = 101 n = 101 n = 101 
Changes in Total Accruals 
Mean 0.050 -0.022 0.006 0.022 
Median 0.042 -0.040 0.020 -0.008 
Percent negative 42 60 42 55 
T test p-value 0.082 0.441 0.722 0.322 
Wilcoxon p-value 0.070 0.081 0.338 0.890 
Changes in Sales 
Mean 0.168 0.210 0.280 0.223 
Median 0.102 0.095 0.160 0.159 
Percent negative 39% 36% 29% 33% 
T test p-value 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Wilcoxon p-value 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Changes in Earnings 
Mean 0.035 0.008 0.016 0.018 
Median 0.026 0.009 0.008 0.010 
Percent negative 34% 45% 44% 43% 
T test p-value 0.003 0.450 0.109 0.113 
Wilcoxon p-value 0.000 0.195 0.334 0.198 
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Table 4-4: Two-digit industry/year portfolios and number of matched MBOs 
Target 
SIC Code 
Matched 
Year 
No. of 
firms in 
portfolio 
No. of 
matched 
MBOs   
Target 
SIC Code 
Matched 
Year 
No. of 
firms in 
portfolio 
No. of 
matched 
MBOs 
07 2007 298 1 
 
32 2007 188 1 
08 2004 35 1 
 
33 2005 202 1 
13 2006 186 1 
 
34 2005 1154 2 
13 2009 247 1 
 
34 2006 1148 3 
15 2004 3096 3 
 
34 2007 1091 1 
15 2005 3049 2 
 
35 2004 891 1 
15 2006 2835 4 
 
35 2005 571 1 
15 2007 2699 2 
 
35 2006 811 2 
16 2007 417 1 
 
35 2007 781 2 
16 2010 467 1 
 
35 2008 749 1 
17 2004 3120 2 
 
35 2010 849 1 
17 2007 2934 4 
 
36 2004 682 2 
17 2008 2702 3 
 
36 2006 614 3 
20 2004 757 3 
 
36 2007 595 1 
20 2005 730 3 
 
37 2004 352 2 
20 2006 665 3 
 
37 2006 274 1 
20 2007 742 1 
 
37 2009 292 1 
20 2010 819 1 
 
37 2011 286 1 
22 2005 157 1 
 
38 2005 315 1 
22 2006 152 1 
 
38 2007 282 3 
23 2006 139 1 
 
38 2008 292 1 
23 2009 119 1 
 
38 2010 313 2 
24 2004 275 1 
 
39 2004 1051 2 
25 2006 196 3 
 
39 2005 1018 1 
25 2007 205 1 
 
39 2006 959 2 
26 2005 274 1 
 
39 2007 950 1 
26 2006 275 2 
 
42 2004 978 1 
26 2010 310 1 
 
42 2006 937 1 
27 2004 1421 6 
 
42 2007 905 2 
27 2005 1339 1 
 
42 2010 893 1 
27 2006 1198 3 
 
45 2005 184 1 
27 2008 986 1 
 
45 2006 181 1 
27 2010 876 3 
 
47 2004 610 1 
27 2011 716 1 
 
47 2006 579 1 
28 2006 544 2 
 
47 2010 561 1 
28 2010 609 1 
 
47 2011 482 1 
30 2007 377 1 
 
48 2004 477 1 
30 2008 361 2 
 
48 2005 491 2 
30 2009 365 1 
 
48 2006 471 1 
30 2011 372 1 
 
48 2011 349 1 
31 2010 14 1 
 
49 2005 467 2 
146 
 
32 
49 
2004 
2009 
226 
539 
1 
2 
 
49 
65 
2006 
2005 
467 
3390 
1 
1 
50 2004 3655 5 
 
67 2004 2133 1 
50 2005 3456 5 
 
70 2007 802 1 
50 2006 3236 5 
 
70 2011 727 1 
50 2007 3109 5 
 
72 2011 558 1 
50 2010 3452 1 
 
73 2004 9268 8 
50 2011 3062 2 
 
73 2005 9140 7 
51 2004 1762 4 
 
73 2006 8879 9 
51 2005 1579 1 
 
73 2007 8394 10 
51 2006 1588 1 
 
73 2008 7852 1 
51 2007 1522 1 
 
73 2009 7223 3 
51 2008 1425 1 
 
73 2010 7209 1 
51 2009 1501 1 
 
73 2011 7152 4 
51 2011 1422 1 
 
75 2005 830 1 
54 2004 404 1 
 
76 2006 427 1 
54 2006 430 1 
 
78 2006 350 1 
55 2004 84 1 
 
78 2011 232 1 
55 2005 112 1 
 
79 2005 1174 1 
55 2007 101 1 
 
80 2006 835 1 
55 2011 87 1 
 
80 2007 805 1 
56 2004 442 2 
 
80 2011 719 1 
56 2005 433 2 
 
82 2007 449 1 
56 2006 350 1 
 
82 2009 395 1 
56 2008 337 1 
 
82 2011 435 2 
56 2010 346 1 
 
83 2004 269 1 
57 2004 379 2 
 
83 2005 334 1 
57 2005 370 1 
 
83 2006 275 1 
57 2006 340 1 
 
83 2007 346 1 
58 2004 765 1 
 
87 2004 3748 8 
58 2005 1533 1 
 
87 2005 2878 5 
58 2007 1304 1 
 
87 2006 2681 3 
58 2011 793 1 
 
87 2007 2577 5 
59 2004 1528 2 
 
87 2008 2454 1 
59 2006 1382 1 
 
87 2009 2227 4 
59 2007 1507 2 
 
87 2010 2070 1 
59 2010 1082 2 
 
87 2011 1643 2 
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Table 4-5: Descriptive statistics for MBOs and matched portfolios 
Statistics are derived from 291 MBOs and median values of each of 225 unique estimation portfolios matched 
on 2-digit SIC code and year. Portfolio statistics are mean and medians of median values of related portfolios. 
Paired differences are computed as MBO value minus median value of the matching portfolio.  The mean and 
median portfolio size is 3672 and 1730 respectively. Firms with extreme positive earnings are dropped from 
portfolios. P-values are  for two-tailed tests. 
 
Year -1 
 
Year -2 
 
MBO 
firms 
Portfolio 
firms 
Paired 
differences  
MBO 
firms 
Portfolio 
firms 
Paired 
differences 
  Total assets (£ mil) 
      Mean 23.78 2.84 20.94 
 
17.44 2.62 14.81 
Median 9.19 1.59 6.66 
 
8.35 1.32 5.68 
Significance level 
       T test p-value 
  
0.000 
   
0.000 
Wilcoxon p-value   0.000    0.000 
Sales (£mil) 
 
            
Mean 43.32 4.10 39.21 
 
34.29 3.77 30.52 
Median 17.39 2.55 13.62 
 
17.31 2.42 12.93 
Significance level 
       T test p-value 
  
0.000 
   
0.000 
Wilcoxon p-value   0.000    0.000 
Earnings (ROA) 
 
            
Mean 0.073 0.079 -0.005 
 
0.066 0.078 -0.012 
Median 0.075 0.065 -0.003 
 
0.061 0.063 -0.009 
Percent negative 16% 0% 52% 
 
15% 0% 54% 
Significance level 
       T test p-value 
  
0.579 
   
0.167 
Wilcoxon p-value   0.950    0.295 
 
  
148 
 
 
  
 This table presents the results of cross-sectional parameter estimates for the year prior to MBO. The expected 
accruals model for parameter estimates is TAijt /Assetsijt-1 = β1jt (1/Assetsijt-1) + β2jt (∆REVijt /Assetsijt-1) + β3jt (PPEijt 
/Assetsijt-1) + εijt, where  TAijt = total accruals for estimation portfolio firm i matched with MBO firm j on industry 
in year t, ∆REVijt = changes in turnover for estimation portfolio firm i matched with MBO firm j on industry in year 
t, PPEijt = Tangible assets for estimation portfolio firm i matched with MBO firm j in year t, Assetsijt-1 = Total 
assets one year before manipulation year. Presented statistics are obtained from 160 cross-sectional regressions for 
unique industry-year portfolios in year -1. N displays statistics for the number of observations in estimation 
portfolios. Statistics for p values (p1, p2, p3) correspond to t values for coefficients (β1, β2, β3) respectively.  
  Adj. R
2
 β1 β2 β3 p1 p2 p3 N 
Mean 0.577 72.886 0.178 -2.869 0.290 0.099 0.105 1287.96 
1st Quartile 0.111 -2.106 -0.036 -0.276 0.000 0.000 0.000 346 
Median 0.770 -0.000 0.024 -0.098 0.011 0.000 0.000 665 
3rd Quartile 0.999 1.876 0.112 -0.013 0.619 0.021 0.080 1425 
Min -0.041 -79.028 -4.046 -318.745 0.000 0.000 0.000 14 
Max 1 10976 20.861 44.711 1 0.998 0.991 9268 
Stdev 0.421 846.44 1.702 26.078 0.386 0.248 0.221 1781.89 
Table 4-6: Parameters of cross-sectional estimation 
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Table 4-7: Prediction errors from cross-sectional estimation in year -1 and -2 
This table presents prediction errors for two years prior to MBO announcement. Prediction errors are computed 
using cross-sectional parameter estimates from following model: TAijt /Assetsijt-1 = β1jt (1/Assetsijt-1) + β2jt 
(∆REVijt /Assetsijt-1) + β3jt (PPEijt /Assetsijt-1) + εijt, where  TAijt = total accruals for estimation portfolio firm i 
matched with MBO firm j on industry in year t, ∆REVijt = changes in turnover for estimation portfolio firm i 
matched with MBO firm j on industry in year t, PPEijt = Tangible assets for estimation portfolio firm i matched 
with MBO firm j in year t, Assetsijt-1 = Total assets one year before manipulation year. Presented statistics are 
obtained from 311 MBOs in year -1 and 223 MBOs in year -2. Non-standardised prediction errors are the 
difference between reported and predicted accruals. Standardised prediction errors are calculated by dividing 
each prediction error by its standard deviation estimated from the related cross-sectional regression. Standard 
deviation of errors are computed for each industry/year estimation portfolio as √(RSS/(T-k)); where RSS = 
residual sum of squares, T = the number of observations in related portfolio, k = number of parameters in the 
regression. Parametric p-values for non-standardised prediction errors are from t tests; non-parametric p-values 
are obtained from Wilcoxon sign rank test. Parametric p-values for standardised prediction errors are obtained 
from Patell's (1976) Zv statistic computed as: ∑Vij/√[∑(Tij-k)/(Tij-(k+2))]; where Vij is standardised prediction 
error for estimation portfolio i matched with MBO firm j, Tij is the number of observations in the estimation 
portfolio i for MBO firm j and k is the number of parameters in the cross-sectional model. All p-values are 2-
tailed). N (#:#) is the number of total (positive: negative) prediction errors in the dataset.  
 
Year -1 
 
Year -2 
 
Non-standardised Standardised 
 
Non-standardised Standardised 
      Mean 0.538 0.035 
 
0.622 -0.004 
Median 0.037 0.001 
 
-0.032 -0.001 
Standard deviation 2.164 0.515 
 
3.582 0.472 
Minimum -3.739 -2.376 
 
-4.488 -2.376 
Maximum 13.051 2.449 
 
24.485 2.485 
Parametric p-value 0.000 0.542 
 
0.013 0.948 
Nonparametric p-value 0.000 0.002 
 
0.252 0.313 
N (Positive:Negative) 291 (176:115) 291 (176:115) 
 
207 (91:116) 207 (91:116) 
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Table 4-8: Prediction errors from performance adjusted estimation in year -1 and -2 
This table presents performance augmented prediction errors for two years prior to MBO announcement. 
Prediction errors are computed using cross-sectional parameter estimates from following model: TAijt /Assetsijt-1 
= β1jt (1/Assetsijt-1) + β2jt (∆REVijt /Assetsijt-1) + β3jt (PPEijt /Assetsijt-1) + β4jt (ROAijt /Assetsijt) + εijt, where  TAijt = 
total accruals for estimation portfolio firm i matched with MBO firm j on industry in year t, ∆REVijt = changes in 
turnover for estimation portfolio firm i matched with MBO firm j on industry in year t, PPEijt = Tangible assets 
for estimation portfolio firm i matched with MBO firm j in year t, ROAijt = Net income divided by assets for 
estimation portfolio firm i matched with MBO firm j on industry in year t, Assetsijt-1 = Total assets one year 
before manipulation year . Presented statistics are obtained from 291 MBOs in year -1 and 206 MBOs in year -2. 
Non-standardised prediction errors are the difference between reported and predicted accruals. Standardised 
prediction errors are calculated by dividing each prediction error by its standard deviation estimated from the 
related cross-sectional regression. Standard deviation of errors are computed for each industry/year estimation 
portfolio as √(RSS/(T-k)); where RSS = residual sum of squares, T = the number of observations in related 
portfolio, k = number of parameters in the regression. Parametric p-values for non-standardised prediction errors 
are from t tests; non-parametric p-values are obtained from Wilcoxon sign rank test. Parametric p-values for 
standardised prediction errors are obtained from Patell's (1976) Zv statistic computed as: ∑Vij/√[∑(Tij-k)/(Tij-
(k+2))]; where Vij is standardised prediction error for estimation portfolio i matched with MBO firm j, T ij is the 
number of observations in the estimation portfolio i for MBO firm j and k is the number of parameters in the 
cross-sectional model. All p-values are 2-tailed). N (#:#) is the number of total (positive: negative) prediction 
errors in the dataset.  
 
Year -1 
 
Year -2 
 
Non-standardised Standardised 
 
Non-standardised Standardised 
      Mean 0.024 0.072 
 
-0.008 -0.035 
Median 0.012 0.035 
 
-0.016 -0.045 
Standard deviation 0.193 0.667 
 
0.223 0.638 
Minimum -0.937 -2.715 
 
-1.031 -2.916 
Maximum 0.956 2.398 
 
1.717 3.472 
Parametric p-value 0.035 0.218 
 
0.593 0.616 
Nonparametric p-value 0.023 0.021 
 
0.127 0.127 
N (Positive:Negative) 291 (162:129) 291 (162:129) 
 
206 (96:110) 206 (96:110) 
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Table 4-9: Prediction errors from cross-sectional WCA estimation 
This table presents prediction errors for working capital accruals 2 years prior to MBO announcement. The 
expected accruals model for parameter estimates is WCAjt /Assetsjt-1 = β1jt (1/Assetsjt-1) + β2jt (∆REVjt 
/Assetsjt-1) + εjt, where WCAjt = working capital accruals for MBO firm j in estimation period year t, ∆REVjt = 
changes in turnover for MBO firm j in estimation period year t, Assetsjt-1 = Lagged total assets for MBO firm j 
in estimation period year t. Non-standardised prediction errors are computed as the difference between 
reported and predicted accruals. Standardised prediction errors are calculated by dividing each prediction error 
by its standard deviation estimated from the related regression. Standard deviation of errors are computed for 
each MBO firm as √ (RSS/T-k); where RSS = residual sum of squares, T = the number of observations in 
estimation portfolio, k = number of parameters in the regression. T ranges from 15 to 9163 firms. Parametric 
p-values for non-standardised prediction errors are from t tests; non-parametric p-values are obtained from 
Wilcoxon sign rank test. Parametric p-values for standardised prediction errors are obtained from Patell's 
(1976) Zv statistic computed as: ∑Vj/√[∑(Tj-k) /(Tj-(k+2))]; where Vj is standardised prediction error for 
MBO firm j, Tj is the number of observations in the estimation portfolio and k is the number of parameters in 
the model. p values are for 2-tailed tests. 
 
Year -1 
 
Year -2 
 
Non-standardised Standardised 
 
Non-standardised Standardised 
      Mean 0.032 0.079 
 
-0.121 0.041 
Median 0.022 0.001 
 
-0.001 -0.001 
Standard deviation 0.296 0.526 
 
1.024 0.476 
Minimum -0.944 -2.137 
 
-5.098 -1.847 
Maximum 2.886 4.481 
 
6.329 3.345 
Parametric p-value 0.031 0.178 
 
0.088 0.559 
Non-parametric p-value 0.007 0.004 
 
0.325 0.721 
N (Positive:Negative) 291 (169:122) 291 (169:122) 
 
207 (103:104) 207 (103:104) 
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Table 4-10: Prediction errors from time-series estimation 
This table presents prediction errors for 2 years prior to MBO. The expected accruals model for parameter 
estimates is: TAjt /Assetsjt-1 = β1jt (1/Assetsjt-1) + β2jt (∆REVjt /Assetsjt-1) + β3jt (PPEjt /Assetsjt-1) + εjt, 
where  TAjt = total accruals for MBO firm j in estimation period year t, ∆REVjt = changes in turnover for 
MBO firm j in estimation period year t, PPEjt = Tangible assets for MBO firm j in estimation period year  
t, Assetsjt-1 = Lagged total assets for MBO firm j in estimation period year t. Unstandardised prediction 
errors are computed as the difference between reported and predicted accruals. Standardised prediction 
errors are calculated by dividing each prediction error by its standard deviation estimated from the related 
pooled time-series regression. Standard deviation of errors are computed for each MBO firm as √ (RSS/T-
k); where RSS = residual sum of squares, T = the number of observations in estimation period, k = 
number of parameters in the regression. T ranges from 4 to 8 years. Parametric p-values for non-
standardised prediction errors are from t tests; non-parametric p-values are obtained from Wilcoxon sign 
rank test. Parametric p-values for standardised prediction errors are obtained from Patell's (1976) Zv 
statistic computed as: ∑Vj/√[∑(Tj-k)/(Tj-(k+2))]; where Vj is standardised prediction error for MBO firm 
j, Tj is the number of observations in the estimation period MBO firm j and k is the number of parameters 
in the model. p values are for 2-tailed tests. 
 
Year -1 
 
Year -2 
 
Non-standardised Standardised 
 
Non-standardised Standardised 
      Mean 0.059 -0.021 
 
-0.002 -0.041 
Median 0.034 -0.004 
 
-0.024 -0.038 
Standard deviation 0.311 0.034 
 
0.339 0.237 
Minimum -0.679 -1.463 
 
-1.041 -0.615 
Maximum 1.091 0.788 
 
1.428 0.515 
Parametric p-value 0.054 0.392 
 
0.965 0.291 
Nonparametric p-value 0.114 0.174 
 
0.646 0.646 
N (Positive:Negative) 101 (56:45) 40(20:20)   63 (30:33) 26 (11:14) 
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Table 4-11: Changes in Accruals, Sales and Earnings in PE-backed MBOs 
This table presents changes in total accruals, sales and earnings of PE-backed MBOs in four years preceding 
MBO announcement. Year 0 is MBO year. Total Accruals are defined as: [(∆Current Assets - ∆Cash) - 
(∆Current Liabilities - ∆Short term debt) - Depreciation]. Earnings are net profit. All three variables are 
obtained as first differences scaled by lagged total assets. Parametric p-values are from 2-tailed t test under the 
null that mean change=0. Wilcoxon p-values are from 2-tailed Wilcoxon sign rank test under the null that 
median change=0. Mann-Whitney test is for the equality of changes in total accruals, sales and earnings in PE-
backed and non-PE backed MBOs. 
 
Year -1 Year -2 Year -3 Year -4 
 
n = 52 n = 52 n = 52 n = 52 
Changes in Total Accruals 
Mean 0.031 -0.051 0.029 0.028 
Median 0.019 -0.042 0.036 -0.011 
Percent negative 44% 62% 35% 62% 
Parametric p-value 0.338 0.101 0.188 0.35 
Wilcoxon p-value 0.291 0.085 0.122 0.649 
Mann-Whitney p-value 0.822 0.241 0.188 0.995 
Changes in Sales 
Mean 0.229 0.199 0.285 0.182 
Median 0.134 0.107 0.189 0.175 
Percent negative 27% 31% 17% 23% 
Parametric p-value 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.008 
Wilcoxon p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Mann-Whitney p-value 0.067 0.658 0.289 0.458 
Changes in Earnings 
Mean 0.033 0.006 0.031 0.021 
Median 0.032 0.011 0.013 0.011 
Percent negative 31% 40% 38% 42% 
Parametric p-value 0.033 0.641 0.042 0.221 
Wilcoxon p-value 0.000 0.282 0.109 0.251 
Mann-Whitney p-value 0.497 0.645 0.454 0.708 
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Table 4-12: Tests of prediction errors by private equity status 
This table presents non-standardised prediction errors by private equity status. See previous tables for the details of accruals 
models tested. Significance of mean and medians is tested by parametric t-test and non-parametric Wilcoxon sign rank test. 
*, ** and *** represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level. N (#; #) is the number of MBOs in year -1 and -2 in relevant 
samples. 
  Total accruals   Performance adjusted   Working capital accruals 
 
Year -1 Year -2 
 
Year -1 Year -2 
 
Year -1 Year -2 
All MBOs 
        
Mean 0.538*** 0.622** 
 
0.024** -0.008 
 
0.032** -0.121* 
Median 0.037*** -0.032 
 
0.012** -0.016 
 
0.022*** -0.001 
N (positive:negative) 291(176:115) 207(91:116) 
 
291(162:129) 206(96:110) 
 
291(169:122) 207(103:104) 
PE-backed 
        
Mean 0.305* 0.328 
 
0.031 -0.007 
 
0.046 -0.267** 
Median 0.016 -0.034 
 
0.010 -0.032 
 
0.021* -0.002 
N (positive:negative) 140 (79:61) 106 (45:61) 
 
140 (72:68) 106 (46:60) 
 
106 (78:62) 106 (51:55) 
Non-PE 
        
Mean 0.753*** 0.931** 
 
0.017** -0.009 
 
0.018 0.031 
Median 0.072*** -0.031 
 
0.013** 0.001 
 
0.025* 0.003 
N (positive:negative) 151 (97:54) 101 (46:55)   151 (90:61) 100 (50:50)   151 (91:60) 101 (52:49) 
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Table 4-13: Additional accruals tests 
This table presents statistics from additional discretionary accruals tests for non-standardised accruals in year 
-1. Panel A displays statistics excluding MBOs that are exempt from reporting audited accounts. Panel B 
shows discretionary accruals for MBOs that reported full accounts in the last available accounting year. Panel 
C excludes portfolio deciles with the highest and lowest number of observations. Panel D shows statistics 
excluding matched portfolios having fewer than 50 observations. 
 
Total accruals 
 
Perf. adjusted 
 
Working capital 
Panel A: Excluding MBOs with audit exemption 
Mean 0.542 
 
0.025 
 
0.032 
Median 0.038 
 
0.012 
 
0.022 
T test p value 0.000 
 
0.016 
 
0.062 
Wilcoxon p value 0.000 
 
0.015 
 
0.006 
N (positive:negative) 289 (176:113) 
 
289 (162:127) 
 
289 (168:121) 
Panel B: MBOs registered as full accounts disclosure 
  Mean 0.675 
 
0.029 
 
0.032 
Median 0.045 
 
0.012 
 
0.028 
T test p value 0.000 
 
0.035 
 
0.054 
Wilcoxon p value 0.000 
 
0.022 
 
0.002 
N (positive:negative) 226 (140:86) 
 
226 (127:99) 
 
226 (136:90) 
Panel C: Excluding portfolios with fewer than 50 observations 
Mean 0.540 
 
0.023 
 
0.031 
Median 0.037 
 
0.012 
 
0.022 
T test p value 0.000 
 
0.044 
 
0.075 
Wilcoxon p value 0.000 
 
0.025 
 
0.008 
N (positive:negative) 289 (175:114) 
 
289 (161:128) 
 
289 (168:121) 
Panel D: Excluding bottom and top portfolio observation deciles 
Mean 0.636 
 
0.032 
 
0.046 
Median 0.047 
 
0.021 
 
0.026 
T test p value 0.000 
 
0.016 
 
0.025 
Wilcoxon p value 0.000 
 
0.007 
 
0.001 
N (positive:pegative) 231 (148:83)   231 (133:98)   231 (141:90) 
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Table 4-14: Propensity Score Matched Discretionary Accruals 
This table presents discretionary total accruals for sample MBOs matched on non-buyout firms by propensity 
scores (PSM). Each MBO is matched on a non-buyout firm with the nearest propensity score. Discretionary 
total accruals are obtained by industry-year matched cross-sectional Jones regressions. PSM matched 
discretionary accruals are calculated as discretionary accruals of MBO firm minus discretionary accruals of 
PSM-matched non-buyout firm. Results are based on accruals winsorised at 1% level.  ***, ** and * 
represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
 
Full Sample 
 
PE-backed 
 
Non-PE 
      Mean 0.318*** 
 
0.237* 
 
0.393** 
Median 0.048** 
 
0.051 
 
0.043 
T-test p-value 0.0018 
 
0.0715 
 
0.011 
Wilcoxon p-value 0.0421 
 
0.1375 
 
0.1705 
N (Positive:Negative) 290 (156:134) 140 (76:64)   150 (80:70) 
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Table 4-15: Industry distribution of management buyouts- Performance sample 
Industry   2-digit SIC Codes Frequency     %     
Oil and gas 13 3 1.18 
Food products 20 13 5.12 
Paper and paper products 25, 26, 27 16 6.30 
Chemical products 28 3 1.18 
Manufacturing 30, 31, 32, 33, 34 14 5.51 
Computer equipment and services 35, 73 46 18.11 
Electronic equipment 36 6 2.36 
Transportation 37, 39, 42, 45 15 5.91 
Scientific instruments 38 7 2.76 
Communications 48 4 1.57 
Electric, gas and sanitary services 49 5 1.97 
Durable goods 50 18 7.09 
Non-durable goods 51 7 2.76 
Retail 
 
53, 54, 56, 57, 59 18 7.09 
Eating and drinking establishments 58 3 1.18 
Entertainment services 70, 78, 79 5 1.97 
Health 
 
80 2 0.78 
All others 
 
7, 8, 15, 16, 17, 22, 23, 47, 
55, 65, 67, 75, 76, 82, 83, 
87 
69 27.16 
     Total       254 100 
Table 4-15 Panel B: Industry distribution by Gompers et al. (2008) classification 
Industry 2-digit SIC Codes Frequency % 
Internet and Computers 50, 73 11 4.33 
Biotech and Healthcare 28, 38, 80, 83 
 
11 4.33 
Communications and 
Electronics 27, 36, 38, 48, 50, 73, 78, 87 30 11.82 
Consumer 8, 20, 22, 23, 25, 27, 31, 32, 34, 39, 50, 
51, 54-59, 73, 76 
58 22.83 
    Business and Industrial 7, 15-17, 26, 28, 30, 32-35, 37-39, 42, 
45, 50, 51, 79, 87 
78 30.71 
     Energy 13, 36, 49 11 4.33 
Business Services 45, 67, 73, 75, 82, 83, 87 49 19.29 
Others 47, 65, 70, 73 
 
6 2.36 
Total       254 100 
 
  
158 
 
Table 4-16: Operating performance around management buyouts 
This table presents median net income performance of management buyouts from year -2 to year +3 relative to 
buyout transaction year (year 0 is the year buyout is completed).  
 
The unadjusted performance is measured as net income divided by beginning assets. Industry adjusted performance 
is measured as net income divided by beginning assets minus industry median. Performance changes are computed 
as year-to-year changes in unadjusted and industry-adjusted net income divided by beginning assets. Computation of 
discretionary accruals is explained in Table 4-2. Significance of medians is tested by 2-tailed Wilcoxon sign rank 
test. Mann-Whitney (M-W) p value is for the significance of performance differences between relevant PE-backed 
and non-PE-backed subsamples. *, ** and *** represent significance at 10, 5, and 1 % level. 
Year -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Panel A: Performance of MBOs 
    Unadjusted 0.077*** 0.089*** 0.105*** 0.072*** 0.079*** 0.067*** 
Industry adjusted -0.009 0.011** 0.029*** 0.011*** 0.009*** 0.012*** 
N (raw:adjusted) 238:180 253:253 237:237 214:212 186:185 161:158 
Panel B: Performance changes in MBOs 
    Unadjusted - 0.009 0.011* -0.012** -0.014*** -0.016*** 
% negative - 47 46 57 61 59 
Industry adjusted - 0.021*** 0.010** -0.005 -0.007** -0.005 
% negative - 41 45 54 58 53 
Panel C: Performance by PE backing 
    Unadjusted earnings 
     PE-backed 0.107*** 0.108*** 0.130*** 0.142*** 0.122*** 0.092*** 
Non-PE backed 0.058*** 0.078*** 0.075*** 0.058*** 0.052*** 0.044*** 
M-W p value 0.022 0.010 0.025 0.001 0.018 0.004 
N (PE:non-PE) 115:123 121:132 113:124 99:115 85:101 77:84 
Industry adjusted earnings 
     PE-backed 0.005 0.020*** 0.059*** 0.078*** 0.060*** 0.050*** 
Non-PE backed -0.015 0.002 0.012 -0.001 -0.002 0.000 
M-W p value 0.179 0.031 0.023 0.002 0.036 0.005 
N (PE:non-PE) 91:89 121:132 113:124 98:114 85:100 76:82 
Panel D: Performance changes by PE backing 
   Unadjusted earnings changes 
    PE-backed - 0.011 0.027 -0.012 -0.032*** -0.013 
Non-PE backed - 0.006 0.007 -0.014** -0.003 -0.017*** 
M-W p value - 0.751 0.555 0.528 0.054 0.569 
Industry adjusted earnings changes 
    PE-backed - 0.019** 0.021** -0.004 -0.028** -0.012 
Non-PE backed - 0.026** 0.004 -0.006 -0.002 -0.002 
M-W p value - 0.595 0.546 0.556 0.081 0.686 
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Table 4-17: Performance by direction and magnitude of earnings management 
This table presents median net income performance of downwards and upwards earnings managers as well as 
conservative and aggressive earnings managers from year -2 to year +3 relative to buyout transaction year (year 0 
is the year buyout is completed).  
 
MBOs with negative discretionary total accruals are classified as downwards and MBOs with positive 
discretionary total accruals are classified as upwards earnings managers. Conservative and aggressive quartiles 
contain MBOs with the smallest and largest absolute discretionary total accruals in year -1 respectively. The 
unadjusted performance is measured as net income divided by beginning assets. Industry adjusted performance is 
measured as net income divided by beginning assets minus industry median. Significance of medians is tested by 
2-tailed Wilcoxon sign rank test. Mann-Whitney (M-W) p value is for the significance of performance differences 
between downwards and upwards, conservative and aggressive earnings management subsamples. *, ** and *** 
represent significance at 10, 5, and 1 % level. 
Year -2 -1 0 1 2 3 
Panel A: Performance around management buyout 
   Unadjusted earnings 
     Downward 0.047*** 0.071*** 0.107*** 0.068*** 0.099*** 0.073*** 
Upward 0.103*** 0.101*** 0.092*** 0.077*** 0.065*** 0.061*** 
M-W p value 0.002 0.056 0.917 0.962 0.204 0.392 
Industry adjusted earnings 
     Downward -0.028* 0.001 0.042*** 0.012** 0.039*** 0.030*** 
Upward 0.014* 0.028*** 0.025*** 0.010*** 0.004** 0.004 
M-W p value 0.016 0.031 0.938 0.925 0.329 0.298 
Panel B: Performance of aggressive and conservative quartiles 
  Unadjusted earnings 
     Conservative 0.069*** 0.067*** 0.083*** 0.077*** 0.102*** 0.081*** 
Aggressive 0.101*** 0.101*** 0.142*** 0.061*** 0.076*** 0.062*** 
M-W p value 0.453 0.424 0.161 0.081 0.263 0.422 
Industry adjusted earnings 
    Conservative 0.003 0.012 0.027** 0.023*** 0.051** 0.028*** 
Aggressive 0.001 -0.002 0.032*** -0.007 0.001 0.006 
M-W p value 0.745 0.277 0.943 0.021 0.012 0.123 
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Table 4-18: Spearman rank order correlations of discretionary accruals 
This table presents Spearman rank order correlations between discretionary accruals in year -1 and changes in net 
income. Panel A lists correlations with the changes in unadjusted net income and Panel B lists correlations with 
changes in industry adjusted net income. DTA, WCA and PDA represent discretionary total accruals, 
discretionary working capital accruals and performance adjusted discretionary total accruals respectively. 
 
∆ROA0 ∆ROA1 ∆ROA2 ∆ROA3 
Panel A: Correlations with unadjusted net income 
  DTA-1 -0.0538 -0.1388** -0.1322* -0.1304*** 
WCA-1 -0.1263 -0.0946 -0.0477 -0.0444 
PDA-1 -0.2640*** -0.0874* -0.0560 -0.0924 
Panel B: Correlations with industry adjusted net income 
  DTA-1 -0.0384 -0.0962** -0.0678** -0.0561*** 
WCA-1 -0.1126 -0.1049 -0.0737 -0.0433 
PDA-1 -0.1989*** -0.2367** -0.0038 -0.1105 
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Table 4-19: Regression of post-buyout performance on discretionary accruals 
This table reports regressions of post-buyout performance changes on earnings management and control variables. 
The dependent variables in regressions are changes in raw income (∆ROA) and changes in industry-adjusted income 
(∆IROA). Changes in net income are computed as change relative to year -1 for a given post-buyout year. Panel A 
reports univariate regressions of performance changes on earnings management. The following multivariate model is 
estimated in Panel B:  
 
∆ROA= α+ b1DTA+ b2PE+ b3SGRO+ b4SIZE+ b5g1+ b6g2+ b7g3, 
 
where ∆ROA= raw and industry adjusted net income change in year 1, 2, 3. DTA= discretionary total accruals in year 
-1; PE= dummy variable, equals 1 if MBO is private equity sponsored and 0 otherwise; SGRO= percentage growth in 
sales from year -2 to -1; SIZE= log of total sales in year -1; g1, g2 and g3 are dummies for buyouts in high-tech 
industries defined as in Gompers et al. (2008) industry classification. Variables are winsorised at 1% and 99% 
percentiles. All models are estimated via OLS regressions with robust standard errors and omitted collinear covariates. 
Second row displays t values in parentheses. *, ** and *** represent significance at 10, 5, and 1% levels. 
Variable ∆ROA1 ∆ROA2 ∆ROA3 
 
∆IROA1 ∆IROA2 ∆IROA3 
Panel A: Univariate regressions 
DTA -0.014*** -0.015*** -0.022** 
 
-0.012*** -0.012*** -0.20** 
(t) (-3.32) (-3.75) (-2.26) 
 
(-2.98) (-3.32) (-2.09) 
R
2
 2.59% 1.78% 8% 
 
1.89% 1.27% 6.51% 
F ratio for regression 11.05*** 14.03*** 5.09** 
 
8.09*** 11*** 4.38** 
N 214 186 161   212 185 158 
Panel B: Multivariate regressions 
 
Dependent variable: ∆ROA 
 
Dependent variable: ∆IROA 
 
∆ROA1 ∆ROA2 ∆ROA3 
 
∆IROA1 ∆IROA2 ∆IROA3 
DTA -0.011*** -0.014*** -0.022** 
 
-0.010** -0.013*** -0.021** 
 
(-2.83) (-3.32) (-2.45) 
 
(-2.47) (-2.98) (-2.33) 
PE 0.041* -0.001 -0.003 
 
0.041* 0.003 0.002 
 
(1.71) (-0.01) (-0.12) 
 
(1.69) (0.10) (0.06) 
SGRO 0.000 -0.022 -0.015 
 
0.000 -0.020 -0.007 
 
(0.00) (-1.02) (-0.32) 
 
(0.06) (-0.92) (-0.14) 
SIZE -0.016 -0.034 -0.023 
 
-0.018 -0.038 -0.029 
 
(-0.85) (-0.98) (-0.88) 
 
(-0.91) (-1.12) (-1.08) 
g1 0.116 0.111 0.103 
 
0.111 0.104 0.107 
 
(1.24) (1.55) (1.60) 
 
(1.18) (1.50) (1.48) 
g2 -0.081 0.141 -0.099 
 
-0.089 0.119 -0.126* 
 
(-1.48) (0.58) (-1.54) 
 
(-1.59) (0.49) (-1.75) 
g3 -0.058** -0.055 -0.098** 
 
-0.056* -0.051 -0.091** 
 
(-2.01) (-1.46) (-2.57) 
 
(-1.93) (-1.36) (-2.32) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
R
2
 11.65% 8.44% 16.7% 
 
9.86% 7.68% 15.22% 
N 210 182 157   208 181 154 
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Table 4-20: Economic impact of discretionary accruals 
This table reports the economic impact of discretionary accruals. St. deviation is the sample standard deviation 
of discretionary total accruals (DTA). Coefficients are estimated by univariate OLS and multivariate ∆ROA= α+ 
b1DTA+ b2PE+ b3SGRO+ b4SIZE+ b5g1+ b6g2+ b7g3 regression, the results of which are reported in the Table 
4-18. Impact is calculated by multiplying the DTA coefficient by the relevant sample standard deviation. 
 
∆ROA1 ∆ROA2 ∆ROA3 
 
∆IROA1 ∆IROA2 ∆IROA3 
Panel A: Univariate regressions 
     St. deviation 1.902 2.018 2.158 
 
1.911 2.022 2.176 
Coefficient -0.014*** -0.015*** -0.022** 
 
-0.012*** -0.012*** -0.20** 
Impact (%) -2.66 -3.03 -4.75 
 
-2.29 -2.42 -4.35 
N 214 186 161 
 
212 185 158 
Panel B: Multivariate regressions 
     St. deviation 1.891 2.01 2.153 
 
1.899 2.014 2.153 
Coefficient -0.011*** -0.014*** -0.022** 
 
-0.010** -0.013*** -0.021** 
Impact (%) -2.08 -2.81 -4.73 
 
-1.89 -2.62 -4.52 
N 210 182 157   208 181 154 
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CHAPTER 5: EARNINGS MANAGEMENT, SOURCES OF MANAGEMENT 
 BUYOUTS AND SECONDARY MBO EXITS 
5.1 Introduction 
Past research has investigated earnings management in public-to-private buyouts (Perry and 
Williams, 1994; Fischer and Louis, 2008; Mao and Renneboog, 2013) and there exists 
evidence of earnings management around reverse leveraged buyouts (Chou et al., 2006; Katz, 
2009). This study explores earnings management practice preceding management buyout 
(MBO), management buy-in (MBI) and secondary management buyout (SMBO) 
transactions. Special emphasis is given to private-to-private buyouts that form the dominant 
majority of all buyout transactions worldwide (Stromberg, 2008), however neglected in the 
past research. Recent years have seen a substantial shift in the buyout exit routes used by 
private equity (PE) investors. The popularity of initial public offerings (IPO) declined with 
the end of second buyout wave and the recent decade witnessed a substantial increase in the 
SMBO deals (Zhou et al., 2013). The managerial behaviour and the role of PE sponsors prior 
to secondary MBO exit therefore also become an empirical issue. 
This study distinguishes between family and non-family ownership and control structures in 
private firms. The existing buyout literature suggests that family succession is an important 
source of MBO transactions (Howorth et al., 2004; Scholes et al., 2008); however the 
evidence on family firms remains exploratory. Limited evidence exists on earnings 
management in private firms (Burgstahler et al., 2006) and family owned firms (Prencipe et 
al., 2008; Stockmans et al., 2010; Kvaal et al., 2012). Nevertheless, they lack the unique 
motivations and distinct agency conflicts of stakeholders at the time of MBO/MBI. This 
study attempts to shed light on the family and non-family firm behaviour prior to buyout 
transactions. Earnings management offers an ideal setting to examine conflicts between 
owners and managers due to its association with their wealth concerns at the time of buyout. 
164 
 
In order to execute the research, data on different types of UK buyouts are collected and 
annual company filings are examined to identify private firm ownership form. Our results 
suggest considerable tendency to inflate earnings one year before buyout transaction. Private-
to-private MBOs
30
, MBIs and SMBOs manage earnings upwards while private divisional 
MBOs show evidence of downwards earnings management. Contrary to existing evidence, 
public-to-private MBOs do not manage earnings, a result we interpret as related to the high 
percentage of deals with PE sponsors. Substantial heterogeneity exists within private-to-
private MBOs. Family businesses avoid earnings management altogether while non-family 
MBOs show differences conditional upon PE-backing. Differences in ownership structures of 
family and non-family firms do not change tendencies to manage earnings; rather it is the 
presence or absence of family identification that affects earnings management. This result is 
demonstrated by significant differences between family and non-family firms ultimately 
controlled by one individual. PE-backed buyouts, in general, exhibit lower abnormal accruals 
than non-PE-backed buyouts. PE investors, however, do not curb earnings management in 
secondary MBOs, suggesting a shift in their incentives at the time of exit. The results urge 
caution against drawing general conclusions about buyouts and highlight their heterogeneity. 
This study contributes to the literature in four ways. First, the prior earnings management 
studies provide evidence from public-to-private MBOs. This study examines MBOs of public 
and private firm origin as well as divisional MBO and MBI transactions. Second, empirical 
evidence regarding agency conflicts during private firm family successions is non-existent. 
Although calls have been made for more research (e.g., Chrisman et al., 2004), past studies 
are limited to theoretical discussions and exploratory evidence (Howorth et al., 2004; Scholes 
et al., 2008). Third, the literature emphasises the need for comparative studies to segregate 
family and non-family firm effects (Chrisman et al., 2004) and to discern different uses of 
                                                          
30
 In this study, private-to-private MBO refers to MBOs of independent private firms. This term includes private 
family and non-family businesses. 
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earnings management in family and non-family firms (Salvatore and Moore, 2010). This 
study follows their invitation for more comparative research. Fourth, the positive role of PE 
sponsors in buyouts is widely acknowledged. Less debated is their role in earnings 
management practices and their shifting motivations at buyout exit. Prior evidence on PE-
backed buyouts relies on IPO exits (Chou et al., 2006; Katz, 2009). This study extends 
previous research by examining the effect of PE-backing prior to buyout and complements 
IPO evidence with a secondary MBO perspective. 
The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 examines motivations for 
earnings management and constructs hypotheses. Section 3 describes data and discusses 
family firm definition. Section 4 presents the results and Section 5 concludes the study. 
5.2 Agency Conflicts and Earnings Management in Management Buyouts 
5.2.1 Public-to-private MBOs 
Jensen (1986) argues that MBO reduces agency conflicts between managers and 
shareholders. However, an MBO is often accompanied by its own moral hazard problems. 
The vendor management team needs to make a choice between its own wealth and wealth of 
shareholders. Should managers choose to maximise their wealth, they can expropriate 
shareholders by manipulating earnings and purchase the firm at an undervalued price. Prior 
literature finds that separation of ownership and management creates incentives for managers 
of public firm to understate earnings before MBO (Perry and Williams, 1994; Fischer and 
Louis, 2008; Mao and Renneboog, 2013). Managers have the ability to exert a self interest-
oriented control over the accounting practices since they possess an informational advantage 
over the shareholders and dispersed ownership structure of public firms allows them to evade 
strict monitoring by shareholders. With the exception of DeAngelo (1986), the evidence 
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collectively suggests that managers adjust earnings downwards in the year preceding MBOs. 
Therefore we hypothesise that: 
H1: Managers of public-to-private MBOs understate earnings prior to buyout transaction. 
5.2.2 Private-to-private MBOs: Family vs. Non-Family Firms 
Although researchers argue that agency conflicts are substantially reduced (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983), the traditional principal agent relationships do not 
accurately describe rather complex nature of conflicts in private firms (Schulze et al., 2001; 
Howorth et al., 2004). There exist various types of ownership structures and owner-manager 
relationships which cannot be formulated into one single recipe. The research must 
essentially distinguish between private family and private non-family firms since the former 
blends ownership and management into a family culture that imposes behavioural 
expectations in line with family reputation on both managers and owners. Such expectations, 
however, do not exist in non-family firms where a family culture is not present. 
Contrary to public firms where managers have self-motivated incentives to manipulate 
earnings, the agency conflicts between managers and shareholders largely take a back seat in 
the private firm literature since the concentrated ownership and non-separation of ownership 
and control reduce information asymmetries between insiders (e.g., Fama and Jensen, 1983). 
Instead, more attention is given to relations between shareholders and outsiders, shareholders 
themselves, institutional settings and capital markets. The existing research indeed suggests 
that private firm managers might have other incentives to manipulate earnings. Less 
importance is attributed to informativeness of earnings (Ball and Shivakumar, 2005) as a 
means to convey information to shareholders since few shareholders can exchange 
information using private channels (Burgstahler et al., 2006). The financial statements, 
however, might be used to communicate with outside investors. In the unique MBO setting, 
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the relations with outside investors and lenders may be especially important should managers 
seek external financing to cover the purchase (Fischer and Louis, 2008). Therefore managers 
may resort to upwards earnings management to facilitate financing. The manager-on-manager 
conflicts can also play an important role in the buyout setting. Kaplan (1989b) finds that a 
large number of managers who are not part of the MBO team sell their shares in the MBO. 
These managers are likely to have incentives to inflate earnings to obtain a higher profit. 
Earnings can also be overstated by outgoing managers before leveraged buyout transactions 
since they cease involvement in the firm following buyout and do not bear the future costs of 
reversals (Mao and Renneboog, 2013). In private firm MBOs, incentives to overstate 
earnings might be even stronger if the outgoing managers also hold large chunks of shares. 
Demsetz and Lehn (1985) argue that large shareholders are able to monitor management 
more effectively and prevent managerial expropriation in firms where ownership and control 
is not separated. However, personal wealth driven concerns might motivate owner-managers 
themselves to take advantage of their unique position and expropriate independent managers 
in MBO deals. This pattern can be more visibly observed in private firms ultimately or fully 
owned by one individual.
31
 In contrast, ability of management team to understate earnings is 
likely to be constrained due to strict monitoring by outgoing shareholders. Hence an upwards 
earnings management can be projected in private firms prior to MBO.  
The private firm research emphasises that altruism between family members (Eisenhardt, 
1989), while reducing agency conflicts, can lead to pursuit of non-economic objectives in 
family firms (Chrisman et al., 2004; Stockmans et al., 2010) creating family-on-family 
conflicts which are harder to resolve due to family members reluctance to put pressure on 
other members (Schulze et al., 2001). These unique conflicts are often associated with poorer 
performance for family firms (Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001; Che and Langli, 2014) and 
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 This study includes 52 private firms 100% owned by one person. With regards to ultimate ownership, we 
differentiate between ultimate family owner and ultimate non-family owner. 
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willingness to manage earnings upwards (Stockmans et al., 2010). On the other hand, the 
agency conflicts in private firms might be manifested in the form of an attempt by entrenched 
large shareholders to expropriate minority shareholders (Chrisman et al., 2004; Salvato and 
Moores, 2010). In both cases, the underlying assumption is that the family or large 
shareholder strives for its survival. Private family firms, however, are less likely to witness 
expropriation of minority shareholders by family since family wealth itself is dependent on 
firm wealth (Schulze et al., 2001). Moreover, in the context of MBO by which the dominant 
shareholder effectively terminates its ownership, stakeholders are less likely to suffer from 
intra-family conflicts or from expropriation attempts by large shareholders. Expropriation 
theory implicitly assumes that minority shareholder wealth is sufficiently large to deserve 
expropriation.  As reported in descriptive statistics, the median non-family shareholding in 
our sample family firms is only 6%. Thus we find it unlikely that family will risk alienating 
minority shareholders. This explanation is more likely to be valid in public firms where 
family firm ownership is more loosely defined than in private firms. Therefore the emphasis 
should be given to the relationship between managers and outgoing owners.   
The stewardship theory (Davis et al., 1997) is an ideal starting point to explain relations 
between managers and family owners (Corbetta and Salvato, 2004). It posits that family 
members identify with the organisation and this identification process can be internalised by 
the selected managers who hold close relationships with the owners. Lansberg (1983) reports 
that family firms often select and appoint non-family managers based on the personal 
connections between controlling family and individuals. As a result, managers and owners 
form a trust-based relationship driven by more than economic goals (Chrisman et al., 2004; 
Howorth et al., 2004; Stockmans et al., 2010). In this type of governance structure, both 
managers and owners are likely to forego their private rents for the benefit of the entire 
family organisation. 
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Burkart et al. (2003) emphasise that family succession issues are crucial to the family firm 
governance and survival. In the absence of a suitable family member to succeed the retiring 
generation (Wright et al., 1992), families might consider transferring control to a trusted 
management team through an MBO (Howorth et al., 2004; Scholes et al., 2008). Family 
identity and reputation concerns play a vital role in the succession decisions. An MBO 
succession route is often preferred for the preservation of business, family identity and 
reputation (Westhead, 1997; Howorth et al., 2004). Family firms gain economic and non-
economic benefits from their reputation in their dealings with third parties, suppliers and 
lenders. For example, families with a long history in the business can enjoy more favourable 
debt financing terms compared to non-family firms (Anderson et al., 2002). Since transfer of 
the family business to an outsider would reduce the private benefits of family control 
(Burkart et al., 2003), families seek to sustain and capitalise on their reputation built over a 
long time. Therefore family successions constitute a sizeable portion of MBO transactions. 
Scholes et al. (2008) report that 20% of MBOs in Europe results from takeover of family 
businesses. Although information asymmetries still exist between management team and 
family during MBO negotiations (Howorth et al., 2004), the opportunistic incentives to 
manage earnings are expected to be minimal in these friendly deals.
32
  
Although more emphasis has been given to family firms recently, the research on earnings 
management in family firms is rather limited. In a study of Italian public family firms, 
Prencipe et al. (2008) find that family owned businesses are less likely to manage earnings 
for income smoothing purpose; however they have incentives to do so for debt covenant 
reasons. Stockmans et al. (2010) examine Flemish family firms and show that poor 
performing family businesses can inflate earnings for the preservation of so-called 
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 For example, MBO team of Mansfield Pollard & Co Limited “express their gratitude to the controlling family 
for their 40 years of service” and stress the sustenance family culture in the annual account. Another family firm 
Raymond Brown Limited initiated succession plans three years before MBO. The senior management team 
involved in the MBO had, on average, 14 years of service with Raymond Brown.  
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socioemotional wealth which refers to non-financial characteristics of the family business 
such as identity and reputation. Kvaal et al. (2012) argue that compared to non-family firms, 
private family business owners are more likely to manage earnings downwards to hide their 
true wealth. Their earnings management proxy, however, is not significantly different 
between family and non-family firms. The limited evidence fails to shed light on the earnings 
management motivations and the trade-off between managers and owners in the unique MBO 
setting. We formulate two hypotheses for family and non-family firms as follows: 
H2: Managers of private family firms do not manage earnings prior to MBO. 
H3: Managers of private non-family firms overstate earnings prior to MBO. 
5.2.3 Management Buy-ins 
MBIs are likely to occur when incumbent managers who are aware of the problems with the 
firm are unwilling to buy the firm (Jelic, 2011). The shareholders are then likely to search for 
external buyers. Scholes et al. (2008) argue that family owned firms resort to MBI as a 
succession route when there is no suitable internal family owner or manager. The incoming 
management teams often face unexpected problems (Wright et al., 1995) that are not revealed 
in the negotiation process. Howorth et al. (2004) argue that the mutual commitment of parties 
to the future of firm is expected to be lower in MBI deals. MBI negotiations between family 
owners and external managers are likely to be beset with opportunistic approach from both 
parties, with the outgoing owners having the informational advantage over incoming 
managers. Therefore, agency conflicts between vendors and buyers would arise. On the other 
hand, the incentives of incumbent management and outgoing shareholders are likely to be 
aligned since neither party would have a stake in firm following MBI deal. They might be 
tempted to seek short term personal gains by inflating earnings to obtain a better bargaining 
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position in price negotiations. Hence vendors may attempt to expropriate incoming 
management team. Based on the discussion we hypothesise that: 
H4: Managers of private firms overstate earnings prior to MBI deals.  
5.2.4 Divisional Buyouts
33
 
The agency conflicts in divisional MBOs mainly appear in the form of differences in the 
priorities of division managers and their parent companies. Fama and Jensen (1983) point out 
that the lack of appropriate incentive and control mechanisms in large companies may create 
agency problems between divisions and their parents. These problems in particular relate to 
the parental constraints imposed on the division, which restrict realisation of growth potential 
in favour of the parental organisation targets. Therefore, divisions have limited ability to 
create value (Wright et al., 1994). An MBO enables the managers to overrule these 
constraints and unleash the latent growth potential by exercising their discretion (Wright et 
al., 2001; Bruining and Wright, 2002). As there are significant asymmetric forces (Wright et 
al., 2001) managers might be tempted to act opportunistically. On the other hand, large firms 
often divest their unprofitable and inefficient assets as part of a restructuring effort to focus 
on their core business (Lang et al., 1995). Managers may use this argument to motivate the 
sale even if there are other reasons. Hence an unprofitable division may set the ideal 
environment for a divisional MBO. We hypothesise that: 
H5: Managers of divisions understate earnings prior to MBO deals. 
5.2.5 Secondary MBOs 
SMBO mainly represents a form of exit for the private equity (PE) investor where the 
original buyout management team maintains its position and outgoing investor is replaced 
with a new PE investor. The literature suggests that secondary MBOs are not a desired exit 
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 Divisional MBOs used in this study are divisions of private firms. 
172 
 
route (Bienz and Lenite, 2008) and used when other routes are not feasible (Jelic and Wright, 
2011). In secondary deals, agency conflicts between managers and exiting investor are likely 
to be minimal due to control mechanisms introduced in the initial buyout (Meuleman et al., 
2009). Managers who seek a new investor and PE investor who seeks a successful exit are 
likely to work together towards their mutual target. Hence, the interests of managers and 
incumbent PE investor would be aligned (Chou et al., 2006). Agency conflicts, however, 
might emerge between outgoing and incoming PE investors. With both sides having similar 
skills, the party with the informational advantage can structure a deal to its benefit. The self-
motivated incentives of the selling PE might be strengthened by its need to create a 
successful track record (Kaplan and Schoar, 2005) and provide a high return for its limited 
partners. On the other hand, the incoming PE, being under pressure to make investment, 
might be less willing to negotiate a more favourable price. Note that incentives to manage 
earnings are different when PE investors buy (MBO) and sell (SMBO) shares. While PE 
funds are likely to curb earnings management practice prior to purchase, they are more likely 
to act towards profit maximisation at the time of exit (Chou et al., 2006; Cao, 2008).  The 
only evidence in this regard comes from buyout initial public offerings called reverse 
leveraged buyouts. Chou et al. (2008) find that PE-backed buyout IPOs manage earnings 
upwards while those without buyout sponsor do not manage earnings. In contrast, Katz 
(2009) finds that PE-backed IPOs engage in less upward earnings management. While the 
limited evidence points to a mixed picture for IPO exits, secondary MBOs are private 
negotiations which are characterised by higher information asymmetries between vendor and 
buyer than in IPOs. Therefore the opportunities and incentives for the selling party to engage 
in earnings management are expected to be higher. Thus, we hypothesise that: 
H6: Managers of MBOs overstate earnings prior to secondary MBO exits. 
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5.2.6 Private Equity Sponsors 
It is often argued that PE sponsors curb earnings management prior to IPOs. The evidence, 
however, mostly comes from venture capital (VC) backed transactions. The importance of 
distinguishment between PE and VC-backed deals in the context of earnings management is 
highlighted by Katz (2009) who argues that VC-related findings are hard to extrapolate to PE 
investors since the two have significant institutional differences. For example, VC funds 
often invest in early stage firms while PE investments involve mature firms with a history 
and different disclosure requirements. Therefore VC and PE sponsors might have distinct 
motivations with regards to earnings management. The VC-related findings draw a positive 
role for VC firms. Morsfield and Tan (2006) and Hochberg (2008) provide evidence that VC-
backed IPOs have lower discretionary accruals than non-VC-backed IPOs. Wongsunwai 
(2013) shows that VC sponsors curb earnings management prior to lock-up expiration. The 
evidence on the role of PE investors is more ambiguous. Chou et al. (2006) find that PE funds 
manage earnings before reverse leveraged buyouts, while the results of Katz (2009) indicate 
lower earnings management in PE-backed IPOs. This study involves both entry (MBO, MBI) 
and exit (SMBO) type of deals, therefore earnings management motivations of PE firms 
related to entry and exit must be separately addressed. PE investors are likely to detect and 
curb earnings management in entry deals since they have a greater need to obtain undiluted 
information in the negotiation process. They are also likely to be similarly motivated to 
reduce upwards earnings management not to pay a high price. At the time of exit, however, 
PE investors have the informational advantage over the buying party and they are in need to 
maximise their profits (Chou et al., 2006; Cao, 2008). Therefore, two different outcomes 
related to entry and exit are expected: 
H7: PE-backed buyouts engage in less earnings management than non-PE-backed buyouts in 
entry deals. 
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H8: PE-backed buyouts engage in more earnings management than non-PE-backed buyouts in 
exit deals. 
5.3 Data and Methodology 
5.3.1 Data Sources and Sample Construction 
This study comprises buyouts completed between 2004 and 2012 in the UK. Data for 
different sources of buyouts and buyout types are collected from Thomson One Banker 
(TOB) and Centre for Management Buyout Research (CMBOR) databases. We collect data 
on private-to-private MBOs, public-to-private MBOs and MBI deals from TOB and 
supplement the data with secondary buyout data from CMBOR to obtain a comprehensive 
sample of UK buyout deals. Accounting data required for earnings management estimations 
collected from financial statements obtained from Fame database. Company annual accounts 
and annual return documents used in the identification of family and non-family firms are 
also downloaded from Fame. 
Private-to-private buyout deals are selected based on the following general criteria: 
Acquisition target must be a private company registered in the UK, transaction must be led by 
an incumbent management team –hence MBO- and the selected companies must have the 
necessary accounting data to estimate earnings management prior to buyout transaction. A 
similar procedure is followed for MBI deals, with the exception that a buyout must be led by 
an incoming management team to qualify as MBI. Public-to-private MBOs are identified 
from the population of going private deals and MBOs.  
The limitations of TOB and other buyout databases have been well documented in the 
literature (i.e. Stromberg, 2008; Jelic and Wright, 2011). Inconsistent reporting is a common 
erroneous feature of these databases. Hence buyout samples suffer from overlaps between 
samples and occasional infiltration from repeated transactions. For instance, the initial 
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private-to-private MBO sample obtained from TOB also contains several public-to-private 
and secondary buyout deals. Therefore additional refinement is made by removing these 
deals and transferring them to their relevant samples. Various filters are used to drop 
irrelevant companies. We read through deal synopsis to identify buyouts originating from 
subsidiaries and formerly bankrupt companies. A separate divisional MBO sample is 
constructed by importing subsidiaries from the main sample and formerly bankrupt 
companies are dropped following Perry and Williams (1994). Following the common practice 
companies in financial industries are also excluded due to differences in their composition of 
financial statements. 
For secondary buyouts and other buyouts we collected data on deal characteristics, financial 
statements, PE sponsorship and presence of existing management in the buyout team using 
following sources: (i) Fame database; (ii) PE sponsor websites, TOB, www.unquote.com and 
news search. To obtain the final secondary MBO sample, we excluded secondary buy-ins and 
determined whether the deal is an MBO or not using the sources above. Private and public 
firm control samples used in tests of earnings management are also constructed using the 
population of active and inactive companies on Fame database. The final samples for 
different buyout types include 229 private-to-private MBOs, 18 public-to-private MBOs, 24 
MBIs, 47 divisional MBOs and 138 secondary MBOs. 
5.3.2 Definition of Family Firm 
Family business literature defines a family firm in a variety of ways depending on the market 
and research question. In countries such as Italy and Norway, family research is facilitated by 
collective research projects on family firms whereby the market-specific family business data 
is collected and made available to researchers (e.g., Sciascia and Mazzola, 2008; Che and 
Langli, 2014). Surveying top managers of companies is also a widely utilised method to 
identify family businesses (Zahra, 2005; Westhead and Howorth, 2006; Wang and 
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Poitziouris, 2010). While a wide range of family definitions exist in the literature, there are 
certain points that are agreed upon by most researchers. Chua et al. (1999) and Miller et al. 
(2007) review the definitions of family firms and conclude that a family firm is typically 
defined as a business owned and managed by multiple family members. Three combinations 
of family ownership and management patterns are described by Chua et al. (1999). Some 
researchers consider a firm family business if owned and managed by family while others see 
it sufficient to have family involvement in either ownership or management alone. 
Differences also arise as to how much ownership is required to consider a firm as family 
owned and what exactly qualifies a firm as family controlled. Notably, different family 
definitions with varying degrees of family ownership and managerial involvement are 
adopted in private and public firms. In publicly listed firms, where dispersed ownership is 
more pronounced than privately held firms it is a common practice to consider less than 50% 
family ownership sufficient to qualify as family business provided that the founder is still in 
the management team, CEO or top members of management are family members (Anderson 
and Reeb, 2003; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2003; Ali et al., 2007). In this definition, family control 
is exerted through strategic managerial positions even though only a minority of shares is 
held by family. For example, average family ownership in Anderson and Reeb (2003) sample 
is only 18%. Other researchers consider controlling majority voting rights as a means to 
assume family control over firm (Barontini and Caprio, 2006; Kvaal et al., 2012). On the 
contrary, in private firms a family network is often required to hold majority ownership to 
qualify as family business without necessarily family involvement in management (Westhead 
and Howorth, 2006; Scholes et al., 2008; Stockmans et al., 2010). Chua et al. (1999) note that 
it would be injustice to ignore firms who insist that they are family firms even though the 
family network does not have majority ownership. 
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Based on the prior literature, we adopt a strict, at the same time inclusive family definition for 
our private firm sample. Three conditions are imposed to qualify a firm as family business: i) 
more than 50% of ordinary shares are held by multiple individuals who are linked by blood or 
marriage, ii) at least one member of family serves in board of directors, iii) a firm is reported 
to be family business in company annual accounts. Firms must meet the first two conditions 
or the last condition to qualify as family business. Surnames and addresses of shareholders 
and managers in annual return filings are used to identify blood relations. This definition is 
consistent with Wilson et al. (2013) for UK family firms.
34
 
Miller et al. (2007) point out that most family research on performance does not distinguish 
between lone founder and family founder, considering firms ultimately owned by one 
individual as family business even though there is zero involvement of other family members 
as shareholders or managers, making it difficult to assess the unique effects of the two. In this 
study we implement another approach and distinguish between ultimate family owner (UFO) 
and lone ultimate owner. Firms owned by a single individual are therefore considered a 
distinct non-family firm category. 
5.3.3 Sample Descriptive Statistics 
The final sample count and distribution of buyouts over time are presented in Table 5-1 Panel 
A. The private-to-private sample is divided into family and non-family groups where the first 
group contains 71 MBOs and the latter 158 MBOs. Only firms for which the annual account 
and annual return filings are available, and the ownership status can be determined from 
those filings are included in the private-to-private MBO sample. To identify family and non-
family firms we examine shareholders, board members and annual accounts one year before 
and after MBO. To qualify as a family business, more than 50% of ordinary shares must be 
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 This definition is different from prior earnings management studies in by Prencipe et al. (2008) and 
Stockmans et al. (2010), which do not require family members to hold managerial positions to qualify as family 
business. 
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owned by one family and at least one member of family must hold board seat. 63 firms are 
identified family business using this definition. Firms that explicitly describe themselves as 
family business in annual accounts are also considered family firm even if their ownership 
structure cannot be determined from annual reports. 8 firms are identified as family business 
by virtue of this definition. The main results are inferred from 71 family MBOs, however 
separate results for the 63 family firms (excluding 8 firms that perceive themselves as family 
business, but lacking data to empirically verify this) are also presented in additional tests. 
Further examination of private non-family firms also reveals three different ownership 
patterns. The first one is businesses wholly owned by a single individual. 52 firms fall into 
this category. These firms are not considered family business since the shares are exclusively 
held by one individual and no other member of family is involved in the management. The 
second ownership pattern is firms jointly owned by two individuals where each person holds 
50% of equity and no member of their family occupies managerial posts. 14 firms fall into 
this category. The third and last ownership pattern is firms with dispersed ownership where 
no single controlling individual or entity exists and all shareholders own less than 50% of 
shares. 92 firms fall into this ownership category. Separate tests for wholly owned non-family 
firms and firms with dispersed ownership are also presented in the results section. 
     [Table 5-1] 
Panel B of Table 5-1 reports mean and median ownership and board size for family firms. 
The first two columns present percentage family and non-family ownership for 63 firms 
where ownership data is available. The average family (non-family) ownership is 88.3% 
(11.6%) and median family ownership is 94% (6%). The third column shows statistics for 
firms controlled by an ultimate family owner (UFO). UFO information is obtained from the 
ultimate controlling party section of company annual accounts. Ultimate controlling persons 
in non-family firms are not included in this classification. 30 family firms are reported to be 
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controlled by UFOs. Mean and median ownership for UFOs is 73.8% and 72.5% 
respectively. The last two columns display number of all board members and number of 
family members on board. The median family firm has 5 managers on board and 2 of these 
posts are occupied by family members. In summary, these statistics suggest that prior to 
MBO transaction family firms are closely held and controlled by family through their 
substantial shareholding and occupied board seats while non-family shareholders own only a 
fraction of common equity. 
5.3.4 Measurement of Earnings Management 
Three proxies are used for earnings management. We initially estimate discretionary total 
accruals with Defond and Jiambalvo (1994) cross-sectional version of Jones model. As 
shown below, this method involves estimating earnings management parameters using 
samples of control firms and computing discretionary accruals are as the difference between 
realised accruals and predicted accruals. As a second measure of earnings management, 
discretionary working capital accruals (WCA) are also estimated. For the third measure of 
earnings management, performance-adjusted discretionary accruals are estimated as in 
Kothari et al. (2005) who show the importance of controlling for performance to overcome 
the likelihood of wrongly rejecting null hypothesis in the events where incentives for 
earnings management are associated with performance. Public and private non-buyout firm 
control portfolios are constructed by matching MBOs on 2-digit SIC code and year. 
Based on prior research (e.g., Perry and Williams, 1994; Dechow et al., 1995; Burgstahler et 
al., 2006), we calculate total accruals (TAC) as change in noncash working capital minus 
depreciation expense. Formally total accruals in year t are defined as: [∆Current Assetst 
(Fame item 48) - ∆Casht (Fame item 42)] - [∆Current Liabilitiest (Fame item 66) - ∆Short 
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term debtt (Fame item 52)] - Depreciationt (Fame item 21).
35
 Working capital accruals are 
defined as change in noncash working capital. Total accruals are modelled as a function of 
inverse lagged assets, change in sales and plant, property and equipment (PPE). 
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where i= 1, …., 133 index for private control firm samples matched with buyouts in the same 
2-digit industry and year
36
; and t= index for the corresponding earnings management 
estimation year. Normal or nondiscretionary accruals (NDA) are estimated as: 
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where α1, α2 and α3= industry-year specific parameter estimates generated by the equation (1) 
and j= 1, …., 254 buyout firm index. Discretionary total accruals (DTA) are calculated as the 
difference between realised and normal accruals. 
DTAjt = TACjt - NDAjt           (3) 
The same procedure is repeated in the estimation of discretionary working capital and 
performance-adjusted total accruals. WCA regressions exclude plant, property and equipment 
variable. Models (1) and (2) are augmented by net income scaled by current assets (ROA) to 
obtain performance-adjusted discretionary total accruals estimates. 
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It is reported that earnings management studies using balance sheet items to calculate accruals are likely to be 
contaminated (Hribar and Collins, 2002). A cash flow based approach is recommended to overcome this issue. 
However, we are limited to a balance sheet approach in accruals calculation since most private firms do not 
report cash flow statement. 
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 It is reported that earnings management studies using balance sheet items to calculate accruals are likely to be 
contaminated (Hribar and Collins, 2002). A cash flow based approach is recommended to overcome this issue. 
However, we are limited to a balance sheet approach since most private firms do not report cash flow statement. 
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5.4 Results 
We start with the full sample of private-to-private MBOs and proceed to divide the sample 
into family and non-family owned categories. The non-family owned sample is further 
divided into dispersed ownership and single ownership samples based on the ownership 
structure. Abnormal accruals for two years preceding MBO are presented since buyout 
planning may not be limited to the immediate year before MBO. Year -1 and -2 represent the 
first and second years before buyout respectively. Our hypotheses predict no earnings 
management for family and upwards earnings management for non-family MBOs. The 
results are presented in Table 5-2 through Table 5-6. 
      [Table 5-2] 
Table 5-2 reports abnormal accruals for the full sample of private-to-private MBOs. All 
earnings management proxies show significant upwards manipulation in year -1. Mean and 
median total discretionary accruals are significant at 1% while median accruals are significant 
at 5% in performance adjusted discretionary accruals and working capital accruals models. 
Results show that earnings management practice is limited to year -1.  
     [Table 5-3] 
Table 5-3 presents abnormal accruals for 71 family owned firms. Consistent with H2, none of 
the three discretionary accruals measures show significant earnings management. The 
number of firms with upwards and downwards earnings adjustment is notably almost equal. 
     [Table 5-4] 
Non-family firms reported in Table 5-4, however, show significant upwards earnings 
management in all models. Again, the earnings management does not extend to year -2. T-
test and Mann-Whitney tests for differences in abnormal accruals reveal that mean and 
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median differences between family and non-family firms are significant at 1% (not reported). 
The results support our predictions regarding family and non-family MBOs in H2 and H3.  
     [Table 5-5]  
Further partition of non-family sample into dispersed ownership and single ownership groups 
reported in Table 5-5 and Table 5-6 confirm that both ownership structures form a convenient 
ground for upwards exploitation of managerial/owner discretion and control over accounting 
procedures. The differences between the two non-family ownership forms are not significant 
(tests not reported). The findings related to family MBOs are consistent with a succession 
(Howort et al., 2004; Scholes et al., 2008) and stewardship explanation for family firms 
(Davis et al., 1997). Moreover, the results suggest that different asymmetric forces shape firm 
dynamics of family firms and single owned firms. Single owned firm behaviour resembles 
that of non-family firms, thus inclusion of these firms in the family business definition is 
likely to produce erroneous findings.  
     [Table 5-6] 
The results for public-to-private MBOs are presented in Table 5-7. Although mean and 
median statistics generally suggest downwards earning management as predicted in H1, 
abnormal accruals are not significantly different from zero. This result can be explained by 
two scenarios. In the first scenario, the low number of observations in the sample might cause 
insignificant test statistics and in the second earnings management practice might be 
discouraged by the PE sponsor. A closer look at the sample reveals that 15 of 18 MBOs are 
backed by a PE investor. The PE explanation might be reasonable since prior MBO literature 
on earnings management (e.g., Perry and Williams, 1994; Mao and Renneboog, 2013) does 
not take into account the effect of PE involvement.      
     [Table 5-7] 
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Table 5-8 shows the results related to MBI transactions. Consistent with H4, mean and 
median abnormal accruals suggest significant upwards earnings management in the year 
preceding buyout. Note that this result comes about in spite of having both family and non-
family MBIs in the sample. As predicted, opportunistically motivated owners exploit their 
informational advantage and parties in MBI deals have lower commitment to business 
without regard to ownership form prior to buyout.  
     [Table 5-8] 
The divisional MBO results presented in Table 5-9 show a less conclusive picture. 
Performance adjusted abnormal accruals in year -1 are negative and significant at 5% while 
year -2 shows significant downwards management in performance adjusted and working 
capital accruals measures. While the abnormal accruals are generally negative, the 
downwards earnings management is more strongly pronounced for year -2 than year -1. This 
pattern is, however, consistent with H5 and with Lang et al. (1995) argument that 
underperforming divisions are more likely to be sold. Thus, division managers may attempt 
to set the stage for an MBO by deflating earnings in two subsequent years before buyout.  
     [Table 5-9]  
SMBO abnormal accruals presented in Table 5-10 suggest significant income overstatement 
in two of the three prediction models. Mean and median discretionary total accruals and 
working capital accruals in year -1 are positive and significant at conventional levels. This 
result is consistent with a scenario where the outgoing PE investor who needs to arrange a 
profitable exit exploits its informational advantage over the incoming investor. The findings 
therefore support the upwards earnings management hypothesis of H6. Tests of difference 
conducted in family vs. non-family, MBO vs. MBI, full MBO vs. divisional MBO and MBO 
vs. Secondary MBO samples suggest significant differences in earnings management 
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between family vs. non-family MBOs and full MBO vs. divisional MBOs.
37
 The differences 
between MBO vs. MBI and MBO vs. SMBO deals are not significant. 
     [Table 5-10] 
Table 5-11 reports abnormal accruals relative to PE-backing status. Nearly half of all buyouts 
receive PE funding in the sample. PE sponsors are most heavily represented in public-to-
private and SMBOs. The results show that PE-backed MBO/MBIs in general have lower 
abnormal accruals than non-PE-backed MBO/MBIs. PE sponsors prevent earnings 
management in private-to-private MBOs; however their role in curbing earnings management 
is limited to non-family MBOs. Family firms do not manage earnings regardless of the PE-
backing status. Non-family firms and in particular those with dispersed ownership manage 
earnings with or without PE-backing, however earnings management is more strongly 
pronounced for non-PE-backed firms. 15 of 18 public-to-private MBOs receive PE funding, 
which suggests that the previous result of no earnings management in public-to-private could 
be due to PE monitoring. There is evidence of earnings management by non-PE-backed 
MBIs, significant at 10%. The non-PE-backed MBI sample size is small; hence the power of 
tests could be limited. SMBOs form an exception to the role of PE in reducing earnings 
management. As predicted, evidence suggests that both PE-backed and non-PE-backed 
SMBOs manage earnings. The differences between the PE-backed and non-PE-backed 
subsamples are, however, only significant in non-family firms (tests not reported). We 
cannot, therefore conclusively state that PE-backing is associated with less earnings 
management. Note that non-family firms constitute a large portion of the private-to-private 
MBOs -158 of 229 buyouts in this sample-; thus this result can be extended to a large section 
of the buyout market. In addition, the role of PE-backing with respect to earnings 
                                                          
37
 MBO and full MBO samples consist of 229 independent private-to-private MBOs. The comparison between 
MBO and MBI samples is done only with private firms since public-to-private MBIs are not considered in this 
study. 
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management is likely to be minimal or non-existent in family firms since family businesses 
do not possess opportunistic motivations to manage earnings. In summary, findings suggest 
that PE behaviour differs depending on whether they are in the buyer or seller position. 
Consistent with Chou et al. (2006) PE firms act opportunistically at the time of exit to 
maximise their return. In contrast, PE sponsors reduce earnings management in non-family 
owned private firms at the time of entry. The findings lend partial support to H7 and H8. 
     [Table 5-11] 
5.5 Robustness Checks 
Additional tests are carried out using various definitions and subsamples of family firms. 
First, a strict definition of family business is employed by excluding firms that perceive 
themselves as family business absent data on their ownership structure. This definition 
reduces the size of family sample from 71 to 63 firms. Second, to differentiate family 
succession and stewardship explanations from minority shareholder expropriation 
explanation, tests are conducted in subsamples of family firms 100% owned by family and 
less than 100% owned by family. Firms wholly owned by family should provide the ultimate 
test of earnings management in family firms. As noted previously, however, the median 
ownership of non-family shareholders is a small 6% in family firms. Therefore the temptation 
to expropriate other shareholders might be small. Lastly tests are conducted in subsamples of 
family firms controlled by one member of family (UFO) through majority shareholding and 
firms with dispersed family ownership structure. The importance of separately treating UFOs 
and non-family ultimate owners is highlighted by Miller et al. (2007). The results presented 
in Table 5-12 display no significant earnings management pattern. Adoption of a different 
family definition produces results consistent with previous findings. The differences between 
family ownership subsamples 100% owned vs. less than 100% owned and UFO vs. non-UFO 
family firms are not significant. Tests suggest, however, that UFO and ultimate non-family 
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owner firms have significant differences (results not reported). The results support family 
succession (Howort et al., 2004; Scholes et al., 2008) and stewardship explanations (Davis et 
al., 1997) that the interests of family owners and managers are aligned when dealing parties 
identify with the firm culture and committed to the business. 
     [Table 5-12] 
5.6 Conclusion 
This chapter provides further evidence on earnings management preceding buyout 
transactions. Differentiating between various types of buyout transactions, we show that 
managers do not monotonically possess opportunistic incentives to understate earnings. 
Earnings management behaviour is influenced by different agency conflicts present in private 
and public firms, as well as having a PE sponsor in the buyout team. The main findings of the 
study emphasise the importance of separate examination of family and non-family buyouts 
and the shifting earnings management motivations of buyout sponsors at times of entry and 
exit. 
We find that family firm managers do not manage earnings prior to MBO, while non-family 
MBOs managers engage in upwards earnings management. This result is robust to adoption 
of a different family business definition, various ownership structures in family and non-
family firms, presence and absence of an ultimate controlling owner in the business. The 
results show that outgoing managers exploit their informational superiority and inflate 
earnings in MBI deals. Divisional MBO managers, in contrast, tend to understate earnings 
prior to buyout. Public-to-private MBOs do not exhibit significant earnings management, 
likely due to a high percentage of PE-backed deals. PE sponsors, in general, curb earnings 
management in entry level buyouts (MBO and MBI) whilst they attempt to maximise their 
profits by upwards earnings manipulation in exits (SMBO). Significant differences in 
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earnings management are observed along the lines of ownership and buyout origin (family vs. 
non-family, full MBO vs. divisional MBO, UFO vs. ultimate non-family owner) and across 
PE-backing status (PE-backed non-family vs. non-PE-backed non-family). The results 
highlight heterogeneity of buyouts and cautions against generalisation of prior earnings 
management evidence from public-to-private MBOs (e.g., Perry and Williams, 1994; Fischer 
and Louis, 2008). 
Little attention has been given to family businesses in buyout research. Empirical evidence on 
family behaviour in MBO context is quite limited or non-existent. Future buyout research can 
examine other aspects of family MBOs such as performance and survival. The lack of 
research on family MBOs also reflects a wider neglect of buyout heterogeneity. Future 
research may take the spotlight away from public-to-private buyouts and enhance our 
understanding of buyouts originating from private firms. 
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Table 5-1: Sample time distribution 
Private-to-private MBO Public-to-
private MBI 
Divisional 
MBO 
Secondary 
MBO Panel A All Family Non-Family 
Year 
       2004 18 6 12 - 1 - 18 
2005 44 14 30 3 1 13 24 
2006 53 14 39 1 8 8 24 
2007 43 13 30 3 6 8 26 
2008 25 9 16 2 1 2 19 
2009 6 4 2 5 4 4 3 
2010 15 3 12 1 1 5 7 
2011 10 3 7 3 1 5 12 
2012 15 5 10 - 1 2 5 
Total 229 71 158 18 24 47 138 
Table 5-1 Panel B: Family firm descriptive statistics 
 Mean and median statistics for family firms in the year prior to MBO. Samples in the first two columns 
exclude 8 firms identifying as family firm but whose ownership structure cannot be determined. 26 firms are 
100% family owned. UFO (ultimate family owner) represents percentage ownership held by a single 
controlling family member where explicitly reported as ultimately controlled in annual accounts.  
  Family ownership 
Non-Family 
ownership UFO Board size Family on board 
      Mean 88.3% 11.6% 73.8% 4.6 1.8 
Median 94% 6% 72.5% 5 2 
N 63 63 30 66 66 
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Table 5-2: Abnormal accruals: Private-to-private MBO sample 
This table presents discretionary accruals in 229 private-to-private MBOs preceding buyout transaction.  
Discretionary total accruals are computed using cross-sectional parameter estimates from following model: TAijt 
/Assetsijt-1 = β1jt (1/Assetsijt-1) + β2jt (∆REVijt /Assetsijt-1) + β3jt (PPEijt /Assetsijt-1) + εijt. Performance adjusted 
discretionary total accruals are computed using cross-sectional parameter estimates from following model: TAijt 
/Assetsijt-1 = β1jt (1/Assetsijt-1) + β2jt (∆REVijt /Assetsijt-1) + β3jt (PPEijt /Assetsijt-1) + β4jt (ROAijt /Assetsijt) + εijt. 
Working capital discretionary accruals are computed using estimated parameters from following model: WCAjt 
/Assetsjt-1 = β1jt (1/Assetsjt-1) + β2jt (∆REVjt /Assetsjt-1) + εjt. In the parameter estimation models, TAijt = total 
accruals for estimation portfolio firm i matched with MBO firm j on industry in year t, ∆REVijt = changes in 
turnover for estimation portfolio firm i matched with MBO firm j on industry in year t, PPE ijt = Tangible assets for 
estimation portfolio firm i matched with MBO firm j in year t, ROAijt = Net income divided by assets for 
estimation portfolio firm i matched with MBO firm j on industry in year t, Assetsijt-1 = Lagged total assets. 
Discretionary accruals are calculated as the difference between reported and predicted accruals. Reported statistics 
are for accruals winsorised at 1% and 99% percentiles. All p-values are 2-tailed). N (#: #) is the number of total 
(positive:negative) abnormal accruals in the dataset.  
 
Total Accruals 
 
Performance Adjusted 
Accruals 
 
Working Capital Accruals 
 
Year -1 Year -2 
 
Year -1 Year -2 
 
Year -1 Year -2 
         Mean 0.425 0.218 
 
0.021 -0.007 
 
0.025 -0.151 
Median 0.044 -0.022 
 
0.012 -0.013 
 
0.015 -0.002 
Standard deviation 1.563 1.701 
 
0.205 0.238 
 
0.312 1.141 
Minimum -3.739 -4.488 
 
-0.937 -1.031 
 
-0.944 -5.098 
Maximum 7.701 8.225 
 
0.956 1.717 
 
2.886 6.329 
T-test p-value 0.000 0.099 
 
0.112 0.678 
 
0.219 0.088 
Wilcoxon p-value 0.000 0.576 
 
0.031 0.181 
 
0.026 0.286 
N (Positive:Negative) 229(138:91) 166(77:89)   229(130:99) 166(80:86)   229(129:100) 166(81:85) 
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Table 5-3: Abnormal accruals: Family MBO sample 
This table shows discretionary accruals in 71 family private-to-private MBOs preceding buyout transaction. 
Total accruals are defined as change in noncash working capital minus depreciation. Working capital accruals are 
defined as change in noncash current assets minus change in current liabilities excluding short term portion of long 
term debt. Discretionary accruals are estimated as suggested by Defond and Jiambalvo (1994). Kothari, Leone and 
Wasley (2005) performance adjusted discretionary accruals are estimated by augmenting prediction model by 
(ROA) of control sample matched on 2-digit SIC code. ROA is defined as net income divided by total assets in the 
year prior to management buyout. Discretionary accruals are calculated as the difference between realised and 
predicted accruals in the year prior to management buyout. Reported statistics are for accruals winsorised at 1% 
and 99% percentiles. 2-tailed t and Wilcoxon p values are under the null that mean (median) discretionary 
accruals=0. N (#: #) is the number of total (positive: negative) abnormal accruals in the dataset.  
 
Total Accruals 
 
Performance Adjusted 
Accruals 
 
Working Capital 
Accruals 
 
Year -1 Year -2 
 
Year -1 Year -2 
 
Year -1 Year -2 
         Mean -0.008 0.191 
 
-0.013 -0.017 
 
-0.043 -0.093 
Median -0.012 -0.011 
 
-0.004 -0.012 
 
-0.006 0.008 
Standard deviation 0.907 1.373 
 
0.202 0.189 
 
0.222 0.448 
Minimum -3.739 -2.902 
 
-0.937 -0.602 
 
-0.944 -2 
Maximum 3.796 7.241 
 
0.571 0.574 
 
0.341 0.579 
T-test p-value 0.940 0.326 
 
0.579 0.504 
 
0.107 0.144 
Wilcoxon p-value 0.701 0.992 
 
0.739 0.358 
 
0.261 0.866 
N (Positive:Negative) 71 (35:36) 51 (25:26)   71 (35:36) 51 (24:27)   71 (33:38) 51 (28:23) 
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Table 5-4: Abnormal accruals: non-family MBO sample 
This table shows discretionary accruals in 158 non-family private-to-private MBOs preceding buyout transaction. 
Total accruals are defined as change in noncash working capital minus depreciation. Working capital accruals are 
defined as change in noncash current assets minus change in current liabilities excluding short term portion of 
long term debt. Discretionary accruals are estimated as suggested by Defond and Jiambalvo (1994). Kothari, 
Leone and Wasley (2005) performance adjusted discretionary accruals are estimated by augmenting prediction 
model by (ROA) of control sample matched on 2-digit SIC code. ROA is defined as net income divided by total 
assets in the year prior to management buyout. Discretionary accruals are calculated as the difference between 
realised and predicted accruals in the year prior to management buyout. Reported statistics are for accruals 
winsorised at 1% and 99% percentiles. 2-tailed t and Wilcoxon p values are under the null that mean (median) 
discretionary accruals=0.  N (#: #) is the number of total (positive:negative) abnormal accruals in the dataset.  
 
Total Accruals 
 
Performance Adjusted 
Accruals 
 
Working Capital 
Accruals 
 
Year -1 Year -2 
 
Year -1 Year -2 
 
Year -1 Year -2 
         Mean 0.594 0.136 
 
0.037 -0.003 
 
0.056 -0.125 
Median 0.066 -0.031 
 
0.025 -0.014 
 
0.036 -0.011 
Standard deviation 1.683 1.581 
 
0.206 0.257 
 
0.341 1.201 
Minimum -2.013 -4.488 
 
-0.653 -1.031 
 
-0.9 -5.098 
Maximum 7.701 8.225 
 
0.956 1.717 
 
2.886 6.329 
T-test p-value 0.000 0.355 
 
0.023 0.894 
 
0.040 0.264 
Wilcoxon p-value 0.000 0.544 
 
0.017 0.332 
 
0.006 0.304 
N (Positive:Negative) 158 (103:55) 115(52:63)   158(95:63) 115(56:59)   158(96:62) 115(53:62) 
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Table 5-5: Abnormal accruals: non-family MBOs: Dispersed ownership sample 
This table shows discretionary accruals in 106 non-family MBOs with dispersed ownership prior to buyout 
transaction. 
Total accruals are defined as change in noncash working capital minus depreciation. Working capital accruals 
are defined as change in noncash current assets minus change in current liabilities excluding short term portion 
of long term debt. Discretionary accruals are estimated as suggested by Defond and Jiambalvo (1994). Kothari, 
Leone and Wasley (2005) performance adjusted discretionary accruals are estimated by augmenting prediction 
model by (ROA) of control sample matched on 2-digit SIC code. ROA is defined as net income divided by total 
assets in the year prior to management buyout. Discretionary accruals are calculated as the difference between 
realised and predicted accruals in the year prior to management buyout. Reported statistics are for accruals 
winsorised at 1% and 99% percentiles. 2-tailed t and Wilcoxon p values are under the null that mean (median) 
discretionary accruals=0.  N (#: #) is the number of total (positive: negative) abnormal accruals in the dataset.   
 
Total Accruals 
 
Performance Adjusted 
Accruals 
 
Working Capital 
Accruals 
 
Year -1 Year -2 
 
Year -1 Year -2 
 
Year -1 Year -2 
         Mean 0.434 0.316 
 
0.037 -0.002 
 
0.039 -0.072 
Median 0.057 -0.009 
 
0.025 -0.032 
 
0.026 -0.008 
Standard deviation 1.424 1.772 
 
0.225 0.261 
 
0.271 1.177 
Minimum -2.013 -2.867 
 
-0.653 -0.475 
 
-0.9 -5 
Maximum 7.701 8.225 
 
0.956 1.717 
 
1.063 6.329 
T-test p-value 0.002 0.121 
 
0.092 0.942 
 
0.138 0.592 
Wilcoxon p-value 0.000 0.989 
 
0.066 0.196 
 
0.042 0.457 
N (Positive:Negative) 106 (70:36) 77 (38:39)   106 (65:41) 77 (34:43)   106 (64:42) 77 (36:41) 
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Table 5-6: Abnormal accruals of non-family MBO: Single owner sample 
This table shows discretionary accruals in 52 non-family MBOs wholly owned by a single individual 
shareholder prior to buyout transaction. 
Total accruals are defined as change in noncash working capital minus depreciation. Working capital accruals 
are defined as change in noncash current assets minus change in current liabilities excluding short term portion 
of long term debt. Discretionary accruals are estimated as suggested by Defond and Jiambalvo (1994). Kothari, 
Leone and Wasley (2005) performance adjusted discretionary accruals are estimated by augmenting prediction 
model by (ROA) of control sample matched on 2-digit SIC code. ROA is defined as net income divided by total 
assets in the year prior to management buyout. Discretionary accruals are calculated as the difference between 
realised and predicted accruals in the year prior to management buyout. Reported statistics are for accruals 
winsorised at 1% and 99% percentiles. 2-tailed t and Wilcoxon p values are under the null that mean (median) 
discretionary accruals=0.   N (#: #) is the number of total (positive: negative) abnormal accruals in the dataset.  
 
Total Accruals 
 
Performance Adjusted 
Accruals 
 
Working Capital 
Accruals 
 
Year -1 Year -2 
 
Year -1 Year -2 
 
Year -1 Year -2 
         Mean 0.921 -0.226 
 
0.037 -0.005 
 
0.091 -0.233 
Median 0.118 -0.063 
 
0.022 0.015 
 
0.044 -0.034 
Standard deviation 2.094 1.024 
 
0.161 0.252 
 
0.454 1.254 
Minimum -0.775 -4.488 
 
-0.347 -1.031 
 
-0.9 -5.098 
Maximum 7.127 0.949 
 
0.411 0.781 
 
2.886 2.027 
T-test p-value 0.002 0.181 
 
0.096 0.898 
 
0.155 0.259 
Wilcoxon p-value 0.007 0.248 
 
0.111 0.777 
 
0.055 0.446 
N (Positive:Negative) 52 (33:19) 38 (24:14)   52 (30:22) 38 (22:16)   52 (32:20) 38 (17:21) 
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Table 5-7: Abnormal accruals: Public-to-private MBO sample 
This table shows discretionary accruals in 18 public-to-private MBOs preceding buyout transaction. 
Total accruals are defined as change in noncash working capital minus depreciation. Working capital accruals are 
defined as change in noncash current assets minus change in current liabilities excluding short term portion of 
long term debt. Discretionary accruals are estimated as suggested by Defond and Jiambalvo (1994). Kothari, 
Leone and Wasley (2005) performance adjusted discretionary accruals are estimated by augmenting prediction 
model by (ROA) of control sample matched on 2-digit SIC code. ROA is defined as net income divided by total 
assets in the year prior to management buyout. Discretionary accruals are calculated as the difference between 
realised and predicted accruals in the year prior to management buyout. Reported statistics are for accruals 
winsorised at 1% and 99% percentiles. 2-tailed t and Wilcoxon p values are under the null that mean (median) 
discretionary accruals=0.   N (#: #) is the number of total (positive:negative) abnormal accruals in the dataset.  
 
Total Accruals 
 
Performance Adjusted 
Accruals 
 
Working Capital 
Accruals 
 
Year -1 Year -2 
 
Year -1 Year -2 
 
Year -1 Year -2 
         Mean -0.007 -0.078 
 
-0.013 -0.072 
 
-0.015 -0.085 
Median -0.012 -0.034 
 
-0.008 -0.057 
 
0.024 -0.033 
Standard deviation 0.178 0.212 
 
0.173 0.159 
 
0.107 0.315 
Minimum -0.381 -0.702 
 
-0.409 -0.474 
 
-0.354 -0.897 
Maximum 0.525 0.124 
 
0.483 0.119 
 
0.095 0.259 
T-test p-value 0.856 0.192 
 
0.736 0.114 
 
0.552 0.332 
Wilcoxon p-value 0.743 0.245 
 
0.616 0.157 
 
0.878 0.683 
N (Positive:Negative) 18 (8:10) 14 (5:9)   18 (8:10) 14 (5:9)   18 (11:7) 14 (6:8) 
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Table 5-8: Abnormal accruals: Management buy-in sample 
This table shows discretionary accruals in 24 MBIs preceding buyout transaction. MBI is defined as a buyout 
transaction where an incoming management team buys the firm and none of the existing managers is involved in 
the purchasing team. 
Total accruals are defined as change in noncash working capital minus depreciation. Working capital accruals 
are defined as change in noncash current assets minus change in current liabilities excluding short term portion 
of long term debt. Discretionary accruals are estimated as suggested by Defond and Jiambalvo (1994). Kothari, 
Leone and Wasley (2005) performance adjusted discretionary accruals are estimated by augmenting prediction 
model by (ROA) of control sample matched on 2-digit SIC code. ROA is defined as net income divided by total 
assets in the year prior to management buyout. Discretionary accruals are calculated as the difference between 
realised and predicted accruals in the year prior to management buyout. Reported statistics are for accruals 
winsorised at 1% and 99% percentiles. 2-tailed t and Wilcoxon p values are under the null that mean (median) 
discretionary accruals=0.   N (#: #) is the number of total (positive:negative) abnormal accruals in the dataset.  
 
Total Accruals 
 
Performance Adjusted 
Accruals 
 
Working Capital 
Accruals 
 
Year -1 Year -2 
 
Year -1 Year -2 
 
Year -1 Year -2 
         Mean 0.128 0.255 
 
0.061 0.048 
 
0.055 0.168 
Median 0.061 0.116 
 
0.027 0.073 
 
0.029 0.141 
Standard deviation 0.297 0.718 
 
0.157 0.439 
 
0.152 0.703 
Minimum -0.308 -1.218 
 
-0.329 -0.976 
 
-0.326 -0.936 
Maximum 1.287 1.892 
 
0.386 0.762 
 
0.325 1.573 
T-test p-value 0.035 0.128 
 
0.043 0.627 
 
0.089 0.296 
Wilcoxon p-value 0.020 0.156 
 
0.045 0.390 
 
0.076 0.331 
N (Positive:Negative) 24 (16:8) 20 (13:7)   24 (17:7) 20 (12:8)   24 (15:9) 20 (12:8) 
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Table 5-9: Abnormal accruals: Divisional MBO sample 
This table shows discretionary accruals in 47 divisional MBOs preceding buyout transaction. 
Total accruals are defined as change in noncash working capital minus depreciation. Working capital accruals are 
defined as change in noncash current assets minus change in current liabilities excluding short term portion of 
long term debt. Discretionary accruals are estimated as suggested by Defond and Jiambalvo (1994). Kothari, 
Leone and Wasley (2005) performance adjusted discretionary accruals are estimated by augmenting prediction 
model by (ROA) of control sample matched on 2-digit SIC code. ROA is defined as net income divided by total 
assets in the year prior to management buyout. Discretionary accruals are calculated as the difference between 
realised and predicted accruals in the year prior to management buyout. Reported statistics are for accruals 
winsorised at 1% and 99% percentiles. 2-tailed t and Wilcoxon p values are under the null that mean (median) 
discretionary accruals=0.   N (#: #) is the number of total (positive:negative) abnormal accruals in the dataset.  
 
Total Accruals 
 
Performance Adjusted 
Accruals 
 
Working Capital 
Accruals 
 
Year -1 Year -2 
 
Year -1 Year -2 
 
Year -1 Year -2 
         Mean 0.067 0.026 
 
-0.068 -0.138 
 
-0.039 -0.311 
Median -0.014 -0.094 
 
-0.029 -0.097 
 
-0.012 -0.261 
Standard deviation 0.758 0.953 
 
0.182 0.454 
 
0.305 0.811 
Minimum -1.273 -1.349 
 
-0.883 -1.447 
 
-1.089 -3.908 
Maximum 3.897 3.621 
 
0.188 1.042 
 
0.958 1.054 
T-test p-value 0.545 0.875 
 
0.013 0.090 
 
0.381 0.055 
Wilcoxon p-value 0.452 0.082 
 
0.032 0.044 
 
0.227 0.016 
N (Positive:Negative) 47(22:25) 33 (12:21)   47 (20:27) 33 (11:22)   47 (20:27) 33 (10:23) 
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Table 5-10: Abnormal accruals: SMBO sample 
This table shows discretionary accruals in 138 secondary MBOs preceding buyout transaction.  
Total accruals are defined as change in noncash working capital minus depreciation. Working capital accruals 
are defined as change in noncash current assets minus change in current liabilities excluding short term portion 
of long term debt. Discretionary accruals are estimated as suggested by Defond and Jiambalvo (1994). Kothari, 
Leone and Wasley (2005) performance adjusted discretionary accruals are estimated by augmenting prediction 
model by (ROA) of control sample matched on 2-digit SIC code. ROA is defined as net income divided by total 
assets in the year prior to management buyout. Discretionary accruals are calculated as the difference between 
realised and predicted accruals in the year prior to management buyout. Reported statistics are for accruals 
winsorised at 1% and 99% percentiles. 2-tailed t and Wilcoxon p values are under the null that mean (median) 
discretionary accruals=0.   N (#: #) is the number of total (positive:negative) abnormal accruals in the dataset.  
 
Total Accruals 
 
Performance Adjusted 
Accruals 
 
Working Capital 
Accruals 
 
Year -1 Year -2 
 
Year -1 Year -2 
 
Year -1 Year -2 
         Mean 0.411 0.029 
 
0.015 -0.011 
 
0.037 -0.009 
Median 0.028 -0.027 
 
0.005 -0.022 
 
0.026 0.002 
Standard deviation 1.496 0.978 
 
0.166 0.201 
 
0.794 0.216 
Minimum -0.875 -5.745 
 
-0.649 -0.928 
 
-6.639 -1.147 
Maximum 7.258 7.258 
 
0.852 1.231 
 
6.024 0.911 
T-test p-value 0.001 0.763 
 
0.280 0.589 
 
0.018 0.667 
Wilcoxon p-value 0.000 0.248 
 
0.276 0.094 
 
0.005 0.801 
N (Positive:Negative) 138(87:51) 102(44:58)   138(73:65) 101(39:62)   138(86:52) 102(53:49) 
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Table 5-11: Abnormal accruals by private equity backing 
This table presents discretionary accruals for private equity backed and non-private equity backed subsamples 
across buyouts. See previous tables for the details of expected accruals models used in the parameter estimation. 
Mean and median significance of accruals is tested by parametric t-test and non-parametric Wilcoxon sign rank 
test. *, ** and *** represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level. N (#: #) is the number of total 
(positive:negative) abnormal accruals in relevant samples.   
 
Private Equity Backed 
 
Non-PE Backed 
 
Total Acc. Perf. Adj. WCA 
 
Total Acc. Perf. Adj. WCA 
Private-to-private MBO 
      Mean 0.211* 0.038* 0.048 
 
0.623*** 0.006 0.004 
Median 0.024 0.016 0.007 
 
0.071*** 0.009 0.022 
N(Positive:Negative) 110(62:48) 110(57:53) 110(58:52) 
 
119(76:43) 119(69:50) 119(71:48) 
Family MBO 
       Mean -0.193 0.006 -0.046 
 
0.105 -0.025 -0.041 
Median -0.079 -0.021 -0.033 
 
0.017 0.002 0.013 
N(Positive:Negative) 27(11:16) 27(12:15) 27(10:17) 
 
44(24:20) 44(23:21) 44(23:21) 
Non-Family MBOs 
       Mean 0.343** 0.049* 0.078* 
 
0.873*** 0.024 0.031** 
Median 0.041** 0.022* 0.044* 
 
0.169*** 0.029 0.034** 
N(Positive:Negative) 83(51:32) 83(45:38) 83(48:35) 
 
75(52:23) 75(46:29) 75(48:27) 
Non-Family Dispersed Ownership 
     Mean 0.171 0.056* 0.048 
 
0.777*** 0.012 0.027 
Median 0.046** 0.025* 0.033 
 
0.094*** 0.021 0.026 
N(Positive:Negative) 60 (38:22) 60(32:28) 60(34:26) 
 
46(32:14) 46(29:17) 46(30:16) 
Non-Family Single Owner 
      Mean 0.791* 0.031 0.158 
 
1.025*** 0.043 0.037 
Median 0.041 0.012 0.047 
 
0.272*** 0.033 0.041 
N(Positive:Negative) 23(13:10) 23(13:10) 23(14:9) 
 
29(20:9) 29(17:12) 29(18:11) 
Public-to-Private MBO 
      Mean -0.001 -0.009 -0.008 
 
- - - 
Median 0.027 0.018 0.025 
 
- - - 
N(Positive:Negative) 15(8:7) 15(8:7) 15(11:4) 
 
3 (0:3) 3 (0:3) 3 (0:3) 
MBI 
       Mean 0.119 0.016 0.033 
 
0.144* 0.132* 0.091 
Median 0.057 0.014 0.023 
 
0.139* 0.137* 0.111 
N(Positive:Negative) 15(10:5) 15(10:5) 15(19:6) 
 
9(6:3) 9(7:2) 9(6:3) 
Divisional MBO 
       Mean 0.082 -0.062* -0.018 
 
0.053 -0.073 -0.057 
Median 0.046 -0.041* -0.027 
 
-0.018 -0.021 -0.009 
N(Positive:Negative) 22(13:9) 22 (9:13) 22 (8:14) 
 
25(9:16) 25(11:14) 25(12:13) 
Secondary MBO 
       Mean 0.282** 0.026 0.119* 
 
0.642** -0.005 -0.112 
Median 0.025*** 0.007 0.026*** 
 
0.037** 0.004 0.024 
N(Positive:Negative) 89(54:35) 89(46:43) 89(57:32)   49(33:16) 49(27:22) 49(29:20) 
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Table 5-12: Tests with additional family MBO samples 
This table presents results for a different adopted family definition and 4 other family MBO subsamples based 
on various levels of family ownership and control. Firms in Panel A require over 50% family ownership and at 
least 1 board seat allocated to a family member to qualify as family firm. This sample excludes firms for which 
ownership data is not available but perceived as family business. Panel B sample shows firms wholly owned 
by family. Panel D shows family firms where a member of family is identified as ultimate owner. Panel C and 
E show family firms excluded from Panel B and D samples respectively. Significance of mean and medians 
are tested by t-test and Wilcoxon sign test. * shows significance at 10%. 
 
Total Accruals 
 
Perf. adjusted 
 
WCA 
Panel A: Family MBOs excluding firms without ownership data 
Mean -0.049 
 
-0.021 
 
-0.054 
Median -0.026 
 
-0.007 
 
-0.016 
N(Positive:Negative) 63 (31:32) 
 
63 (30:33) 
 
63 (28:35) 
Panel B: MBOs 100% owned by family 
Mean 0.101 
 
-0.026 
 
-0.027 
Median -0.043 
 
-0.022 
 
-0.026 
N(Positive:Negative) 26 (12:14) 
 
26 (10:16) 
 
26 (12:14) 
Panel C: MBOs less than 100% owned by family 
Mean -0.109 
 
-0.021 
 
-0.077* 
Median -0.061 
 
0.001 
 
-0.022 
N(Positive:Negative) 37 (16:21) 
 
37 (19:18) 
 
37 (15:22) 
Panel D: Family MBOs controlled by an ultimate owner 
Mean -0.088 
 
-0.046 
 
-0.097* 
Median -0.061 
 
0.013 
 
-0.051 
N(Positive:Negative) 30 (14:16) 
 
30 (16:14) 
 
30 (13:17) 
Panel E: Family MBOs not controlled by an ultimate owner 
Mean 0.051 
 
0.011 
 
-0.003 
Median 0.001 
 
-0.006 
 
-0.001 
N(Positive:Negative) 41 (21:20)   41 (19:22)   41 (20:21) 
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    CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
This thesis aims to examine performance of management buyouts in the UK. In doing so, this 
study argues that post-MBO performance can be explained by value-adding mechanisms 
introduced following MBO as well as potential earnings management activity in the process 
towards MBO. We try to answer three questions throughout the study. First, do recent MBOs 
still create value? Second, do managers manipulate earnings prior to MBO transactions and 
what are the effects of earnings management on subsequent performance? Third, how do 
sources of buyout and different ownership structures in pre-buyout firms influence the 
earnings management practice? 
The hypotheses related to these three questions are tested using various hand-collected 
samples of MBOs undertaken in the UK. The period of the research comprises buyouts 
completed between 2000 and 2012 at its longest point. This period serves to provide recent 
evidence on MBOs. However the choice is also influenced by the restrictions imposed by 
data sources on historical data. The benefits of using more comprehensive datasets, both in 
terms of market and historical coverage cannot be ruled out. The key characteristics and 
limitations of databases used in this study are discussed in Chapter 3 and 4. This research 
mainly used Thomson One Banker (TOB) and Fame databases to collect required data. TOB 
is used to collect MBO samples while Fame is used to gather financial and ownership data 
related to MBO companies. 
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 present summary findings of the three 
empirical chapters. Section 3 discusses limitations and further research. 
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6.1 Summary Results of Empirical Chapters 
6.1.1 Performance of Management Buyouts in the Last Decade 
Chapter 3 examines operating performance around 412 private-to-private and divisional 
MBOs. The performance is represented by various measures of profitability, efficiency and 
growth. The performance is measured relative to pre-buyout company and industry 
performance. The results of univariate analysis show improvements in return on sales, 
employee productivity and growth. MBOs outperform the industry firms in terms of 
profitability starting from two years prior to buyout and the year preceding buyout coincides 
with a peak in profit levels. We speculate that this pattern might indicate a selective PE 
investment strategy based on superior profits or an earnings management scenario. The 
performance improvements are, however, smaller than those documented for early buyouts 
and they are mostly limited to the first three years following buyout. Consistent with prior 
research (e.g., Boucly et al., 2011), private-to-private MBOs focus more on growth while 
divisional MBOs have larger profitability improvements. Private equity-backed MBOs 
consistently have better profitability and growth, but lower efficiency than non-private 
equity-backed MBOs. This result is, however, due to a selection effect and PE-backed 
buyouts do not outperform other buyouts by any measures of performance after this effect is 
controlled, although they continue to outperform industry. This result implies that PE firms 
capitalise on better performing firms rather than improving their performance. Buyouts that 
arrange a successful exit through IPO, trade sale and secondary MBO have better post-buyout 
profitability, lower efficiency and growth. Buyouts staying in their original form for more 
than five years tend to be less profitable but continue their growth. We interpret this result 
from the perspective of a short and long term investor vision. Temporary investors such as PE 
funds seek to extract as much value as possible within a limited time frame so that they can 
realise the highest possible return at a successful exit. Long term investors, however, choose 
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to focus on company growth and reinvest the profits. OLS regressions confirm that PE 
sponsorship is not significantly associated with post-buyout performance changes while 
leverage remains a significant driver of profitability, efficiency and growth. The regressions 
also confirm the importance of controlling for selection bias resulting from the investment 
choice of PE firms. The findings of the study suggest that generating operational value is 
harder in recent buyouts. Moreover, the post-buyout performance is mostly attributable to 
existing firm characteristics rather than a result of buyout effect and little or no additional 
value is created following buyout. The research should, however, distinguish between 
selective investment and earnings management explanations to explain buyout performance. 
6.1.2 Earnings Management and MBO Performance 
Chapter 4 investigates earnings management preceding private-to-private MBOs and 
subsequent performance. The prior literature establishes a link between discretionary accruals 
and performance, showing that earnings management proxies are negatively associated with 
future performance (e.g., Teoh et al., 1998b). Literature also documents downwards earnings 
management prior to MBOs (e.g., Perry and Williams, 1994). If earnings understatement is a 
generic phenomenon across all buyouts, we argue that performance improvements following 
buyout might be overstated. The tests are performed using a sample of 291 UK MBOs. 
Privately held firms are used to test earnings management for two reasons. First, several 
studies examine public-to-private MBOs. Second, private-to-private MBOs represent a larger 
section of the buyout market (Stromberg, 2008), thus it is easier to make market-wide 
inferences based on private-to-private MBOs. The earnings management is tested by means 
of cross-sectional and time-series total discretionary accruals models. The results of cross-
sectional tests suggest significant and consistent tendency to overstate earnings in the year 
preceding MBO transaction. We find that earnings management activity is limited to non-PE-
backed buyouts and PE sponsorship curbs earnings management. The results are consistent 
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across Defond and Jiambalvo (1994) cross-sectional model, Kothari et al. (2005) 
performance adjusted estimation and application of propensity score matching as well as the 
use of working capital discretionary accruals. The results of time-series tests are inconclusive. 
We attribute this result to the limited availability of historical time series used in the 
parameter estimation. 
To examine the effect of earnings management to subsequent performance, we divide the 
sample into upward and downwards earnings management subsamples. Further, we construct 
aggressive and conservative earnings manager quartiles. The results show that aggressive 
earnings managers and upward earnings managers suffer deterioration in performance 
following buyout. MBOs that inflate earnings have significantly higher profitability before 
buyout and lower afterwards. Aggressive earnings managers follow the same pattern; 
however, the differences between aggressive and conservative quartiles are significant only 
for post-buyout years. More importantly, upward earnings managers stop performing better 
that industry after second post-buyout year while MBOs in the aggressive quartile do not 
outperform the industry at all. In contrast, downwards and conservative earnings managers 
perform significantly better than industry in all post-buyout years examined. The Spearman 
rank order correlations show that discretionary total accruals and changes in performance 
have a significant relationship. The regression analysis confirms that discretionary accruals 
can explain the post-buyout performance changes. The results of this study suggest that 
performance improvements in buyouts may not be solely due to superior organisational 
structure and value-adding strategies implemented following the transaction. 
6.1.3 Earnings Management, Sources of Management Buyouts and Secondary MBO 
Exits 
Chapter 5 extends the prior work in Chapter 4 by investigating earnings management across 
different sources of buyouts and ownership structures amongst them. We examine public, 
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private and divisional MBOs as well as MBI deals and secondary MBO transactions. The 
largest sample, private-to-private MBOs are further categorised based on their family and 
non-family ownership prior to buyout. The purpose of this study is to shed light on the 
agency forces in different governance structures that are likely to explain the reasons for 
undertaking an MBO. MBOs also present a unique opportunity to examine manager and 
owner relationships due to shifting roles of the parties. Various samples of buyouts are used 
to test earnings management. The ownership status of 229 private-to-private MBOs is 
identified. This sample includes 71 family and 158 non-family MBOs. In addition, we use 18 
public-to-private MBOs, 24 MBIs, 47 divisional and 138 secondary MBOs in the tests. 
The results suggest significant differences in earnings management practices of buyouts. 
Family owned private firms avoid earnings management in all tests while private non-family 
firms inflate earnings prior to MBO. Adoption of a different family definition and tests using 
ultimate ownership do not change the results. We find that in the context of private firms, 
differences exist along the lines of family and non-family businesses rather than other forms 
of ownership within these groups. The differences between family and non-family firms are 
significant. Contrary to existing evidence, we find that public-to-private MBOs do not 
manage earnings. We attribute this result to the presence of PE sponsors in the majority of 
going private deals. The results also suggest MBIs manage earnings upwards while divisional 
MBOs tend to manage earnings downwards prior to buyout. The difference between full and 
divisional MBOs is significant. The certification role of PE investors appears to change at the 
time of entry and exit transactions in line with their changing investor position. PE sponsors 
mitigate upwards earnings management in non-family firms at the time of entry while they 
tend to act opportunistically and overstate earnings prior to secondary MBO exits. Family 
firm tendencies are not related to the provision of PE sponsorship. Family businesses do not 
engage in earnings management whether they are backed by PE investors or not. In general, 
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this study suggests that considerable heterogeneity exists within different sources of buyouts. 
The findings are consistent with the family business literature (e.g., Chrisman et al., 2004; 
Howorth et al., 2004) that family firms suffer less agency problems and they are an important 
source of buyouts. Evidence from private non-family MBOs indicates that agency problems 
in prospective MBO firms are not limited to owners and managers. Instead, manager-on-
manager conflicts of interests also play an important role when ownership and control are not 
clearly separated. In contrast to public firms, where MBO team managers have the ability to 
act opportunistically to deflate earnings (Perry and Williams, 1994), MBO teams in private 
non-family firms exert less control over financial reporting. Also consistent with Chou et al. 
(2006) and Cao (2008), the results suggest that PE sponsors may engage in earnings 
management when they are under pressure to deliver returns to their limited partners. 
6.2 Managerial Implications 
This research contributes to the value creation debate around buyouts. Buyouts and buyout 
sponsors have a long history of public controversy. Ethical concerns about buyouts were 
raised as early as 1970s (e.g., Sommer, 1974) and the debate continues today after several 
high profile bankruptcies such as Southern Cross Care Homes and Phones 4u. We show that 
buyouts and buyout sponsors generate little value following MBO transaction. Buyouts 
largely sustain superior performance relative to industry; however, improvements relative to 
pre-buyout performance are small or non-existent. We also show that buyout performance 
has an earnings management component and post-buyout value gains or losses do not fully 
reflect operational activities. We acknowledge that the results are partly due to different 
nature of private-to-private buyouts and caution against generalisations. The implications for 
researchers, investors and regulators are threefold: First, buyout research should control for 
earnings management and selection components of performance; otherwise the value creation 
debate is likely to be based on biased parameters. Second, the targeted investment strategies 
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of PE firms and their subsequent inability to generate additional value raise questions about 
the role of PE sponsors in buyouts as well as sustainability of their investment strategies. 
Third, the prevalent practice of earnings management with the exception of family MBOs 
raises suspicions about the transparency of buyout deals, especially for private-to-private 
MBOs where deal pricing is based on private negotiations and little deal information is 
disclosed. Regulators and standard setters may need to consider imposing better disclosure 
requirements for this type of acquisitions.  
6.3 Further Research 
In this study, we examine performance and earnings management in the UK MBOs. This 
research can be extended in several ways. Below we discuss suggestions for future research. 
First, empirical chapters in this study cover a 9-year period at their longest point. The 
research might benefit from longer historical time series that cannot be obtained through 
available commercial databases. Proprietary datasets might be useful in this context. Second, 
this study examines only one MBO market. Future research can cover other active MBO 
markets where private company data is available. The markets with a strong family business 
culture can provide interesting extensions to this study. Third, early and mid-2000 years are 
heavily represented in our MBO samples. Most of these MBOs are likely to have been 
realised by an exit transaction around the latest financial downturn. Statistics suggest that the 
recent financial crisis provided the worst exit environment in the UK, with 157 of 245 buyout 
exits ending up in receivership in 2009 (CMBOR, 2010). The findings of our study also 
indicate that MBOs that aggressively manage earnings have poor post-buyout performance. 
Therefore, it would be interesting to know to what extent these failed MBOs engage in 
earnings management prior to initial buyout. Fourth, the implications of earnings 
management on MBO survival would offer additional insights into value creation in buyouts 
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both in the light of recent exit environment and in general context. To our knowledge, no 
study has examined the relation between earnings management and MBO survival. Fifth, a 
significant number of MBOs are sourced from family businesses that aim to sustain the 
family reputation and culture. Future research can shed more light on the family firm 
behaviour both before and after MBO. This can provide significant contributions to the 
mainly agency theory oriented MBO literature. 
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